Coin-Operated Capitalism by Cohney, Shaanan et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 




University of Pennsylvania 
David A. Hoffman 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Jeremy Sklaroff 
University of Pennsylvania 
David A. Wishnick 
University of Pennsylvania - Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Contracts Commons, Corporate 
Finance Commons, Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons, Internet Law Commons, 
Law and Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, 
and the Technology and Innovation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Cohney, Shaanan; Hoffman, David A.; Sklaroff, Jeremy; and Wishnick, David A., "Coin-Operated Capitalism" 
(2019). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2027. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2027 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 




Shaanan Cohney,* David Hoffman,**  
Jeremy Sklaroff *** & David Wishnick ****  
This Article presents the legal literature’s first detailed analysis of 
the inner workings of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). We characterize the 
ICO as an example of financial innovation, placing it in kinship with 
venture capital contracting, asset securitization, and (obviously) the 
IPO. We also take the form seriously as an example of technological 
innovation, in which promoters are beginning to effectuate their promises 
to investors through computer code, rather than traditional contract. 
To understand the dynamics of this shift, we first collect contracts, 
“whitepapers,” and other disclosures for the fifty top-grossing ICOs of 
2017. We then analyze how the software code controlling the projects’ 
ICOs reflected (or failed to reflect) their disclosures. Our inquiry reveals 
that many ICOs failed even to promise that they would protect investors 
against insider self-dealing. Fewer still manifested such promises in code. 
Surprisingly, in a community known for espousing a technolibertarian 
belief in the power of “trustless trust” built with carefully designed code, a 
significant fraction of issuers retained centralized control through 
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previously undisclosed code permitting modification of the entities’ 
governing structures. 
These findings offer valuable lessons to legal scholars, economists, 
and policymakers about the roles played by gatekeepers, the value of 
regulation, and the possibilities for socially valuable private ordering in 
a relatively anonymous, decentralized environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If you believe what you read on social media, the world of venture 
finance is undergoing a sea change. Old institutions like banks and 
venture capital firms are finding themselves supplanted by masses of 
individuals coordinating through new financial platforms.1 Excessively 
compensated elites are on the outs. They are being replaced—so say the 
believers—by equity crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending, and the wisdom 
of the crowd.2 The rise of the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is a chapter in 
this story, and this Article’s subject.3 
Obviously, the ICO was named after the IPO, or “Initial Public 
Offering.” But though the IPO has been familiar for almost a century, the 
ICO is exotic. Unlike its namesake, an ICO does not typically involve the 
sale of equity in (or governance rights pertaining to) a corporation.4 
Instead, ICO participants buy an asset—a “token”—that enables its 
holder to use or govern a network that the promoters plan to develop 
with the funds raised through the sale.5 It would be as if Coca-Cola had 
funded its initial deployment of vending machines through the sale of 
tokens its machines might one day require. The token holders’ interests 
would have been imperfectly aligned with the interests of investors who 
owned shares in Coca-Cola, Inc. Rather than caring about share value, 
they would have cared about token value, which would relate to the 
supply of the tokens and demand for vended Coke. 
For this hypothetical Coca-Cola, it’s easy to imagine physical tokens 
and real vending machines. But for ICOs, the tokens and the “machines” 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See, e.g., Chance Barnett, Trends Show Crowdfunding to Surpass VC After 2016, 
Medium: Startup Grind (July 22, 2016), https://medium.com/startup-grind/trends-show-
crowdfunding-to-surpass-vc-in-2016-65df924d8a82 [https://perma.cc/2BUP-EDFP] (“[H]igh 
growth entrepreneurs . . . have more sources and channels for finding capital than they’ve 
ever had.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Olav Sorenson, Valentina Assenova, Guan-Cheng Li, Jason Boada & Lee 
Fleming, Expanded Innovation Finance via Crowdfunding, 354 Science 1526, 1526 (2016) 
(finding that crowdfunding has channeled capital to innovators outside the traditional ambit of 
venture capital financing). 
 3. For an introduction to the law, economics, and sociology of peer-to-peer, networked 
culture, see generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production 
Transforms Markets and Freedom (2006). Finance, too, is entwined with the emerging 
networked mode of information production. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology 
and Securities Regulation, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 977, 997–1020 (2015); Kathryn Judge, The 
Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer Lending and Kickstarter, 50 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 603, 613–21 (2015); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 
2.0, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 202–05 (2012). One goal of this Article is to place questions about 
the culture and economics of networked information production on the one hand, and finance 
on the other, within a common frame. 
 4. Here, as elsewhere, this Article makes general claims in the text but acknowledges 
exceptions in the footnotes. For instance, ICOs can involve the sale of equity, but it is rare. 
See infra note 209. 
 5. While an ICO can occur after a network has been built, the core practice is to 
raise funds predevelopment. See infra sections II.A–.B. 
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they operate are digital. They exist on the internet, embodied in software 
code. The key forms of software are known as “smart contracts”—
automated, “if-this-then-that” rules that coders can design to govern the 
functionality of the digital “crypto” assets sold in ICOs.6 
Smart contracts may be digital and automated, but they help structure 
real-world relationships. At present, relationships between ICO promoters 
and token buyers are quite nebulous.7 Imagine that those Coca-Cola 
token investors lacked established legal means to enforce any promises 
made by Coca-Cola, Inc., cap the supply of tokens, require the use of 
those tokens to buy Coca-Cola from vending machines, limit sales of 
Coca-Cola through non-vending-machine channels, or even deploy 
machines at all. That scenario roughly captures the state of ICO legal 
contracting and governance today. This is a financial form ripe for fraud, 
and it has allegedly been used to that precise end.8 
But fraud also went hand-in-hand with early financial markets;9 its 
presence settles little about the fate of the ICO form. According to some, 
the ICO is an innovative, low-cost method to raise capital and enables a 
widened range of potential investors to support the development of new, 
software-based enterprises.10 In 2017—the year that ICOs entered popular 
                                                                                                                           
 6. Smart contracts were first introduced by Nick Szabo, who drew inspiration from 
the “humble vending machine.” Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on 
Public Networks, First Monday (Sept. 1, 1997), https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/ 
fm/article/view/548/469 [https://perma.cc/KKT6-9PHC]. 
 7. See Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)—What to Know Now and Time-Tested Tips for 
Investors, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/initial-coin-
offerings-what-to-know [https://perma.cc/3J2N-MLHN] (last updated Aug. 16, 2018) 
(“ICO promoters and issuers may be offering the tokens or coins to investors without 
typical disclosures and customer access to documents required by U.S. regulators like the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that help investors make an informed 
investment decision.”). 
 8. Shane Shifflett & Coulter Jones, Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wannabes 
Show Hallmarks of Fraud, Wall St. J. (May 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-
beware-hundreds-of-bitcoin-wannabes-show-hallmarks-of-fraud-1526573115 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (finding that approximately 20% of ICOs examined by the 
authors have red flags, including plagiarism in their whitepapers, false promises of returns, 
and fake founder profiles); cf. John M. Griffin & Amin Shams, Is Bitcoin Really Un-tethered? 4 
(June 13, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3195066 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that 50% of the rise in Bitcoin price and 64% of rise in 
other top cryptocurrency prices between March 2017 and March 2018 can be explained as 
the product of timed market manipulation). 
 9. See, e.g., Ian Klaus, Forging Capitalism: Rogues, Swindlers, Frauds, and the Rise 
of Modern Finance 39–47 (2014) (recounting successful trades at the London Stock 
Exchange in February 1814 based on falsified reports of Napoleon’s death). 
 10. See Nathaniel Popper, Easiest Path to Riches on the Web? An Initial Coin 
Offering, N.Y. Times: DealBook (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/ 
business/dealbook/coin-digital-currency.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
[hereinafter Popper, Easiest Path]. Nathaniel Popper, an excellent observer of this market 
at its inception, wrote generally on the bitcoin phenomenon before it reached a wide 
audience. See Nathaniel Popper, Digital Gold: Bitcoin and the Inside Story of the Misfits 
and Millionaires Trying to Reinvent Money (2015) [hereinafter Popper, Digital Gold]. 
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consciousness11—453 ICOs raised an estimated $6.58 billion.12 By July 1, 
2018, an additional 684 ICOs had raised an estimated $17.47 billion.13 Yet 
only a few months later, ICO project valuations were at fractions of 
previous years’ highs, causing some analysts to proclaim a “crypto 
winter.”14 
Twenty-four billion dollars raised over eighteen months is not chump 
change, but Facebook raised sixteen billion dollars in one day with its 
2012 IPO.15 Though one might not jump to read an entire law review 
article about Facebook’s IPO, an article about the strange world of public 
coin offerings may present a more compelling proposition. Indeed, an 
inquiry into ICOs could be fascinating even if (perhaps especially if) the 
entire ICO market were to dry up tomorrow. 
As we aim to show, ICOs have much to teach us about the uneasy 
relationships between law and technology in our present moment.16 To 
students of capital markets, the interest should be obvious. One basic 
question about our new financial contracting world is simple: How are 
                                                                                                                           
 11. See, e.g., Laura Shin, Here’s the Man Who Created ICOs and This Is the New 
Token He’s Backing, Forbes (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/ 
2017/09/21/heres-the-man-who-created-icos-and-this-is-the-new-token-hes-backing/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z8K8-462P] (identifying 2017 as the year ICOs became a “runaway trend”). 
 12. Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, CoinSchedule, https://www.coinschedule.com/ 
stats.html?year=2017 [https://perma.cc/HGB2-MG4P] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). This 
Article will later address the difficulties of calculating accurate network values. See infra 
note 293. Solely to ease exposition, this Article will generally use market values (in U.S. 
dollars) reported by widely used coin-data sites. 
 13. See Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2018, CoinSchedule, https://www.coinschedule.com/ 
stats.html?year=2018 [https://perma.cc/39GY-6C23] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (summing 
data for months January through June). 
 14. Charles Bovaird, What Will It Take to Thaw the Crypto Winter?, Forbes (Dec. 13, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2018/12/13/what-will-it-take-to-thaw-the-
crypto-winter/ [https://perma.cc/FVY4-TRT3] (“The market for [ICO]s, in particular, 
has been hard-hit . . . . Many of the companies that held these token sales in 2017, a time 
when the entire market was arguably suffering from ICO mania, have been encountering 
serious challenges.”); Samantha Chang, ICO Market Is Dead: Crypto Investor Barry 
Silbert, CCN (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/ico-market-is-dead-crypto-investor-
barry-silbert/ [https://perma.cc/VS38-5ZT4] (quoting Barry Silbert’s assertion that 
“[t]he ICO market is dead—over” (internal quotation marks omitted)) 
 15. See Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Eavis, Facebook Raises $16 Billion in I.P.O., N.Y. 
Times: DealBook (May 17, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/facebook-
raises-16-billion-in-i-p-o/ [https://perma.cc/V47G-6VJN]. 
 16. We join a nascent literature on this topic. See generally Iris M. Barsan, Legal 
Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings, 3 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier [RTDF] 54 
(2017); Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 679 (2019) [hereinafter 
Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain]; Kevin Werbach, Trust but Verify: Why the Blockchain 
Needs the Law, 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 487 (2018) [hereinafter Werbach, Trust but Verify]; Dirk 
A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Linus Föhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, 
It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators (Univ. du Lux. Law Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 2017-011, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3072298 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (noting severe disclosure failures in a global and rapidly growing market). 
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investors protected from exploitation?17 For regulators, scholars, and 
investors this issue is an increasingly pressing one. As of early 2019, 
government agencies at both the federal and state levels have launched 
ICO investigations, and multiple firms have been charged as fraudulent 
or criminal enterprises.18 Even blockchain technologists admit that ICOs 
                                                                                                                           
 17. Cf. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 Minn. 
L. Rev. 561, 587–603 (2015) (describing and dismissing worries that crowdfunding markets 
might be dominated by low-quality startups with few ways for investors to distinguish better 
ones from the pack). 
 18. See In re Coinalpha Advisors LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10582, 2018 WL 
6433070, at *2 (Dec. 7, 2018) (charging a digital asset investment fund with violation of 
Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act); News Release, Colo. Dep’t of Regulatory 
Agencies, Two Companies Promoting Cryptocurrencies Under Scrutiny by Colorado 
Securities Commissioner 1 (May 3, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(announcing orders against two ICO teams for potentially violating Colorado securities 
laws); Press Release, N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass’n, NASAA Updates Coordinated Crypto 
Crackdown (Aug. 28, 2018), http://www.nasaa.org/45901/nasaa-updates-coordinated-
crypto-crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/4SRN-ENC7] (noting a coordinated enforcement 
effort by state regulators against ICOs and cryptoassets, resulting in 200 active 
investigations and 46 enforcement actions); Press Release, N.D. Sec. Dep’t, Securities 
Commissioner Issues Orders Against 3 More Companies Promoting Initial Coin Offerings 
in North Dakota (Oct 11, 2018), http://www.nd.gov/securities/news/news-archive/ 
securities-commissioner-issues-orders-against-3-more-companies-promoting-initial [https:// 
perma.cc/8Y2W-PV75] (announcing charges against three ICO teams for “promoting 
unregistered and potentially fraudulent securities in North Dakota”); Press Release, SEC, 
SEC Charges EtherDelta Founder with Operating an Unregistered Exchange (Nov. 8, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-258 [https://perma.cc/3ZU9-X747] 
(discussing charges against the operator of a cryptoasset exchange that facilitates ICO 
token sales); Press Release, SEC, SEC Halts Fraudulent Scheme Involving Unregistered 
ICO (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-53 [https://perma.cc/ 
LZ3N-Q2BG] (announcing the charging of “two co-founders of a purported financial 
services start-up with orchestrating a fraudulent” ICO “that raised more than $32 million 
from thousands of investors last year”); Press Release, SEC, Two Celebrities Charged with 
Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2018-268 [https://perma.cc/9MFW-QK8B] (discussing charges against music 
producer DJ Khaled and boxer Floyd Mayweather Jr. with unlawfully concealing payments 
they received for promoting ICO tokens); Press Release, SEC, Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC 
Registration Charges, Agree to Register Tokens as Securities (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-264 [https://perma.cc/7BN8-QN29] (discussing 
orders entered against the Airfox and Paragon ICO teams for sales of unregistered 
securities); Press Release, Tex. State Sec. Bd., $4 Billion Crypto-Promoter Ordered to Halt 
Fraudulent Sales (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/4-billion-
crypto-promoter-ordered-halt-fraudulent-sales [https://perma.cc/SCN5-F6FC] (noting 
that the Texas Securities Commissioner entered an “Emergency Cease and Desist Order to 
halt the multiple investment programs operated by BitConnect, an overseas company that 
claims a market share of $4.1 billion for its cryptocurrency coins”). For a broader 
discussion of legal risks accompanying ICOs, see generally Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, 
Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public 
Capital Markets 97 (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 527, 2018), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=3048104 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing risk of fraud and abuse). 
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as a form of fundraising suffer credibility problems, as many projects have 
still not delivered functional products.19 
Less obviously, an understanding of the ICO experience can also 
inform debates about the digital future of capitalism.20 ICOs represent the 
increasing financialization of internet-based peer production, and they 
also reflect the informational ecosystem the internet has wrought. The 
legal system’s interactions with these trends are on display in what follows. 
This Article is built around a survey of the 50 ICOs that raised the 
most capital in 2017 and the role that computer code plays in structuring 
them. The presence of a cryptoasset at the heart of an offering enables 
entrepreneurs to deliver investor protections through computer code, 
rather than through legalistic means. This technological capacity was 
central to the ideological and practical case advanced by the 
entrepreneurs who engaged in ICOs. In the 2017 market, founders spoke 
of automated, “[d]ynamic [c]eiling[s]” for cryptoasset supply;21 of placing 
founders’ cryptoasset allocations in “time-locked smart contracts” to 
align incentives for productivity;22 and of replacing trusted parties with 
decentralized and verifiable computation.23 We take an initial look at 
examples of smart contract design to establish that code does have the 
potential to become either a substitute for or a complement to old-
fashioned legal governance in financial contracting. 
But potential is not “reality,” and this study shows just how far code 
falls short of expectations for the top 50 ICOs of 2017. We analyze the 
relationship between the “paper” promises made by ICO promoters in 
their offering documents and the actual functionality of the digital assets 
they deliver. This Article establishes actual functionality by examining the 
                                                                                                                           
 19. See Bovaird, supra note 14 (“Some have criticized the methods used in these 
token sales, which have frequently involved nothing more than . . . [an] idea outlined in a 
white paper.”); see also Rocco, Futility Tokens: A Utility-Based Post-Mortem, Token Econ. (Oct. 
9, 2018), https://tokeneconomy.co/futility-tokens-a-utility-based-post-mortem-d7b1712a5a4e 
[https://perma.cc/2KW2-4V7K] (dissecting ICO tokens offered by various projects and 
finding that many could never have supported their touted functionality while generating 
a profit); Nathaniel Whittlemore, Crypto Narrative Watch: Crypto Winter Edition, Token 
Econ. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://tokeneconomy.co/crypto-narrative-watch-crypto-winter-
edition-bf1cf584def2 [https://perma.cc/CAE2-HH38] (noting that many ICO teams 
promised their tokens would eventually provide specific functions, but that such 
functionality was still missing as of late 2018). 
 20. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 
Theoretical Inquiries L. 369, 375 (2016) (“Emerging, nontraditional regulatory models 
have tended to be both opaque to external observation and highly prone to capture. New 
institutional forms that might ensure their legal and political accountability have been 
slow to develop.”). 
 21. The Status Network: A Strategy Towards Mass Adoption of Ethereum, Status 
(June 15, 2017), https://status.im/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z233-EPQT]. 
 22. Terms of Token Sale, Storj Labs (BVI) Ltd. 14, https://storj.io/sale-terms.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G37K-97S4] (last updated May 18, 2017). 
 23. See Protocol Labs, Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network 8 (2017), 
https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL5G-CATU]. 
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smart contracts associated with each ICO, along with the broader 
software environments through which those smart contracts 
function.(These are known as “distributed ledgers” or “blockchains,” 
which we discuss further below.) Through careful auditing of the gap 
between what ICOs promise and what their code delivers, we aim to 
present coin offerings at a deeper level of institutional detail than is 
currently present in the literature. Indeed, though legal scholars have 
begun writing about smart contracts in theory, we are the first to take 
smart contracts seriously as real-world objects of study.24 
We evaluate our sample on three aspects of governance that ICO 
proponents have claimed can be delivered through code and which 
economic theory suggests should be salient to ICO investors. First, did 
ICO promoters make any promises (and encode those assurances) to 
restrict the supply of their cryptoassets? Second, did ICO promoters 
pledge (and build their promises into smart contracts) to restrict the 
transfer of any cryptoassets allocated to insiders according to a vesting or 
lock-up plan? Third, did ICO promoters use code to retain the power to 
modify the smart contracts governing the tokens they sold, and if so, did 
they disclose (in natural language) that they had allocated themselves 
that power? Credible commitments regarding these salient cryptoasset 
qualities should matter to an investor interested in the economic 
fundamentals of an ICO. 
Our basic finding is that ICO code and ICO disclosures often do not 
match. In a financial ecosystem built around the proposition that regulation 
is unnecessary because code is the final guarantee of performance, the 
absence of coded governance protections is troubling. We also show that 
at least some popular ICOs have retained the power to modify their 
tokens’ rights but have failed to disclose that ability in plain English. 
One takeaway is that no one reads smart contracts,25 making them a 
rickety wheel on the ICO investment vehicle. Why might this be, and how 
significant is it? In evaluating our findings, we consider a few potential 
explanations for the mismatches between code and disclosure that we 
observe. We ultimately conclude that while the disjunct is troubling, the 
normative implications of our project will turn on learning more about 
who buys ICOs and why.26 
                                                                                                                           
 24. See generally Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 Law & Soc’y 
Rev. 91 (2003) (articulating a research agenda examining contractual artifacts as such). 
For two excellent primers on smart contracts, see generally Primavera De Filippi & Aaron 
Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code 72–88 (2018); Kevin Werbach & 
Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 Duke L.J. 313 (2017). 
 25. The obvious allusion is to ordinary contractual fine print. Cf. Yannis Bakos, 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? 
Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2014) (finding 
vanishingly low reading rates for end-user license agreements). 
 26. We hasten to add that the ICO is not inherently a scam: Economic theorists have 
recently begun developing models that show the potential for cryptoassets to unlock 
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We proceed as follows. Part I provides clear and precise definitions 
of various aspects of ICO machinery. It also presents the history of 
various components: cryptocurrencies, blockchain-based networks, smart 
contracts, and ICO technology. Part II describes the three ways that we 
evaluate the quality of an ICO’s paper–code match and offers an 
introduction to the mechanisms by which tokens can vouch for quality. 
Part III presents the methods of our empirical study. It describes our 
sources, collections, coding, and smart contract audit procedures. Part IV 
offers evidence that the ICO market does not vet smart contract code for 
the qualities we have identified and offers theories as to why. It also 
suggests how researchers could help regulators and lawmakers in better 
understanding and overseeing this new business form. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO TOKENS 
To set the stage for our analysis of ICO quality—and our premortem 
on the current market’s pathologies—this Part presents an operational 
account of ICO components and mechanics. 
A. From Debt and Equity to Native Coin 
Consider a group of entrepreneurs who want to create a soda company. 
Though they have an amazing recipe, they lack sufficient seed capital to 
quit their day jobs and market their soda to the world. To access the 
traditional capital markets, they might form a corporation and seek a 
business loan, or perhaps a few rounds of private venture capital funding. 
If successful, they might then choose to issue shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). In exchange for payment of a price (in dollars) set by 
investment bankers through careful underwriting, the team would part 
with shares of its company. The purchasers of those shares would then 
possess a bundle of rights to govern the corporation, along with residual 
claims on its assets in proportion to the number of shares they own. Once 
built, the corporation could charge its customers in dollars, pay its 
                                                                                                                           
information and value for investors during the early stages of an entrepreneurial venture. 
See Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Initial Coin Offerings and the Value of Crypto 
Tokens 2–5 (MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5347-18, 2018), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3137213 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Sabrina Howell, Marina Niessner 
& David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token 
Sales 1 (NBER Working Paper No. 24774, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24774 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Thomas Bourveau, Emmanuel T. De George, Atif 
Ellahie & Daniele Macciocchi, Initial Coin Offerings: Early Evidence on the Role of 
Disclosure in the Unregulated Crypto Market 5 (July 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193392 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding a 
measure of disclosure is correlated with market values). But see Eric Budish, The 
Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain 5–11 (NBER Working Paper No. 24717, 
2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24717 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(arguing that if bitcoin were an economically important store of value, it would be 
hacked). 
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employees and suppliers in the same, and then distribute the leftovers to 
its shareholders. 
The new world of coin-based finance looks different from this 
traditional model. Instead of issuing contractual claims on the assets of a 
legal entity (in the form of debt or equity), the team might now issue a 
token—call it Colacoin—that it promises will be the only way to buy sodas 
from its (yet to be deployed) vending machines.27 The team could also 
pledge that possession of Colacoins would enable their holders to vote 
on proposed alterations to the vending machine’s prices. Further, they 
could even commit to paying suppliers—bottling companies, truckers, 
lawyers who work for them—in Colacoin. If, and as long as, the 
dehydrated people of the world want access to machine-vended cola, 
then Colacoin will hold value. And if Colacoin is easily exchangeable for 
dollars, then the nascent company’s truckers and lawyers will not mind 
receiving their initial payments in a strange currency. Replace Coca-Cola 
with a software-based venture (like a file-sharing service or a platform for 
streaming video), and Colacoin with a cryptoasset, and you have an ICO. 
Obviously, the scenarios differ in a few ways. First, they diverge in terms 
of how they allocate claims on the entrepreneurs’ business. Traditional 
capital markets require business owners to contractually divest themselves 
of various rights over their corporation’s assets.28 In contrast, the ICO 
method can leave economic ownership and legal control unencumbered.29 
Second, they vary in their source of value. While stock prices should 
reflect the net present value of the legal rights to the company’s expected 
future cash flows,30 cryptoasset pricing should reflect an equilibrium 
between token demand, which is driven by the present value of expected 
future use and exchange options within the token’s native ecosystem, and 
token supply, which is driven by the token’s monetary policy.31 
                                                                                                                           
 27. To users, Colacoin thus resembles the coupons, scrips, airmiles, and other cash 
substitutes that merchants have employed throughout the past century and a half. See 
Norman I. Silber & Steven Stites, Merchant Authorized Consumer Cash Substitutes 1–2 
(Hofstra Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2018-03, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3161453 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Coca-Cola 
offered a coupon redeemable for one glass of soda as early as 1887. See id. at 2. 
 28. See, e.g., Ivo Welch, Corporate Finance 4–5 (4th ed. 2017) (discussing tradeoffs 
between various contractual methods of financing). 
 29. See Balaji S. Srinivasan, Thoughts on Tokens, Earn.com (May 27, 2017), 
https://news.earn.com/thoughts-on-tokens-436109aabcbe [https://perma.cc/D7RJ-8DJW]. 
Clearly, when a token provides rights to purchasers to use a future service, the owner is, in 
a sense, encumbered. The effect is similar to an airline being encumbered by its loyal 
customers’ airmiles. We mean that tokens do not typically divide the formal rights of 
ownership into pieces. 
 30. See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for 
Determining the Value of Any Asset 11–19 (3d ed. 2012). 
 31. Work on cryptoasset valuation is in its early stages. See, e.g., Chris Burniske & Jack 
Tatar, Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor’s Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond 171–84 (2017) 
(suggesting cryptoasset valuation models); Catalini & Gans, supra note 26, at 3–5; Aswath 
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Third, the infrastructure of capital markets enables vetting, trading, 
and liquidity in established ways. A mighty edifice of regulation and 
institutional capital stands behind each issuance: Investors know, or at 
least have the tools to inform themselves about, what they are getting. By 
contrast, cryptomarkets are new, their players mere years or months old.32 
No Wall Street investment bank has backed an ICO.33 Indeed, the absence 
of ICO-specific regulation and intermediaries is seen to be a feature, not 
a bug, by many enthusiasts.34 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly to our lawyer-readers, ICOs 
expand the role played by computer code in governing transactional 
relationships. Traditional capital-market transactions are heavily mediated 
                                                                                                                           
Damodaran, The Bitcoin Boom: Asset, Currency, Commodity, or Collectible?, Musings on 
Mkts. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-bitcoin-
boom-asset-currency.html [https://perma.cc/GXF2-ZTU3] (suggesting that cryptoassets 
share characteristics with both currencies and commodities). For recent empirical work on 
cryptoasset valuation, see generally Hugo Benedetti & Leonard Kostovetsky, Digital Tulips? 
Returns to Investors in Initial Coin Offerings (May 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182169 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that 
ICO underpricing is driving by Twitter followers and activity); Bourveau et al., supra note 
26 (examining the the effects of disclosures on market quality for ICOs); Jongsub Lee, Tao 
Li & Donghwa Shin, The Wisdom of Crowds and Information Cascades in FinTech: 
Evidence From Initial Coin Offers (Sept. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=3195877 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that analyst 
ratings are associated with increased value); Christian Masiak, Jorn H. Block, Tobias 
Masiak, Matthias Neuenkirch & Katja Pielen, The Market Cycles of ICOs, Bitcoin, and 
Ether (July 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198694 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that ICO prices interact with the prices of 
bitcoin and ether); Paul Momtaz, Putting Numbers on the Coins: The Pricing and 
Performance of Initial Coin Offerings (May 27, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169682 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that 
ICOs are systematically underpriced, but that long-term performance is mixed); Lauren 
Rhue, Trust Is All You Need: An Empirical Exploration of Initial Coin Offers (ICOs) and 
ICO Reputation Scores (May 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3179723 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that reputation scores 
from rating sites are not very well correlated with each other or with value, but hype and 
internet buzz are correlated with value). 
 32. See, e.g., Darryn Pollock, How Binance Conquered the Cryptocurrency World with Help 
of a Utility Token, Forbes (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrynpollock/ 
2018/10/08/how-binance-conquered-the-cryptocurrency-world-on-the-back-of-a-utility-token/ 
[https://perma.cc/FH5P-N29X] (describing the rapid rise of Binance, which was 
established in 2017). 
 33. While venture capitalists have taken cryptoassets into their portfolios, see infra 
section IV.B.4, that is not the same as the underwriting function performed by investment 
banks in the traditional capital markets. For a model describing when venturers will turn 
to traditional capital sources instead of ICOs, see generally Jiri Chod & Evgeny Lyandres, A 
Theory of ICOs: Diversification, Agency, and Information Failure (July 18, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159528 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 34. See Jesse Powell, Kraken’s Position on Regulation, Kraken (Apr. 22, 2018), 
https://blog.kraken.com/post/1561/krakens-position-on-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/X3NC-
G9AL] (arguing that regulatory action “doesn’t matter to most crypto traders”). 
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by laws, regulations, contracts, and social norms.35 ICO transactions augment, 
and perhaps replace, those mediators by embedding controls within the 
smart contracts through which rules function.36 At the same time, they also 
create new roles for lawyers and other legal-adjacent personnel. 
The Colacoin clearly would be a far more experimental way to raise 
capital for the underlying soda company than through the sale of debt or 
equity.37 Yet despite their differences, the scenarios share something at a 
particular level of abstraction: The value of debt, equity, and Colacoin 
tokens all depend heavily on the success of the entrepreneurial team in 
building and attracting customers to the product. 
B. Understanding Cryptoassets 
A working conception of ICOs begins with the cryptoassets—the digital 
coins and tokens—at the center of the operation. Like a physical coin, a 
cryptoasset is scarce and control over it is transferable. But while physical 
coins are transmitted hand-to-hand (or hand-to-machine), changes in 
control of cryptoassets occur through the networks that host them (via the 
transfer of a digital key).38 Indeed, a cryptoasset is nothing more than an 
entry in a ledger that specifies that a particular user, identified by a certain 
“private key” (essentially, a fancy password) is the sole party able to 
exercise a discrete set of powers associated with the ledger entry. While 
their private keys might travel hand-to-hand in the physical world, the 
actual cryptoasset is destined to remain a mere ledger entry, forever 
locked inside its “native” protocol.39 
                                                                                                                           
 35. Though market fundamentalists might occasionally forget this, it is essential to 
any understanding of the contemporary economy. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal, Laws of 
Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 652 (2014) (reviewing Thomas Piketty, Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century (2014)) (“Capitalism is fundamentally a legal ordering: the bargains 
at the heart of capitalism are products of law.”); Katherina Pistor, A Legal Theory of 
Finance, 41 J. Comp. Econ. 315, 315 (2013) (“[L]aw and finance are locked into a 
dynamic process in which the rules that establish the game are continuously challenged by 
new contractual devices, which in turn seek legal vindication.”). 
 36. This places them in the tradition of code-based controls studied most closely in 
the context of intellectual property. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed 
Copyright Enforcement, 95 Geo. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing this in the context of 
copyright enforcement). 
 37. Cryptoasset sales can be viewed as a new strategy for “decoupling” economic 
ownership from the control of business ventures that Henry Hu has documented. See 
Henry T.C. Hu, Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of 
Decoupling and Transparency, 70 Bus. Law. 347, 351, 354–63 (2015). 
 38. See Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman & Tyler Moore, Bitcoin: 
Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J. Econ. Persp. 213, 213 (2015). Network 
communication protocols are the linguistic conventions that enable transmissions of 
intelligible information between participants in a network. See generally Andrew S. 
Tannenbaum & David J. Wetherall, Computer Networks 29–40, 75–81 (5th ed. 2011). 
 39. By this we mean that the cryptoasset is never itself transferred. While the record 
denoting its ownership may be modified, the asset is doomed to remain but an abstraction 
represented within the ledger on which it originated. 
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Cryptoasset history begins with Bitcoin currency and the Bitcoin 
ledger (also known as a “blockchain”).40 Prior to their advent, money was 
either held in physical form (for example, coins or paper notes) or on 
the ledger of a centralized intermediary (for example, bank deposits or 
PayPal balances).41 Bitcoin is the first significant digital currency system 
that needs no centralized intermediary to maintain proper books.42 The 
key to the ledger’s design—and that of the public blockchain-based 
systems in its wake—is how it maintains a trustworthy record of 
ownership rights. Rather than being centralized within a single firm, the 
Bitcoin ledger is replicated and distributed across a network of computers 
that communicate with each other via the internet.43 These computers 
are called “nodes.”44 When a holder of bitcoins distributes a message to 
the network’s nodes asking to transmit some bitcoins to another user, the 
transactors need not rely on the trustworthiness of any actor in the 
system to revise their copy of the ledger appropriately.45 Rather, they rely on 
economic incentives and code-based controls that govern the nodes’ 
behavior to ensure that all copies of the ledger are updated identically.46 
The shift toward a broad range of blockchain-based business plans was 
realized in another network: Ethereum. The designers of Ethereum 
produced a general-purpose computational system that operates through 
a public blockchain.47 To perform computations on this decentralized 
“world computer,” users must pay a per-function fee of “ether”—a “gas” 
charge—which functions as Ethereum’s currency.48 As a result, the value 
of ether depends significantly on the supply of, and demand for, 
                                                                                                                           
 40. On the prehistory and history of Bitcoin, see generally Arvind Narayanan & Jeremy 
Clark, Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree, ACM Queue (Aug. 29, 2017), https://queue.acm.org/ 
detail.cfm?ref=rss&id=3136559 [https://perma.cc/ZA6A-BJL9]; Popper, Digital Gold, supra note 
10. 
 41. See Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 58 
(2016) (distinguishing between certificated and uncertificated forms of money). 
 42. See generally De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24, at 61–71; Kevin Werbach, 
Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust (2018). 
 43. See Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller & Steven 
Goldfeder, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies 27–50 (2016); Böhme et al., supra 
note 38, at 216. 
 44. Narayanan et al., supra note 43, at 7–10. 
 45. See Werbach, Trust but Verify, supra note 16, at 512–13. 
 46. See id. This reliance on incentives and code-based controls, rather than social 
control mechanisms like law and norms, was a central objective of early cryptocurrency 
visionaries. See Popper, Digital Gold, supra note 10, at 119–20. But it does not mean that 
Bitcoin is necessarily impossible to hack. See Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer, Majority Is Not 
Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable, Comm. ACM, July 2018, at 95, 95. 
 47. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 24, at 333–35; Rohr & Wright, supra note 18, 
at 19. 
 48. Ethereum Whitepaper: A Next Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized 
Application Platform, Github, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper 
[https://perma.cc/46KY-4V3W] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). The “gas” charged is proportional 
to the complexity of the computation requested. Id. 
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computational power active on the Ethereum system. One of the key 
reasons for Ethereum’s popularity is its support for snippets of computer 
code that interact with the ledger known as smart contracts.49 One can 
think of smart contracts as a prewritten set of system-performance rules. 
Just as legal contracts govern the allocation of paper money among 
transactors, smart contract code governs the transmission of ether, or 
other stored assets, among transactors on the Ethereum system.50 
To understand how Ethereum works, imagine that you drop a quarter 
into a vending machine slot and down falls a can of Coca-Cola. This 
“humble” mechanism serves as the inspiration for wide-ranging creativity 
on Ethereum, where smart contract engineers write scripts about how the 
system will behave in response to various inputs.51 These inputs might 
include basic information about where to send ether, and also more 
complex information, like data from a weather vane.52 Ether plays the 
role of both the vending machine’s quarters and its most important 
payload—the Coca-Cola of the system. Indeed, because ether acts as a 
decent (if volatile) currency, one can engage in smart contracting that 
attempts to mimic paper-age agreements for insurance,53 escrow,54 or 
even something akin to corporate formation.55 
To build increasingly complex and interoperating mechanisms 
within Ethereum, its community has begun developing standards—“fill 
                                                                                                                           
 49. See generally Karen E.C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based 
Smart Contracts and the Social Workings of Law, 3 Engaging Sci. Tech. & Soc’y 1 (2017); 
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 24; Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and 
the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263 (2017). 
 50. In most ways, calling these code snippets “contracts” is quite misleading, but we 
are stuck with the dominant terminology. For careful discussions, see generally J.G. Allen, 
Wrapped and Stacked: ‘Smart Contracts’ and the Interaction of Natural and Formal Language, 
14 Euro. Rev. Cont. L. 307 (2018); James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, 
J.L. & Innovation (forthcoming 2019) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 51. It also served as inspiration for Szabo’s initial coinage of the smart contract idea. 
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 52. That is, some device might transmit readable data to an Ethereum-based smart 
contract from the outside world—for instance, a website—via an “oracle.” See Fan Zhang, 
Ethan Cecchetti, Kyle Croman, Ari Juels & Elaine Shi, Town Crier: An Authenticated Data 
Feed for Smart Contracts, 2016 Proc. 2016 SIGSAC Conf. on Computer & Comm. Security 
270, 270; Houman Shadab, What Smart Contracts Need to Learn, Lawbitrage (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2014/09/smartcontracts.html [https://perma.cc/H8AD-
QAG9]. 
 53. See, e.g., AXA Beta, About Us, Fizzy, https://fizzy.axa/en-gb/faq [https://perma.cc/ 
EG6J-EHQT] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (describing an Ethereum-based flight insurance system). 
 54. See, e.g., LocalEthereum, How Our Escrow Smart Contract Works, LocalEthereum’s 
Blog (Oct. 26, 2017), https://blog.localethereum.com/how-our-escrow-smart-contract-
works/ [https://perma.cc/QSM3-Y56C]. 
 55. Attempt is a key word here: The leading example of a quasi-corporate form on the 
Ethereum blockchain was a smart contract known as “the DAO,” which failed spectacularly. See 
Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, supra note 16, at 697–708 (“The 2016 DAO is a cautionary 
tale about the limits of relying on a ‘code is law’ model when (as inevitably happens) gaps in the 
nexus of contracts emerge without a legal intervention point on which the law can work.”). 
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in the blank” templates that perform agreed-upon functions. One of 
those—standard “ERC-20”56—plays a large role in our story. It establishes 
a simple template to create (or “mint,” in crypto-lingo) and operate 
entirely new cryptoassets within the Ethereum system. This is what the 
description of the standard looks like in code: 














Creating a new cryptoasset typically requires a minimum of 
approximately fifty lines of code and three decision components: the asset’s 
name, its ticker symbol, and the number of units—or “tokens”—to mint. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 56. See Fabian Vogelsteller & Vitalik Buterin, ERC-20 Token Standard, GitHub, 
https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md [https://perma.cc/4GZA-
EFMP] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). The acronym “ERC” means “Ethereum Request for 
Comment.” Chris Dannen, Introducing Ethereum and Solidity: Foundations of Cryptocurrency 
and Blockchain Programming for Beginners 106 (2017). The “Request for Comment” is a form of 
memorandum used to draft networking protocols and standards, most prominently used by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force in designing core internet technologies. See RFC Editor, 
Informational RFC 5540: 40 Years of RFCs, Internet Eng’g Task Force (Apr. 7, 2009), 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5540 [https://perma.cc/RS4N-TU8F]. The Ethereum community 
has adopted this form of consensus-based standard to develop common design patterns for smart 
contracts. See Dannen, supra, at 111. 
 57. ERC20 Token Standard, Ethereum Wiki, https://theethereum.wiki/w/index.php/ 
ERC20_Token_Standard [https://perma.cc/8AXZ-LE4X] (last updated Dec. 4, 2018). A 
cryptoasset that meets the ERC-20 standard contains a block of code for each of the named 
functions and events above. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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C. ICOs Hit the Bigtime 
In 2014, Ethereum raised real money by selling ether to the public.58 
The next major ICO was Augur, which concluded in October 2015.59 The 
market grew slowly until 2017, when it hit the gas. 













                                                                                                                           
 58. Ethereum sold tokens directly to the unaccredited public but did not initially 
enable a secondary market. See Vitalik Buterin, Launching the Ether Sale, Ethereum Blog 
(July 22, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/launching-the-ether-sale/ 
[https://perma.cc/PK7W-XBMD] (stating, in the announcement of Ethereum’s ICO, that 
ether would be purchasable directly from the Ethereum website but would not 
immediately be usable or transferable). Some subsequent token sales have been private 
(sometimes called “presales”), see, e.g., Chloe Cornish & Richard Waters, Silicon Valley 
Investors Line Up to Back Telegram ICO, Fin. Times (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/790d9506-0175-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5 (on file with the Columbia Law Review), 
but the archetypal version is public—democratized, in the tradition of Kickstarter and 
other “peer-to-peer” financial platforms. See supra notes 3, 17 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Augur: Welcome to the Future of Forecasting, ICObench, https://icobench.com/ 
ico/augur [https://perma.cc/43KA-CNUW] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). Between the 
Ethereum ICO, which concluded in September 2014, and the Augur ICO, which 
concluded in October 2015, there were several small ICOs that raised under $2 million. 
See, e.g., ICOs and Crowdsales: Over $270 Million Raised and Counting, Smith & Crown (Dec. 1, 
2016), https://www.smithandcrown.com/icos-crowdsale-history/ [https://perma.cc/M66D-3H2T]. 
 60. This chart was prepared to illustrate general monthly trends in the number of 
ICOs launched during the period between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2018. The 
data underlying this chart—which excludes the DAO ICO in 2016—were collected from 
coinschedule.com as of December 31, 2018. Since December 31, 2018, coinschedule.com 
has made some minor classification and presentation changes to this data. These 
classification and presentation changes have resulted in deviations of less than 1% (on a 
total basis) from the data presented graphically herein. This holds for both the number of 
ICOs in the last three years (Figure 2) and the total amounts raised by ICOs in the last 
three years (Figure 3). For the most current data available from coinschedule.com, see Crypto 
Token Sales Market Statistics, CoinSchedule, www.coinschedule.com/stats.html [https:// 
perma.cc/W9T3-AZW9] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).  
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As the ICO market exploded so too did regulatory interest in its 
activities.62 Such scrutiny is no surprise: ICOs, like many internet-based 
phenomena before them, intentionally take place at the regulatory 
perimeter.63 They exploit a basic tension between the cross-jurisdictional 
and pseudonymous aspects of cryptocurrency transactions on the one 
hand and the objectives of regulators on the other.64 The question of just 
                                                                                                                           
 61. This chart was prepared to illustrate general monthly trends in the total funds 
raised by ICOs launched during the period between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 
2018. For further discussion of how this data set was obtained, see supra note 60. The 
spike in March 2018 represents when the EOS raise was realized in the dataset, though it 
occurred continuously before then. 
 62. See Alex Sunnarborg, The Incoming Wave of ICO Regulation (Yes, It’s Coming), 
Coindesk (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/the-incoming-wave-of-ico-regulation-
yes-its-coming [https://perma.cc/U3GZ-DFVW]. 
 63. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 383, 392–97 (2017) (defining “regulatory entrepreneurship” as a business 
activity in which legal uncertainty regarding a core aspect of the business necessitates that 
the business attempt to change or shape the law, and noting that “[r]egulatory 
entrepreneurship often happens when businesses are built upon new technology”); Tim 
Wu, Strategic Law Avoidance Using the Internet: A Short History, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
Postscript 7, 7 (2017), https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/2017/03/01/strategic-
law-avoidance-using-the-internet-a-short-history-postscript-response-by-tim-wu/ [https://perma.cc/ 
P6JS-KTK7] (stating that tech-sector entrepreneurs, starting in the late 1990s and continuing 
to the present, have recognized “that the Internet might provide profitable opportunities 
at the edges of the legal system”). 
 64. See, e.g., Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & Tālis J. Putniņš, Sex, Drugs, and 
Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, 33 Rev. Fin. 
Stud. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that 
approximately one half of bitcoin transactions are associated with illicit activity). 
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how significant the demand is for cryptoassets among money launderers 
and tax evaders is not one we answer here, but it sits as a backdrop to the 
inquiry that follows. 
In the traditional IPO context, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and state securities regulators oversee issuer activity 
from soup to nuts.65 They mandate registration of securities issuances, 
require pages and pages of disclosures over the life cycle of a security, 
restrict the trading activities of various parties, and possess myriad 
investigation and enforcement powers to effectuate their portfolio of 
laws and regulations.66 As of 2018, no similarly clear regime was in place 
for ICOs.67 In lieu of the heavily lawyered products of IPO documentation, 
the ICO market agreed upon a less formal document known as a 
“whitepaper.”68 
Like governmental and nonprofit whitepapers that seek to exemplify 
authoritative subject mastery while gesturing toward collaborative openness, 
cryptoasset whitepapers are public documents that describe promoters’ 
plans for development and solicit community involvement.69 Authoritative 
copies are typically available in PDF form on promoters’ websites and are 
provided through listing services like coinschedule.com. 70  This makes 
whitepapers a transparent form of investor information but obviates the 
need for outside vetting before they go live. 
                                                                                                                           
Unsurprisingly, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) is using its authority to combat money laundering and criminal activity 
involving cryptoassets. See Letter from Drew Maloney, Assistant Sec’y for Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to the Honorable Ron Wyden, Ranking Member, U.S. 
Senate Comm. on Fin. 1 (Feb. 13, 2018), https://coincenter.org/files/2018-03/fincen-ico-
letter-march-2018-coin-center.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P6B-K8VD] (stating that “[c]ombating 
the abuse of existing and emerging payment systems by illicit financiers”—including various 
cryptoasset-based systems—“is a priority issue for FinCEN”). 
 65. See What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https:// 
perma.cc/75DL-EUXT] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
 66. See id. 
 67. However, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has suggested that “tokens and offerings 
that feature and market the potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or 
managerial efforts of others contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.” Initial 
Coin Offerings (ICOs), SEC, https://www.sec.gov/ICO [https://perma.cc/835G-LQ8K] 
(last updated Feb. 22, 2019); see also Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 2017 
WL 7184670, at *1 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter Report of the DAO] (“[T]he Commission 
has determined that DAO Tokens are securities under the Securities Act of 1933 
(‘Securities Act’) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’).”). 
 68. See Barsan, supra note 16, at 54 (“Every ICO starts with a whitepaper, very similar 
to a prospectus, that describes the project and the rights given to investors.”). 
 69. Appendix C contains several examples of language obtained from these whitepapers. 
See Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated 
Capitalism—Appendix C: Individual ICO Claims (Apr. 2019), https://columbialawreview.org/ 
content/coin-operated-capitalism-appendix-c/   (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 
Appendix C]. 
 70. See id. 
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The legal status of whitepapers (and accompanying tweets, Medium 
posts, Reddit comments, and social media buzz) is unclear at best. 
Sometimes, whitepapers refer to—and embed—contractual terms and 
conditions of sale. 71  In such cases, they provide information about 
product attributes, which would function as contractual warranties. In 
other cases, they resolutely speak in future tenses, offering difficult-to-
parse details about what is promised and what is merely aspirational.72 
Absent clearly communicated and defined offers, it is unlikely that 
buying a token in reliance on such documents constitutes a traditional 
contract, though other regimes of consumer protection law (state consumer 
Unlawful Trade Practices statutes, false advertising, securities laws) might 
fill the regulatory gap. 
Beyond the informational environment, ICO issuances also differ 
from IPO issuances in terms of where they are traded. While public 
equities trade on established secondary markets like the NYSE or NASDAQ, 
cryptoassets trade on hundreds of upstart markets, sometimes under 
light-to-nonexistent regulation.73 They are located in diverse jurisdictions 
and have been embroiled in a range of legal controversies.74 
Despite these significant divergences between IPOs and ICOs, the 
near-identical nomenclature is no mistake. Both entail the issuance of 
assets whose value depends on the success of a business venture, and 
both are offered to so-called “retail” investors. These essential similarities 
in economic function have not been lost on federal securities regulators 
in the United States, who lately have begun to apply the wonderfully 
medium-agnostic securities laws to regulate ICOs.75 A number of state  
                                                                                                                           
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See Steven Russolillo & Eun-Young Jeong, Cryptocurrency Exchanges Are Getting 
Hacked Because It’s Easy, Wall St. J. (July 18, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
cryptocurrency-exchange-hacks-keep-happening-1531656000 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (noting that “[r]egulatory gaps” create conditions for widespread hacking); 
Kai Sedgwick, The Number of Cryptocurrency Exchanges Has Exploded, Bitcoin.com 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/the-number-of-cryptocurrency-exchanges-has-
exploded/ [https://perma.cc/28LB-TYM2] (documenting over 500 exchanges). 
 74. See, e.g., Matthew Leising, U.S. Regulators Subpoena Crypto Exchange Bitfinex, 
Tether, Bloomberg (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-
30/crypto-exchange-bitfinex-tether-said-to-get-subpoenaed-by-cftc (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review); Kosaku Narioka, Court Blocks Payday for Chief of Bankrupt Mt. Gox Bitcoin 
Exchange, Wall St. J. (June 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-blocks-payday-
for-chief-of-bankrupt-mt-gox-bitcoin-exchange-1529929409 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 75. At first, the SEC moved gingerly in response to the novelty of the ICO form, 
leaving open the question of whether cryptoassets fell into a bona fide statutory and 
regulatory gap. Cf. Eric Biber, Sarah E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Saltzman, Regulating 
Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 
1561, 1583–84 (2017) (describing the business strategy of exploiting gaps in existing law as 
“policy disruption”). In 2017, the SEC took a number of public actions concerning ICOs 
that began answering the question. See, e.g., In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release 
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regulators are also actively policing bad actors in the ICO market.76 
Assuming the ICO market matures, these outlier-policing activities 
will likely be augmented with broader regulatory schemes aimed at 
standardizing disclosures for the mine run of ICOs.77 For that effort to be 
successful, it is imperative for policymakers to understand the contours 
of ICO transactions, and the institutional environment in which they take 
place, in detail. We turn to offering such detail now. 
II. SMART CONTRACTS IN THE WILD 
This Part seeks to better understand some of the basic economics of 
cryptoassets, and the roles that code—specifically, smart contracts—
might be playing. The central relationship we investigate is that between 
“paper” and “code.”78 Ever since the cryptographer (and law graduate) 
Nick Szabo first introduced the concept of smart contracts, their artisans 
have sought to use code to replace and augment traditional institutions 
for ensuring performance within transactional relationships. The utopian 
ideal is a “grand merger of law and computer security,”79 which might 
render the protections offered by the former to be at best superfluous.80 
That hope is emphatically present in some of the offering and 
promotional materials that crypto investors receive. These materials 
speak of sales where smart contracts will “stop accepting commitments at 
                                                                                                                           
No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/63QB-6CRB]; Report of the DAO, supra note 67; Complaint at 5–7, 
SEC v. Plexcorps, No. 17-CV-7007 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206145. 
Prominently, in early 2018, Commissioner Clayton used his bully pulpit to state that “many 
promoters of ICOs and cryptocurrencies are not complying with our securities laws.” See 
Jean Eaglesham & Paul Vigna, Cryptocurrency Firms Targeted in SEC Probe, Wall St. J. 
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-launches-cryptocurrency-probe-1519856266 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 76. See State and Provincial Securities Regulators Conduct Coordinated International 
Crypto Crackdown, N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass’n (May 21, 2018), http://www.nasaa.org/ 
45121/state-and-provincial-securities-regulators-conduct-coordinated-international-crypto-
crackdown-2/ [https://perma.cc/XC7D-WSPY]. 
 77. See, e.g., Shlomit Azgar-Tromoer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments 
in Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 Am. U. L. Rev. 
69, 104–11 (2018) (“[I]nformational asymmetries in the blockchain territory may warrant 
securities regulation.”); Rohr & Wright, supra note 18, at 97 (calling upon the SEC to 
establish a regulatory framework that addresses fraud prevention, investor protection, and 
capital formation). 
 78. For the purposes of this Article, “paper” refers to the prose-bound texts of 
traditional agreements, offering materials, and promotional copy that accompany ICOs. 
These documents live mainly on the internet, but resemble their physical-paper 
predecessors in form. Conversely, “code” refers to the blockchains and associated smart 
contracts that govern the cryptoassets sold through ICOs. 
 79. Szabo, supra note 6. 
 80. Id. 
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888,888ETH hard cap,”81 of automated destruction of excess cryptoasset 
supply,82 and of “Reserve Tokens . . . locked in a smart contract” according 
to predetermined specifications.83 They promise with precision that “new 
founders’ tokens [are] distributed pursuant to the launch of an EOSIO 
Platform in a smart contract and [that the default EOSIO Software 
configuration] releases 100,000,000 of such tokens . . . linearly to Block.one 
every second over a period of 10 years.”84 While markets of unsophisticated 
investors typically require investor protection laws and intermediaries to 
protect against market manipulation,85 the “crypto industry” has “greater 
transparency, fewer middle men . . . [and] programmatically enforceable 
contracts.”86 That is, this community tries to make concrete the ideological 
project of using code to replace the rules of entity governance that law 
currently creates. 
Practical realities also motivate a turn to code in this space. Even if 
the paper surrounding ICOs created legally binding obligations—which 
it sometimes will not87—legal rights are only as valuable as their practical 
enforceability.88 Because cryptoassets can move freely and pseudonymously 
through the internet, it can be difficult to pin them down to particular 
jurisdictions.89 And the promoters of many ICOs have set up shop in ways 
that make it challenging for U.S. courts and regulators to reach their 
assets.90 Thus, promises that are made in marketing documents and 
                                                                                                                           
 81. Monaco, Whitepaper, Crypto Rating 8, https://cryptorating.eu/whitepapers/Monaco/ 
monaco-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSB2-GF36] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 82. Monetha, Whitepaper 35–36 (2017), https://ico.monetha.io/Monetha_WP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE6M-859F]. 
 83. Monaco, supra note 81, at 11. 
 84. Frequently Asked Questions, EOS, https://eos.io/faq (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 85. See, e.g., 1 Louis Loss, Joel Seligman & Troy Paredes, Fundamentals of Securities 
Regulation 4 (7th ed. 2018). 
 86. Powell, supra note 34. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36, 64–77. 
 88. But see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2021, 2032 (1996) (discussing cases “when the relevant law announces or signals a change 
in social norms unaccompanied by much in the way of enforcement activity”); Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1269, 1300 (2015) (“In these studies, we found not only that subjects’ intuitions 
about contract formation diverge from the legal rules, but that commitment to promissory 
obligations is more deeply entrenched than mere legal enforceability.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Receiver’s Initial Status Report for Receivership Estate of Arisebank at 
3–7, SEC v. Arisebank, No. 3:18-cv-0186-M (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2018), ECF No. 53 (detailing 
a receiver’s difficulties in recovering cryptoassets). 
 90. See id.; see also SEC Office of Investor Educ. & Advocacy, SEC Pub. No. 153, Investor 
Alert: Ponzi Schemes and Virtual Currency (2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ 
ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKC6-R59V]; David Z. Morris, The Rise of 
Cryptocurrency Ponzi Schemes, Atlantic (May 31, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2017/05/cryptocurrency-ponzi-schemes/528624/ [https://perma.cc/FJU7-
NSYW]. 
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terms and conditions of sale, even if legally binding, might lack an easy 
and practical form of legal remedy. 
Given this background, an ICO that promises particular, encodable 
governance terms but does not encode them is not delivering on an 
archetypal feature of this financial form. According to those who argue 
the form is novel—so novel as to deny the need for wise intermediaries, 
venture capitalist (VC) vetters, and regulators with teeth—it is the 
immutable, transparent code that enables (and creates) a trustless but 
trusted market.91  With that foundational, code-centered principle in 
mind, we ask the classic question that motivates so much of the law of 
finance and corporate governance: How can investors turn over 
productive control of their money to entrepreneurs while also protecting 
themselves against exploitation? 
This is a timeworn problem. In the old-growth public markets, investors 
can rely on disclosure regimes (imperfectly backed by public agency 
enforcement) and fiduciary rules (imperfectly backed by court 
enforcement) to manage risk. In private firms—ranging from family-
owned businesses to VC-backed startups—contracts must generally 
suffice. What is new here (if anything) is that the cryptoasset community 
proposes a technological solution—the token’s coded rules—to manage 
some crucial sources of agency cost.92 
One type of bargained-for protection is a constraint on the supply of 
the investment asset for sale. In the traditional corporate context, each 
share sold to investors provides a legal right to a piece of an enterprise’s 
residual assets. In an efficient market, changes to the number of 
outstanding shares would affect share price but not firm value.93 Put 
another way, the enterprise’s assets are like a pie, and every newly issued 
share makes each slice smaller. Because they want big pieces, early 
shareholders seek protection against late-breaking stock issuance. 94 
Traditional corporations act through human agents; those humans are 
only able to issue as many shares as the corporation’s (amendable) Articles 
                                                                                                                           
 91. See Kemane Ba, Konduktum - SMT Proposal /Tackling Copyrights/ Voting for “Proof 
of Authorship,” Steemit (Jan. 28, 2018), https://steemit.com/utopian-io/@kemane/ 
konduktum-smt-proposal-tackling-copyrights-voting-for-proof-of-authorship [https://perma.cc/ 
P7DD-H6G9]; cf. Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, Activism.net, 
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html [https://perma.cc/2WQA-LSM8] 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (arguing that “cryptographic protocols” will provide “nearly 
perfect assurance against tampering” in the new world of crypto anarchy). 
 92. For an agency-costs model of the choice between VC and ICO forms, see Chod 
and Lyandres, supra note 33, at 14–24. 
 93. See, e.g., Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 
15 J. Fin. Econ. 61, 62 (1986) (“Thus with close substitutes, efficient capital markets and 
fixed investment policies, the price of any firm’s shares should be independent of the 
number of shares the firm, or any shareholder, chooses to sell.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets 
the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud. 
281, 291–92 (2003). 
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of Incorporation allow. 95  Exploitative issuances are deterred by the 
common law of fiduciary duty.96 
Supply constraints matter to cryptoasset investors, as well. Remember, 
tokens are not typically claims on the enterprise’s residual assets.97 
Rather, they normally provide investors the right to use or govern the 
actual system whose hypothesized construction is funded by their 
money.98 Shareholders in Coca-Cola care about the value of their residual 
claims on Coca-Cola, Inc.’s assets. But the holders of Colacoin care about 
the demand for, and supply of, use-rights to the future system. The 
number of use-rights available—in other words, the “money supply” of 
circulating tokens—is thus a central determinant of individual token 
price.99 The value of a token, like the value of a stock, can be diluted 
through new issuance. Just as our Colacoin owners hope that legions of 
thirsty people demand vending-machine cola, they also pray that Coca-
Cola will not engage in rampant inflation of the token supply. Similarly if 
Coca-Cola promises to remove tokens from circulation (so-called ‘burning’), 
Colacoin owners would expect the value of their investment to rise. 
ICOs, unlike corporations, are not birthed through the filing of 
Articles of Incorporation that limit stock issuance. There is no analog to 
the fiduciary rules, or the Delaware Chancery Court, that govern when 
dilution can occur. Cryptoassets are instead created, limited, and used up 
according to code controlling the contents of a blockchain.100 Thus, a 
purchaser’s protection against wanton inflation of supply comes directly 
from the cryptoasset code.101 That is not to say that ICO promoters might 
not also make soft-law promises about supply—in fact, they often do, and 
such promises likely bear on value.102 But when such promises are not 
manifest in the code, investors’ ability to enforce constraints will be 
limited to their very uncertain ability to sue and recover founders’ assets. 
Because ICO project founders can do business entirely over the internet, 
they may be hard to find and sue. Further, it remains to be seen which 
causes of action might be successfully pursued in the ICO context.103 
                                                                                                                           
 95. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 8, § 157 (2019). 
 96. See, e.g., In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 328 (Del. 1993). 
 97. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
 99. The supply of tokens might affect a project in other ways, as well. A project with 
too few circulating tokens might unnecessarily limit scalability, thereby depressing project 
value. This makes the price function for tokens multimodal, a dynamic not present in 
pricing shares of stock. 
 100. See generally De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24. 
 101. As one group of commentators notes, the Bitcoin blockchain “can be understood 
as the first widely adopted mechanism to provide absolute scarcity of a money supply.” 
Böhme et al., supra note 38, at 215. 
 102. Bourveau et al., supra note 26, at 19 (using whitepaper promises of soft cap to 
predict an increase in price). 
 103. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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A second bargained-for protection has to do with the threat that key 
members of the entrepreneurial team will walk away from the project. 
Investors generally protect against desertion (and motivate exertion) 
through a set of carrots and sticks offered to managers. They incentivize 
them with equity options—rights that enable managers to share in the 
firms’ future profits—but condition those options’ exercise on 
contractual conditions, in other words, vesting.104 Option, lock-up, and 
vesting rules attempt to align managers’ incentives with those of the firm 
and are endemic in the early-stage VC financing world.105 
In ICOs, classic options are quite rare, but token-vesting promises are 
common.106 As one project (marketing its vesting promises) wrote, it “is a 
governance practice designed to ensure long-term alignment of interests 
and is standard for any serious project.”107 Another wrote that “[v]esting is a 
must. There are no excuses not to do it. It aligns everyone’s incentives 
and ensures that no founder dumps happen.”108 
As with promises regarding supply, vesting promises that are coded 
are enforced automatically.109 Those merely present in marketing materials 
or paper contracts are less likely to be enforceable.110 Uncoded vesting 
promises might (or might not) be present in governing documents of 
the underlying formal organizations. They likely would be located in the 
                                                                                                                           
 104. We appreciate that token vesting is different from the traditional equity mode 
and that a more precise term might be “lock-up.” We follow the nascent industry 
terminology for clarity. See, e.g., Dana Edwards, Criteria for Determining Fair Distribution 
in an ICO: The Importance of Vesting to Align Incentives, Steemit (2017), 
https://steemit.com/blockchain/@dana-edwards/criteria-for-determining-fair-distribution-in- 
an-ico-the-importance-of-vesting-to-align-incentives?sort=new [https://perma.cc/3X6C-CANT]. 
 105. See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 94, at 292 (“VC financings commonly 
utilize both founder vesting and non-compete clauses.”) 
 106. We did not observe any of the tokens in our sample using an options mechanism. 
Anecdotally, we are only aware of one project that has used options to facilitate 
development: Ripple. See Anna Irrera, U.S. Blockchain Startups R3 and Ripple in Legal 
Battle, Reuters (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-r3-ripple-lawsuit/u-s-
blockchain-startups-r3-and-ripple-in-legal-battle-idUSKCN1BJ27I [https://perma.cc/W64R-
Z7NR]. Perhaps one reason that options mechanisms are underrepresented is that 
appropriate strike prices are hard to determine for tokens. See Editorial Team, 
CryptoCurrency Options—An Alternative Way to Trade Crypto, CoinBureau (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://www.coinbureau.com/education/cryptocurrency-options/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZF94-FBQS] (detailing the volatility of Bitcoin’s strike prices). 
 107. Bancor, Bancor Network Token (BNT) Contribution & Token Allocation Terms, 
Medium (June 5, 2017), https://medium.com/@bancor/bancor-network-token-bnt-contribution-
token-creation-terms-48cc85a63812 [https://perma.cc/VR97-EL2Y]. 
 108. Luis Cuende, Aragon Network Token Sale Terms: Founder Vesting, Simple 
Pricing and Distribution, Aragon One Blog (Apr. 21, 2017), https://blog.aragon.one/ 
aragon-network-token-sale-terms-8998f63a3429 [https://perma.cc/G7X6-7WQC]. 
 109. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 110. As an example, consider NaPoleonX, which changed its vesting mechanism from 
six months to a series of four distribution periods halfway through its ICO process. See 
Stéphane Ifrah, NaPoleonX Newsletter, NaPoleonX, http://notifications.napoleonx.ai/napoleonx-
update-31/01 [https://perma.cc/S4YA-M9YP] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
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employment contracts of the various managers and founders, but such 
contracts probably will not be publicly verifiable. 
Perhaps to allay this very concern, ICOs often make claims about 
their smart contract vesting. For instance, one promises that: 
20% of the BMCs will be allocated to the founding Blackmoon 
Crypto team and advisors, locked in a smart contract with a 24-
month vesting period, and six-month cliff. These BMCs won’t be 
immediately tradable and will secure the core team members by 
ensuring their motivation after the Distribution Period.111 
Because promoters focus on it so much, examining how and whether 
vesting promises are coded sheds light on how strongly investors should 
buy the claim that a project’s key people will not exit with their newly 
raised capital.112 That is not to say that failing to code vesting means that 
founders are about to abscond: Coded vesting rules are only one way to 
protect against looting. However, it is a way that is technically feasible and 
consonant with the industry’s ideological claim that law is a poor substitute 
for code. 
A third and final protection against exploitation in ICOland is the 
supposition that the initial rights investors receive are not modifiable. 
Part of the appeal of cryptoassets and smart contracts that operate on 
blockchains hinges on their “immutable” nature. Legal contracts contain 
ambiguity and permit formal and informal modifications, but smart 
contracts are purportedly drafted in exhaustive, precise code that seems 
to set the parties’ obligations permanently.113 Because cryptoassets are 
defined by smart contracts, whether those smart contracts are modifiable 
should profoundly impact price and receive intense investor scrutiny.114 
A fully disclosed regime that permitted a token to be modifiable should 
have uncertain effects on value. On the one hand, no social enterprise 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Blockchain Paper, Black Moon Investment Analysis: Blackmoon Crypto, Medium 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@researchpaper/blackmoon-crypto-is-part-of-the-
blackmoon-financial-group-a-financial-technology-company-founded-56b5a64d88c3 [https:// 
perma.cc/M3V6-BFBC]. 
 112. The story of a project called Matchpool demonstrates how the absence of coded 
vesting rules can result in mischief. Within days of a reported $5.7 million ICO, one founder 
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from the wallet without explanation. See Nick Tomaino (@NTmoney), Twitter (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://twitter.com/NTmoney/status/849755116156600321 [https://perma.cc/RXE2-NNUQ]. 
 113. See Sklaroff, supra note 49, at 291. 
 114. In fact, to the extent that investors are told to focus on code, they are explicitly 
warned that it will be immutable. See, e.g., Catalin Cimpanu, Researchers: Last Year’s ICOs Had 
Five Security Vulnerabilities on Average, Bleeping Comput. (June 25, 2018), https:// 
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average-a6c6a818d89a [https://perma.cc/A3XC-N4AR])). 
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existing over any medium-length time period can have functioning 
governance rules immutably fixed at its inception. Human relations, 
including financial ones, evolve. Imagine a constitution that could never 
be amended, or a similar corporate charter.115 Thus, investors told that 
every rule of a token ecosystem had been irrevocably fixed at their 
creation should (we think) recoil at the coders’ hubris.116 On the other 
hand, when one party holds the power to modify formal relations, other 
parties bear risk. To the extent that a smart contract defining investors’ 
rights is mutable at the will of the issuer, investors ought to expect that 
the limits of that process would be explained in detail. Consider a fully 
modifiable Colacoin, for instance. One day the issuer might say that your 
coin, which you thought bought you a right to delicious fizzy soda, could 
only be used to purchase noncarbonated beverages or could be used to 
purchase cola only when you inserted additional fiat currency.117 The 
“rights” you bought would be notional. 
Surprisingly, until July 2018, the crypto industry rarely discussed 
modification.118 That month, in response to a hack of a popular token, a 
handful of prominent cryptocurrency voices sounded the alarm that 
several circulating tokens were modifiable at will. 119  They were, to 
summarize a long Twitter thread, angry. This is not conclusive evidence 
that modifiability is seen as a negative characteristic of tokens, but it does 
suggest that the coded ability to modify a token is not an anodyne fact. In 
short: We would expect that if token code is explicitly modifiable, that 
fact would be disclosed. Similarly, if the token code’s governance 
provisions are not modifiable, we would expect that the marketing 
                                                                                                                           
 115. Cf. Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 2 
(2006) (suggesting that corporations adopt state-law default terms for their charters in 
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 119. See Jackson Palmer (@ummjackson), Twitter (July 9, 2018), https://twitter.com/ 
ummjackson/status/1016455890294091776 [https://perma.cc/WKG8-WDL9] (identifying that 
some tokens “include an ‘upgrade’ capability which also allows them to essentially 
upgrade/replace the token contract” and others allow token creators have the “to completely and 
centrally pause transfers”). 
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documents would explain how, and why, the project can evolve with the 
times. 
With these three investor-protection ideas in hand, we now will 
provide examples of how they are actually accomplished in the real world. 
We focus our discussion on Ethereum code. Ethereum nodes operate a 
simulated computer called the “Ethereum Virtual Machine” (EVM).120 
This simulation runs by using both data and code (smart contracts) 
stored on the Ethereum ledger.121 The smart contracts exist on the 
Ethereum ledger in a complex, hard-to-read machine language known as 
bytecode.122 But they are most commonly written in an intuitive program-
ming language called Solidity.123 Solidity hides the internal details of the 
EVM and the complex machine language that it processes.124 Before being 
uploaded to the blockchain, a program called a compiler is used to 
translate the Solidity source code into Ethereum bytecode.125 This Article 
presents examples in Solidity. 
Solidity code contains four major types of entities: variables, 
functions, events, and modifiers.126 
• Variables are the data-storage components of any smart contract 
and, in the case of a token’s smart contract, store balances for 
each user-address, along with other data required for the smart 
contract to operate.127 
• Functions describe the rules by which the smart contract 
operates, storing discrete chunks of code that perform specific 
tasks.128 Functions are executed (or “called”) by sending a specially 
formatted transaction to the Ethereum network.129 Functions are 
identified by a name and a set of parameters (or “arguments”) 
that are the inputs to the function.130 
                                                                                                                           
 120. What Is Ethereum?, Ethereum Homestead Documentation, http://ethdocs.org/ 
en/latest/introduction/what-is-ethereum.html [https://perma.cc/53WA-DANP] (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2019). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Bernard Peh, Solidity Bytecode and Opcode Basics, Medium (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@blockchain101/solidity-bytecode-and-opcode-basics-672e9b1a88c2 
[https://perma.cc/ZDB3-BH7P]. 
 123. See id. (“Like many other popular programming languages, Solidity is a high 
level programming language.”). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Structure of a Contract, Solidity, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.2/ 
structure-of-a-contract.html [https://perma.cc/UD2K-3WDZ] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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• Events are signals that a smart contract sends to other applications 
or smart contracts programmed to receive them.131 They act as a 
form of logging.132 
• Modifiers allow a developer to easily restrict the execution of a 
function under certain conditions.133 For example, a developer 
may restrict the ability to mint new tokens to the smart contract 
owner alone.134 
 










To audit a given cryptoasset, we obtain a copy of the Solidity code 
(illustrated above), either from etherscan.io, where developers commonly 
upload their smart contract’s Solidity code, or from GitHub, a source 
code repository often used as part of the development process. 
Etherscan.io replicates the bytecode present on the blockchain but 
requires developers to upload Solidity source code for display.136 The site 
                                                                                                                           
 131. Id. 
 132. See Contracts, Solidity, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.2/contracts.html 
[https://perma.cc/845Q-9DEG] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (“Solidity events give an 
abstraction on top of the EVM’s logging functionality.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. The code snippet shows a fictional “addFunds” function that adds funds to the 
sender’s account balance. The code can only be executed by the contract owner, as 
indicated by the “function modifier.” To execute the function, a user must supply two 
parameters: (1) the address of the sender and (2) the amount by which to increase the 
account balance—these are commonly known as “arguments.” The operator “+=” then 
adds the variable “amount” to the variable “accountBalance[sender]” and then saves that 
new value as the variable “accountBalance[sender].” 
 136. See Contract Verification - Constructor Arguments, Etherscan Support Ctr., https:// 
etherscancom.freshdesk.com/support/solutions/articles/35000022165-contract-verification- 
constructor-arguments [https://perma.cc/2FTU-86WD] (last updated Nov. 21, 2017); What 
Is Etherscan?, Etherscan Support Ctr., https://etherscancom.freshdesk.com/support/solutions/ 
articles/35000022140-what-is-etherscan [https://perma.cc/KD78-SSBS] (last updated Nov. 21, 
2017). 
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additionally provides a verification feature, which allows users to check 
that the Solidity code matches the bytecode.137 
After obtaining source code, we then examine each function of a 
smart contract and manually track the role each line plays. We use code 
comments—explanatory lines of human-language text inserted by 
developers, which have no computational function—as guides to assist in 
identifying developers’ intentions.138 A typical smart contract in our 
sample contains between five hundred and one thousand lines of code. 
We inspect that code, looking for the presence of our three investor-
protection attributes. 
A. Supply Promises 
1. Minting. — Cryptoassets issued via ICOs are created through a 
process known as minting. 139  Recall that the Ethereum blockchain 
provides an extremely simple way to mint new cryptoassets through the 
ERC-20 standard.140 But even if they do not conform to the ERC-20 
                                                                                                                           
 137. See Contract Verification - Constructor Arguments, supra note 136. In a few cases, 
Etherscan did not affirmatively indicate that the uploaded display code matched the 
bytecode. In those cases, we did not separately verify the match. 
 138. Importantly, our assessment does not constitute a security audit, nor does it 
guarantee the correctness of the code. It merely seeks to ascertain the intended purpose 
of the various contract components. We leave analyzing the correctness of ICO smart 
contracts to others. Source code can be examined along a number of axes, among them 
syntax, semantics, and correctness. Syntax refers to the symbolic representation of the 
code—the particular sequence of words and numbers that comprise code. See Richard 
Paige, Foundations of Tree- and Graph-Based Abstract Syntax in Software Languages: 
Syntax, Semantics, and Metaprogramming 87, 87 (Ralf Lämmel ed., 2018). In our case, 
this is the set of rules governing the Solidity language. At a higher level of abstraction, the 
semantics of code refers to the actual meaning or functionality of a program. Isabelle 
Attali, A Primer on Operational Semantics in Software Languages: Syntax, Semantics, and 
Metaprogramming, supra, at 241, 241. Therefore, two pieces of code written in different 
programming languages can have the same semantics, while differing in syntax. As a 
result, semantics is the level at which we attempt to audit the code. 
 139. See David Hoffman, Penn Wharton Pub. Policy Initiative, Regulating Initial Coin 
Offerings (ICOs) 2 n.2 (2018), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/303-a 
[https://perma.cc/W5TW-K2AP]. An alternative process, known as mining, is often used 
to create cryptoassets, but not for ICOs. See Böhme et al., supra note 38, at 222 
(“[B]itcoins are created when a miner successfully solves a mathematical puzzle.”). In 
mining, suppliers of computational power receive cryptoassets in exchange for performing 
network-critical functions for the blockchains housing the cryptoassets. Id. at 218. Bitcoin 
provides an archetypal example of mining. Id. Bitcoin miners devote processing power to 
the blockchain, using their computers to solve complex math problems that help verify 
transactions. Id. The first miner to discover a valid solution can lay claim to the newly 
mined bitcoin. Id. For further details, see id. at 215–18. 
 140. See Hoffman, supra note 139, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
Using instructions found online, we were able to mint our own cryptoasset in twenty 
minutes. See maxnachamkin, How to Create Your Own Ethereum Token in an Hour (ERC20 + 
Verified), Steemit (July 10, 2017), https://steemit.com/ethereum/@maxnachamkin/How-to-
create-your-own-ethereum-token-in-an-hour-erc20-verified [https://perma.cc/A5U5-RDK7]. 
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standard, minted assets are typically created by executing relatively simple 
code on a blockchain.141 
In other words, a minted cryptoasset is created through an act of 
founder fiat. Billions or trillions of cryptoasset tokens are generated at a 
nominal cost reflecting fees paid to interact with the respective 
blockchain.142 Then the team will typically commence an ICO, transferring 
the tokens to investors in private sales or to members of the general 
public in mass offerings. The sales are accomplished using smart contracts, 
automatically routing the project’s tokens to investors in exchange for 
other cryptoassets or, more rarely, for fiat currency. 
Minting is an essential part of the ICO story. It creates the opportunity 
for early-stage blockchain projects to rapidly raise capital without the 
formalities required by corporate law and regulation. But it also opens 
the door to fraudsters, who can mint and sell tokens based on the 
expectation of a given supply schedule, only to mint more than 
expected—or to mint a special stash for themselves. 
To understand minting, let’s examine an ICO for a cryptoasset called 
Kin (ticker symbol: KIN), orchestrated by a company called Kik Interactive 
(“Kik”). Kik runs a global messaging platform with approximately 300 
million registered users.143 Like other digital communications companies, 
it has sought to broaden its business model by turning to blockchain.144 
Ultimately the company would like to build a “decentralized ecosystem of 
digital services for daily life.”145 
If all goes according to plan, Kin will be the currency enabling and 
constituting this utopian ecosystem.146 Building on Kik’s previous efforts 
to develop in-app loyalty points, Kin is meant to serve as a “transaction 
currency” that Kik users can exchange for premium features, like 
                                                                                                                           
 141. This is not a necessary attribute of minted assets. For a summary of the smart 
contract code audited, see infra notes 594 –645. 
 142. In our sample, some teams minted the full supply of their cryptoasset instantaneously. 
Others chose a dynamic supply model, in which supply grew proportionately to the amount of 
investment received. 
 143. Lucas Matney, Kik Already Has Over 6,000 Bots Reaching 300 Million Registered 
Users, TechCrunch (May 11, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/11/kik-already-has-over-
6000-bots-reaching-300-million-registered-users/ [https://perma.cc/GYN7-LAAD]. 
 144. Kik Interactive, Inc., Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem of Digital Services for Daily 
Life 3 (2017), https://kinecosystem.org/static/files/Kin_Whitepaper_V1_English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V3QE-ZHNF] [hereinafter Kik Interactive, Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem] 
(advocating for the adoption of blockchain-based networks to facilitate digital ecosystems in 
order “to realize Kik’s vision of a sustainable future in online communication and commerce”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 23 (“Kin will bring to fruition a new era of decentralized community 
ownership, enabling a vibrant ecosystem of digital services that power daily life.”). 
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membership in “VIP” chat groups with celebrities.147 It will also incentivize 
developers to work alongside the project.148 
According to its whitepaper, Kik planned to mint ten trillion Kin 
tokens, of which one trillion would be put up for sale.149 A blog post from 
Kik’s founder and CEO states that 488 billion were sold for $50 million in 
a presale arranged with specific investors and venture capital funds active 
in the industry.150 The remaining 512 billion tokens were offered to the 
public during the project’s ICO, which ran from September 12–26, 2017.151 
Ultimately, the ICO raised $98.8 million for the project, bringing the 
total amount raised to almost $150 million when including the private 
presale.152 
We audited the smart contract code to understand how these supply 
promises were accomplished. The cap on the number of tokens available is 
indeed coded in the smart contract. In addition, the smart contract 
mandates two discrete sale phases, and there are coded limits on how 
many tokens could be sold during each. One of these phases is the 
project’s ICO, and the other is presumably the private presale.153 Figure 5 
illustrates the code’s function. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 147. Id. at 5, 13–15. Other proposed premium features include the ability to publish 
messages with special visual features or to broadcast “shoutout” messages to large groups. 
Id. 
 148. See id. at 5–6, 19 (describing how a “Kin Rewards Engine” will “create natural 
incentives for digital service providers to adopt Kin and become partners in the 
ecosystem”). 
 149. Id. at 21. 
 150. Ted Livingston, Kin TDE: If You Want to Participate, You *Must* Register by 
September 9, 9:00 a.m. ET, Medium (Aug. 29, 2017), https://medium.com/kinfoundation/ 
kin-tde-if-you-want-to-participate-you-must-register-by-september-9-9-00-a-m-et-2f1304a4aa4b 
[https://perma.cc/2RMJ-FREH]; see also Khari Johnson, Kik Raises $50 Million Ahead of 
Token Sale for Its Cryptocurrency Kin, VentureBeat (Aug. 29, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/ 
2017/08/29/kik-raises-50-million-ahead-of-token-sale-for-its-cryptocurrency-kin/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3DRF-NRZL] (“Presale investors include Blockchain Capital, Pantera Capital, 
and Polychain Capital, all well-known blockchain-specific investment firms.”). 
 151. See Khari Johnson, Kik Raises $98 Million in Kin Cryptocurrency Token Sale, 
VentureBeat (Sept. 26, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/09/26/kik-raises-98-million-
in-kin-cryptocurrency-token-sale/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WU-PAR2] [hereinafter Johnson, 
Kik Raises $98 Million]; Kin Token Distribution Event Starts Today, Kik Blog (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.kik.com/blog/kin-token-distribution-event-starts-today/ [https://perma.cc/M7Z6-
GA7Q]. 
 152. See Johnson, Kik Raises $98 Million, supra note 151. Due to concerns that there 
would be insufficient demand to sell the entire ICO stake, Kik ended the sale eight hours 
earlier than initially planned, and announced that it would distribute all unsold tokens to 
ICO buyers on a pro-rata basis. See u/masrod, Maintaining the Kin Token Structure: 
Redistributing Unsold Kin, r/KinFoundation, Reddit (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/ 
r/KinFoundation/comments/724xg9/maintaining_the_kin_token_structure/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YU9X-8AZE]. 
 153. To purchase tokens, purchaser addresses must be added to a list of participants by 
Kin’s development team. See Livingston, supra note 150. 
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Here, the developers hard-
code a number of values 
for use in later functions. 
 
Here and elsewhere we 
removed both variables 
and code to better suit our 
presentation format, while 
retaining key features. 
 
The “create” function is 
run each time ether is 
transferred to the contract 
during the ICO—set at 14 














The final function checks 
that neither the individual 
nor the total caps have 
been reached and then 
mints and issues to the 
sender the appropriate 
amount of Kin—stored 
within the contract’s ledger. 
 
FIGURE 5: KIN PROJECT CODE154 
That is minting. But there are other processes that can alter supply. 
2. Increasing Supply. — The full supply of a minted cryptoasset can 
be set at the outset of a project, or can fluctuate depending on how 
much investment the project receives.155 The circulating supply of the 
asset can also fluctuate. For instance, a founding team could retain some 
of an initially minted asset supply and use it to inflate the circulating 
amount in the future.156 Similarly, a team might alter rules governing the 
                                                                                                                           
 154. Kin (KIN), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/ 
0x818fc6c2ec5986bc6e2cbf00939d90556ab12ce5#code [https://perma.cc/5CUF-SFC6] (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
 155. See supra Figure 5 (setting the max tokens in the first two lines of code). 
 156. See, e.g, Brad Garlinghouse, Ripple to Place 55 Billion XRP in Escrow to Ensure 
Certainty of Total XRP Supply, Ripple, https://ripple.com/insights/ripple-to-place-55-
billion-xrp-in-escrow-to-ensure-certainty-into-total-xrp-supply/ [https://perma.cc/8FWS-FP5M] 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (explaining Ripple’s decision to place 55 billion XRP into a 
“cryptographically-secured escrow account” to secure XRP). 
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ICO process to achieve various supply effects. For example, the Kin ICO 
smart contract contains code to enforce volume restrictions for individual 
purchasers.157 Each address permitted to participate in the sales may only 
send a limited amount of ether to the smart contract that disburses KIN 
tokens.158 However, these limits could be manually modified by the smart 
contract owner at any time.159 
The important point here is that maximum supply of a minted 
cryptoasset can be specified and enforced (or not) via the code comprising 
the cryptoasset itself. Projects can also contain an absolute cap. But some 
cryptoassets lack this feature. For example, there is no absolute cap on 
the amount of ether that can be created.160 Indeed, there is heated 
debate about whether this is a desirable feature or not.161 
Supply caps are a typical part of an ICO’s marketing materials.162 As 
one promoter said, “Even if on the last day of distribution Richard 
Branson shows up on a resplendent white yacht packed stern to bow with 
cash, we wouldn’t be able to sell him any more.”163 
3. Decreasing Supply (or “Burning”). — In prototypical blockchains, 
cryptoassets circulate like money. Think of Colacoin: If you drop a 
Colacoin in a vending machine for a pop, the coin will get picked up by a 
Coca-Cola employee, head to the corporate vault, be used in payment for 
the vault guard’s salary, and then—maybe after the vault guard goes for a 
jog—get dropped back into another vending machine in the system. To 
take one example, circulation is the default rule for ether.164 When 
                                                                                                                           
 157. See supra Figure 5 (comparing weiAlreadyParticipated, the number of tokens 
already purchased, with participationCap, the total amount allowed to be purchased, and 
msg.value, which contains the requested purchase amount). 
 158. See supra Figure 5 (creating a cap on ether received). 
 159. This structure creates opportunities for the development team to temporarily 
increase caps and quietly notify certain favored purchasers, and then reduce the cap once 
the additional purchases have been made. See Kin (KIN), supra note 154 (providing 
several means to place participants in different tiers with different caps). 
 160. See Ether, Ethereum, https://www.ethereum.org/ether [https://perma.cc/39TF-
TDR6] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
 161. See Michael Collins, Ethereum Stakeholders Consider Capping the Amount of 
Total Ether, Bitrates (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.bitrates.com/news/p/ethereum-
stakeholders-consider-capping-the-amount-of-total-ether [https://perma.cc/MYY6-BC26] 
(discussing proposals to cap the amount of ether). Despite many attempts to impose a 
hard cap, there has been no progress. See Vitalik Buterin (@VitalikButerin), Twitter (Apr. 
2, 2018), https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/980744740277661696 [https://perma.cc/ 
Q7SX-SBZF] (describing an April Fool’s joke proposing implementing a currency cap on 
ether and therefore demonstrating that there is still no cap). Note that ether supply is in 
some ways determined by the economics of mining, a reference to the “ice age” difficulty 
bomb. See Collins, supra. 
 162. See infra Part III & Appendix B. 
 163. See dennisk82, Polybius Bank (PLBT Tokens), Steemit (July 12, 2017), https:// 
steemit.com/crypto/@dennisk82/polybius-bank-plbt-tokens [https://perma.cc/TS9B-C2NY]. 
 164. See Ethereum Whitepaper, supra note 48. 
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someone pays ether to complete a transaction on the Ethereum 
blockchain, its recipient can spend that ether right away.165 
But perpetual circulation is not always the fate of a cryptoasset. 
Cryptoassets also can be used up, or “burned”—that is, destroyed.166 
Burning can play important roles depending on the business model 
envisioned by project founders. Some might advertise that the token 
could be exchanged for the right to access the completed project. Then, 
the exchanged asset would be permanently “burned” upon use. Some 
projects described plans to actively buy tokens from holders and then 
burn them, creating token price appreciation similar to a stock 
buyback.167 In others, only those tokens exchanged for certain features in 
the product—for example, tokens paid as fees—are burned. Finally, 
burning is used as a mechanism in ICOs, as a way to destroy unsold 
supply. 
Burning on the Ethereum blockchain takes two forms. The first is a 
simple transfer of tokens (or ether) to the address of Ethereum’s 
“genesis” block,168 consisting of all zeros. As this address has no owner, 
the tokens cannot be spent and as such are “burned.” The second is to 
use an Ethereum smart contract’s function programmed with the logic to 
either delete the ownership record and decrement the total supply 
accordingly, or that which destroys the entire smart contract, rendering 
                                                                                                                           
 165. See id. 
 166. See Natale M. Ferrara, ‘Token Burning’ and Other Crypto Jargon Simplified, 
Forbes (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eidoo/2017/11/29/token-burning-
and-other-crypto-jargon-simplified/ [https://perma.cc/V323-SYF2] (“In its simplest form, 
burning a token means making the token permanently unspendable.”). 
 167. See, e.g., FinShi Capital Crowdsale Whitepaper, FinShi Capital, http://finshi.capital/ 
whitepaper_finshi_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEZ9-27WX] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
FinShi’s whitepaper states: 
FinShi Capital takes on the obligation of buying back the tokens 
through the fund’s profits, thus implementing dividend policy. Once 
the fund announces an exit from a portfolio company, there will be 
created a queue of investors who applied for selling their tokens back 
to the fund. The amount of tokens for buy-back will be announced 
together with the exit date. The fund will buy out the tokens within 
one month after the exit from a startup. After that the tokens will be 
destroyed. 
Id. As Professor Tony Casey pointed out to us, the economics of buy-backs are interesting 
in that the functional result is to distribute residual profits to nonowners. Presumably, the 
organizers have concluded that such commitments, whether or not credible, can result in 
a more profitable immediate liquidity event, suggesting that they discount the possibility of 
long-term gains. 
 168. Every entry (“block”) on a blockchain is linked to both the entry following it and 
the entry preceding it. However, this cannot apply to the first block which has no 
antecedent. This block, known as the “genesis block,” is created by computer code 
explicitly laying out the contents of the ledger entry. See Genesis Block, Bitcoin Wiki, 
https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Genesis_block [https://perma.cc/SDR2-UYH5] (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2019). 
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any tokens or ether sent to that address inaccessible. The below snippet 
shows a characteristic burning function. 
 
FIGURE 6: BURNING CODE169 
A smart contract with appropriate code can keep track of burned 
tokens, enabling investors to easily audit the current supply. 
Not all burning promises are executed so cleanly. Consider, for 
instance, Paragon, an ICO that aims to “revolutioniz[e] all things 
cannabis with blockchain.”170 Lest you think it’s all a smoky haze (and we 
promise that’s the first and last joke), the project does have a dedicated 
cryptoasset: an ERC-20 token called PRG. The whitepaper specifies that 
PRG holders will be able to interact with all of the project’s many 
initiatives; holders will be able to vote on real estate investments,171 guide 
project governance decisions,172 purchase access to coworking services,173 
and exchange tokens for local currency in cannabis-unfriendly 
jurisdictions.174 
                                                                                                                           
 169. The burning code checks that the user has a sufficient balance of tokens, reduces 
their account balance and total supply by the request amount, and notifies interested 
parties through the “Burn” event. See Create Your Own Crypto-Currency with Ethereum, 
Ethereum, https://www.ethereum.org/token [https://perma.cc/NC6X-NED2] (last 
visited Feb, 21, 2019). 
 170. Paragon, Whitepaper Version 1.0, at 1 (2017), https://paragoncoin.com/ 
whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K5W-9SWH]. “All things” is not really an exaggeration; 
the whitepaper discusses plans to streamline operations for cannabis growers and 
dispensaries, purchase and operate coworking spaces for cannabis startups, and engage in 
widespread prolegalization advocacy. Id. The whitepaper describes a ParagonSpace, a 
Paragon Accelerator, an “immutable ledger for all industry related data.” Id. at 8. Of 
course, all of these efforts are powered by cryptoassets and smart contracts. 
 171. See id. at 21. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. at 17–18. 
 174. See id. at 12. Ultimately, the SEC focused on these promises when it brought a 
cease-and-desist action against the Paragon team for selling unregistered securities. See In 
re Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10574, 2018 WL 6017663, at *4 (Nov. 16, 
2018) (noting that “Paragon and its agents . . . emphasized that the company would build 
an ‘ecosystem’ in a way that would cause PRG tokens to rise in value”). This has been one 
of the highest-profile enforcement actions against ICO teams; many have suggested that it 
was the nail in the coffin for the 2017–2018 ICO market. See Nikhilesh De, After Friday’s 
SEC Actions, Experts Say ICO Party ‘Is Truly Over,’ CoinDesk (Nov. 17, 2018), 
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The code that is unique 
to PRG consists mostly 
of variables specifying 
the name of the token 
and quantity of tokens 
available. 
 
In addition to these promises about governance, Paragon promised 
that any unsold tokens from the private or public sale would be burned.175 
And it describes a transaction fee system whereby “[a]ll fees on the 
Paragon ecosystem” incur a $0.000000005 charge (that’s five billionths of 
a dollar), half of which is burned and half of which replenishes the 
project’s PRG reserve.176 
We can perceive only a small part of this complex set of rules in the 
code.177 PRG’s smart contract code does limit issuance to 200 trillion 
tokens. This is captured in Figure 7 below. 
 
FIGURE 7: PARAGON SUPPLY CODE178 
We also verified that Paragon contains code allowing users to burn a 
portion of their tokens. This is captured in Figure 8 below. 
 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.coindesk.com/after-fridays-sec-actions-experts-say-ico-party-is-truly-over 
[https://perma.cc/F94J-BA6K] (suggesting that due to enforcement actions against 
Paragon and other ICO projects, “the party is truly over”). 
 175. See Paragon, supra note 170, at 14. 
 176. Id. at 32. Finally, the whitepaper describes a process for stabilizing the price of 
PRG by selling or buying back tokens. This suggests that the team can unilaterally change 
the number of tokens in circulation when it deems that that there is “severe price 
volatility” or “excessive sell volume,” making it difficult for investors to value tokens ex 
ante. Id. at 31. The project does claim that Reserve Funds “cannot be . . . distributed to 
employees or investors,” and that insiders are restricted from trading PRG following a 
purchase or sale by the Fund, though there is no enforcement mechanism specified. Id. 
 177. The Paragon code repository contains what appears to be a third-party audit 
certification by ABDK Consulting, a blockchain services consultancy. The certificate claims 
that the auditors have inspected the code and “the code does not contain any major flaws 
that would prevent a secure and proper interaction with this contract.” Mikhail Vladimirov 
& Dmitry Khovratovich, ABDK, ParagonCoin Token Contract: Final Report, Github (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://github.com/paragon-coin/token/blob/master/ParagonCoinTokenContractFinalReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QNC3-QBFY]. The auditors also noted that “the contract charges a fee . . . 
which should be made clear.” Id. 
 178. Paragon (PRG), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/ 
0x7728dFEF5aBd468669EB7f9b48A7f70a501eD29D#code [https://perma.cc/F58F-M3G4] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
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PRG here provides a 
facility for burning 
tokens in a manner 
that registers a 
decrease in the token 
supply. 
Each PRG transactions is 
accompanied by a token 
fee of supply * 5 * 10 -33 + 
2500. 
 
Half of these tokens are 
permanently removed from 
the supply, and half are 
distributed to the owner. 
 
Eventually, this leads to a 
complete depletion of the 
token supply. 
FIGURE 8: PARAGON COIN BURNING CODE179 
However, we modeled the transaction fee system described in the 
paper and discovered troubling implications for supply. Following the 
creation of the smart contract, each transfer of a PRG token consumes 
approximately one-six-billionth of the total supply in transfer fees, half of 
which is paid to the owner of the PRG smart contract and half of which is 
burned. After a sufficient number of transactions the fee approaches the 
number of tokens remaining in the supply, causing the eventual demise 
of the network. This is captured in Figure 9 below. 
 
FIGURE 9: PARAGON FEE CODE180 
B. Vesting Promises 
If supply controls protect against the threat of dilution, vesting 
mechanisms protect against the threat of desertion.181 They work either 
by delaying when the founder is granted assets or deferring the moment 
of their liquidity.182 A smart contract usually provides for vesting by 
allocating a portion of minted tokens to insiders but then locking them 
                                                                                                                           
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 182. See, e.g., Kin (KIN), supra note 154 (granting assets that vest periodically over 
different periods). 
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up until some condition is satisfied.183 The code prohibits the transfer, 
sale, or use of the tokens until the condition’s trip-wire is hit.184 Most 
ICO-coded vesting is time-based, with few of the contractual conditions 
that come with stock vesting offline.185 
Let’s return to Kik and examine its vesting promises. In its marketing 
documents, Kik made fairly specific, detailed promises about token 
vesting. Of the ten trillion total Kin created, Kik’s whitepaper claimed that 
thirty percent would be allocated to Kik in exchange for its “startup 
resources, technology, and a covenant to integrate with the Kin 
cryptocurrency and brand.”186 This stake would be subject to a vesting 
schedule that released ten percent every quarter, for ten quarters.187 
Further, sixty percent of the initial Kin was allocated to the Kin 
Foundation, the entity that is meant to gradually take control of the 
project.188 This stake vests according to its own schedule.189 A total of 
0.061% of this stake will be released into circulation daily, or roughly 
twenty percent per year.190 Kik even released a separate whitepaper 
detailing the vesting dynamics for the Foundation stake, specifying, for 
example, that the unvested portion of this stake will be around 4.6 
trillion Kin on March 12, 2019.191 
                                                                                                                           
 183. See, e.g., StatusNetwork (SNT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/ 
address/0x744d70fdbe2ba4cf95131626614a1763df805b9e#code [https://perma.cc/FG4X-
DRXM] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (granting tokens to a holding wallet where they are 
collectable after they vest). 
 184. The team could always choose to mint new tokens not subject to the vesting 
condition and claim that the project will eventually accept both kinds of tokens. 
 185. There are, of course, outliers. Aragon, an Ethereum-based platform for building 
and managing decentralized organizations, claimed that its ERC-20 tokens will provide 
holders with governance rights. See Aragon Network Whitepaper, Github (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper/blob/master/README.md [https://perma.cc/J72V-
DY2V] (suggesting that token holders will be able to vote on issues like network upgrades, 
dispute resolution, monetary policy, and fiscal policy). Importantly, these governance 
features are only activated upon execution of a multisignature smart contract by holders 
instructed not to execute until the product launches. See Luis Cuende & Aragon, 
Introducing the Aragon Community Multisig, Aragon: Project Blog (May 15, 2017), 
https://blog.aragon.one/introducing-the-aragon-community-multisig-348a69d16374 [https:// 
perma.cc/K8QM-63U2]. 
In our audit, we were unable to confirm that ANT tokens contain these latent 
governance rights. Rather, we discovered that governance features will be introduced 
through a future distribution of tokens which themselves will have the promised features. 
 186. Kik Interactive, Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem, supra note 144, at 21. 
 187. Id. at 21–22. 
 188. Id. at 19. 
 189. See id. at 21. These tokens are allocated to fund the Kin Rewards Engine. See 
supra note 148 and accompanying text. Since the number of tokens being placed in 
circulation decreases over time, this feature also creates inflation for the token. Kik 
Interactive, Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem, supra note 144, at 22. 
 190. Kik Interactive, Inc., Kin Rewards Engine 5 (2017), https://kinecosystem.org/static/ 
files/Kin_Rewards_Engine_RFC.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNG9-TNCF] . 
 191. 4,601,252,295,287 Kin to be exact. Id. This is assuming a January 1, 2018, start date. Id.  
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This container variable 
is used to hold values 







This excerpt shows the 
hard-coded allocation 
of two grants—60% of 
the token supply to the 
Kin Foundation, and 
30% to the Kik project. 
 
FIGURE 10: KIN ALLOCATION CODE192 
The project implemented some of these promises in the code. The 
Kin smart contract creates vesting by maintaining a database of grants 
with a start date, end date, cliff, and installment length.193 Grants are 
both creatable and revocable by the smart contract owner.194 No more 
than 100 grants may ever be created and no address may receive a grant 
twice.195 Every grant we have seen so far has a hardcoded cliff of one year, 
with two installments, one of which must be executed by the owner of the 
smart contract and on which is executed by the vesting trustee.196 
When the Kin ICO commenced, the developers created two new 
grants. One corresponds to Kik’s thirty percent stake and faithfully 
implements the ten percent per quarter vesting schedule described in 
the whitepaper.197 Interestingly, the development team manually added a 
comment to the code showing that the address owning the stake belongs 
to Kik.198 This suggests that Kik may have believed there would be at least 
some investor scrutiny over the technical governance features of its 
project. 
The second grant corresponds to the sixty percent Foundation stake. 
We were unable to locate code for any of the highly detailed vesting 
mechanisms described in the whitepaper. We did observe that this grant 
is wholly controlled by the owner of a vesting trustee smart contract. Of 
course, offline ownership of that smart contract—the legal person within 
the Kin or Kik organization that actually receives the unlocked tokens—is 
                                                                                                                           
 192. Kin (KIN), supra note 154. 
 193. See supra Figure 10. 
 194. See Kin (KIN), supra note 154. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See supra Figure 10. 
 198. See id. 
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not hardcoded into the Kin token code itself. It’s simply bestowed on 
whoever has the private keys for that smart contract. In other words, 
there’s nothing about the token code that enforces separate ownership of 
Kik’s stake and the Foundation’s. Instead, it depends entirely on the 
offline governance features of the project, enforced using traditional 
tools like corporate charters and bylaws (or not at all). 
C. Modifiability 
Beyond the specific protections against inflation of supply and 
desertion by key people, the promise of cryptoassets has also rested on 
the idea that investors are protected by the immutability of blockchain 
code. As we noted above, lawyers might well think of this as a wacky idea. 
And sure enough, immutability has indeed gone by the wayside for a 
number of ICO projects. Disclosure of what we refer to as “modifiability” 
is another matter. Though some token teams do advertise that tokens 
may provide new rights in the future, they do not explain that modification 
is a way to change any aspect of the token, not just activate valuable new 
features. And yet, as we will see, modification is built into the design of 
some ICO systems. How does this work?199 
In the simplest setting, a developer can simply copy the contents of 
the data stored in a smart contract, and create a new smart contract, 
prepopulated with the data from the former. While those who owned 
tokens in the context of the original contract also own tokens in the new 
smart contract, the developer is free to create new code controlling the 
behavior of the latter. More concretely, an issuer may refuse to honor the 
original token when they finally complete development of the product 
the ICO was designed to fund. 
This can be accomplished using two sets of rules: a primary smart 
contract with which users interact and a series of secondary smart contracts 
whose code is incorporated by reference.200 Our lawyerly audience can 
think of the typical relationship between a website’s Terms of Service and 
its Privacy Policy: The former usually contains a link to the latter, and 
purports to bind visitors to both.201 Or, think of a public law that points 
to a private standard, like a city code that adopts LEED green-building 
                                                                                                                           
 199. See infra notes 200, 204–215 and accompanying text. 
 200. See, e.g., Blackmoon Crypto Token (BMC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https:// 
etherscan.io/address/0xdf6ef343350780bf8c3410bf062e0c015b1dd671#code [https://perma.cc/ 
8CX2-QJ64] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). A second approach to modification ensures the 
simultaneous removal of tokens from an existing contract and addition of equivalent tokens 
in a new contract. Users can upgrade to the new contract by manually calling a function in 
the old contract. 
 201. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 1635, 
1636 (2011) (“The social networking site [Facebook] has a Terms of Use Agreement with 
a section titled ‘privacy.’ The agreement references Facebook’s privacy policy, a separate 
document.”). 
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standards.202 The standard can be updated privately, thereby modifying 
the effect of public law.203 
A similar “pointing” mechanism enables the modification of cryptoasset 
smart contracts. All tokens using this method share identical code. The 
primary smart contract stores for each user the address of a secondary 
smart contract, containing the most recent set of accepted 
modifications.204 The owner of the primary smart contract can modify 
the code by proposing a new secondary address, defining the smart 
contract whose terms will be incorporated. In one example we found 
(Monaco), the code gave users three days to opt in or out before the 
modification spread. When a user opts out, her current secondary smart 
contract address is frozen until the next time they explicitly opt in. The 
default state of all users is opt in, as illustrated below.205 
 
FIGURE 11: MONACO MODIFICATION CODE206 
                                                                                                                           
 202. See Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED: Municipal Adoption of 
Private Green Building Standards, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 285, 289 (2010). 
 203. See id. at 303–07 (describing the process by which LEED certification standards 
are updated). This practice is, needless to say, controversial. See Nina Mendelson, Private 
Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 
112 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 748 (2014) (“[D]ecisions to incorporate private standards into the 
law . . . represent a potentially injurious public message that is inconsistent with core 
democratic values.”); Schindler, supra note 202, at 316 (describing the advantages of 
standards developed in a public system, while recognizing the benefits private regulatory 
standards provide). 
 204. When a user executes a contract function, the primary contract checks the 
reference stored for the user and executes the incorporated code stored on the secondary 
contract. 
 205. Code for some tokens with modifiable contracts contained copyright notifications 
in the comments attributing the source to Ambisafe. See, e.g., Polybius (PLBT), Contract Code, 
Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x0affa06e7fbe5bc9a764c979aa66e8256a631f02#code 
[https://perma.cc/K66Y-9A26] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 206. This snippet illustrates the opt-in process in the Monaco contract. The user’s 
account balance and total supply are decreased by the requested amount, the old contract 
runs a function on the new contract requesting that the tokens be “transferred,” and finally, 
interested parties are notified via the “Upgrade” event. See Monaco (MCO), Contract Code, 
Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xb04cfa8a26d602fb50232cee0daf29060264e04b#code 
[https://perma.cc/FR29-3D54] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
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The Polybius project provides another example. It is a proposed 
“fully digital bank accessible everywhere at any time . . . with a very 
efficient cost/revenue ratio.”207 Eventually, Polybius plans to “grow into 
your daily servicer and companion ecosystem . . . enabl[ing] secure and 
seamless connections between life and the things we love and use every 
day.” 208  Investors contributing to the project can supposedly expect 
“higher returns” than those investing in traditional banks.209 
The development team did make some limited claims about smart 
contract modification. The token purchase agreement explicitly states 
that “Polybius shall procure that the Smart Contract is modified and/or 
amended via an additional smart contract” to activate tokenholder 
voting.210 It further specifies that the voting mechanism will enable the 
development team to propose changes to project smart contracts and to 
implement the changes if they receive two-thirds of tokenholder votes.211 
There are no further details. 
However, we found modifiability functions in the smart contract 
code that extended well beyond changes to tokenholder voting rules, as 





                                                                                                                           
 207. Polybius, Polybius Prospectus 1 [hereinafter Polybius Prospectus] (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 208. Id. at 2. 
 209. Id. at 1. The first step in this project was the sale of Polybius tokens (PLBT) to 
raise money for the Polybius Foundation. Id. at 3. PLBT gives holders rights more 
traditionally associated with stock or other forms of ownership. Id. It promises that holders 
will have the “right to receive a part of distributable profits of Polybius P.I. or Polybius 
Bank. All tokens in aggregate will have the right to receive 20% of such profits.” Id. at 3. 
Note that this makes it highly likely that PLBT are securities. The prospectus recognizes as 
much, placing the following note at the bottom of each page: 
The tokens have not been and will not be registered under the United 
States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and 
may not be offered or sold in the United States or to or for the benefit 
of US persons (as defined in Regulation S under the Securities Act) 
unless they are so registered, or an exemption from the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act is available. One such exemption 
allows the resale of tokens purchased for their own account and for 
investment purposes only by investors who (i) are not otherwise 
affiliated with the Polybius Foundation, (ii) have been exposed for some 
time to the economic risks that ownership of tokens entails, and (iii) are 
not part of the distribution of the tokens. 
Id. at 1. 
 210. Polybius Crowdfunding Terms & Conditions, Polybius, https://polybius.io/media/ 
terms_and_conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7XZ-Y5HM]  [hereinafter Polybius Crowdfunding 
Terms & Conditions] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
 211. See id. 
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FIGURE 12: POLYBIUS MODIFICATION CODE212 
Through this code, Polybius can propose modifications by deploying 
an entirely new secondary smart contract and linking it to the primary 
smart contract via the commitUpgrade function.213 The primary smart 
contract does not allow the owner to make modifications directly—the 
owner must first propose the upgrade, which only takes effect after three 
                                                                                                                           
 212. Polybius (PLBT), supra note 205.  
 213. See supra Figure 12. 
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days unless the user opts out.214 In terms that legal readers will be 
familiar with, it is a “sticky default.”215 
Using these mechanisms, a development team can unilaterally change 
the tokens purchased by investors—or sometimes, propose changes that 
will be adopted if a certain percentage of users do not object.216 Unless 
investors scrutinize both the potential for their tokens to be unilaterally 
modified, and the substantive terms of the modifications actually 
proposed, they are unlikely to discipline hasty or abusive changes. As we 
describe in Part IV, investors hardly pay attention to even simple 
nontechnical markers of quality. It is thus incredibly unlikely that they 
have the technical skills to monitor a development team’s use of 
modification. 
III. A SURVEY OF ICOS 
Having identified three salient attributes of ICO governance, we now 
attempt to step back to look at a larger set of issuances to see how (and 
if) they dealt with governance issues. We reviewed the fifty largest 2017 
ICOs by amount raised in dollars.217 For each listed promotion, we 
scrutinized the whitepapers, token sale agreements, and computer code 
posted by the promoters. Appendix C pulls quotes about supply, burning, 
vesting, and modification (if they are available) from the issuers’ public 
statements.218 We compared those promises, read by investors, with what 
we discerned from close examination of software code. Our approach is 
empirical, but obviously neither comprehensive nor representative of all 
2017 ICOs. 
                                                                                                                           
 214. See supra Figure 12. 
 215. For the classic initial treatment, see generally Omri Ben-Shahar & John E. Pottow, 
On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651 (2006). 
 216. It is similar to a reverse collective action clause. See generally W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 52 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 51, 52–55 (2013). 
 217. As discussed in section IV.B below, there are major challenges involved in 
sourcing even the most basic information about this market. Finding a list of the largest 
ICOs is one such example. The amount of funds raised in ICOs are self-reported and 
listing sites rarely scrutinize their own figures. Further, there are omissions of important 
ICOs and other discrepancies across the various listing sites. We essentially used a list of 
the top fifty 2017 ICOs compiled by Coinschedule, with three notable exceptions. The site 
omits the Grid+ ICO, which raised about $38.5 million in its presale and ICO, as well as 
Tron, a controversial project that raised $70 million in its presale and ICO. See infra 
Figure 13 (summarizing ICOs and amounts raised). These projects would both be within 
the top thirty of our sample, so we manually added them to our list. Additionally, we 
omitted one project that was listed by Coinschedule. Sonm, which apparently raised $42 
million, does not have an accessible original whitepaper. This made it impossible to 
determine its claims about token functionality. 
 218. See generally Appendix C, supra note 69. 
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A. The Scene from 50,000 Feet 
The fifty firms we studied were reported to have raised a total of 
approximately $2.6 billion at their ICOs and the notional initial market 
cap was $7.0 billion.219 In the sample, nineteen were headquartered in the 
United States, six in Singapore, and the remaining in a variety of countries, 
including Switzerland (five), England (two), China (two), Estonia (two), 
and Thailand (two).220 By January 2019, eleven of the projects had not 
released any kind of alpha version or demo of their project.221 
Our approach to auditing is limited: We try to take the position of a 
sophisticated, but time-constrained, investor. Consider, again, Polybius. 
Its whitepaper makes several claims that would lead us to expect certain 
features directly coded into tokens or other smart contracts. The most 
striking example is the team’s promise that “according to the conditions 
of the ICO, payouts to tokenholders are directly connected to the 
earnings of the Polybius project.”222 The team goes on to specify a range 
of offline activities that will support payment of the dividend, like 
preparation of audited financial statements, and tells readers to expect 
dividend payments in Ethereum.223 
Beyond ERC-20 compliance and the presence of a modification 
feature, we did not verify that any of these features are present, largely 
because Polybius’s coded governance exists in bytecode (which, as you 
will recall, is the Ethereum machine language). Without spending a 
large sum of money purchasing the time and know-how of a very 
motivated and talented reverse engineer, an investor would have to rely 
                                                                                                                           
 219. See infra Appendix A. 
 220. See infra Appendix A. 
 221. See infra Appendix A. 
 222. satoshi092, What Are Polybius Tokens and Why Should They Be in Every Crypto-
Investor’s Portfolio?, Steemit (Aug. 9, 2017) https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@satoshi092/ 
what-are-polybius-tokens-and-why-should-they-be-in-every-crypto-investor-s-portfolio [https:// 
perma.cc/4XBK-2CPJ]; see also Polybius Prospectus, supra note 207, at 6 (noting that 
moneys raised will be used “mainly, but not exclusively on acquisition of licenses, building 
out the systems, hiring the team and marketing”). 
 223. See Polybius, Polybius Token Whitepaper 4 (2017), https://polybius.io/media/ 
token_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV8L-VBXE]; see also Polybius Crowdfunding Terms & 
Conditions, supra note 210 (“‘Smart Contract’ means the Ethereum smart contract made for 
Polybius . . . and is the mechanism of the distribution of Payouts to the Token holders as 
described in the Token Whitepaper.”). There was ample mention of dividends in the terms 
and conditions that governed token purchases, which calls the dividends “Payouts.” 
Polybius Crowdfunding Terms & Conditions, supra note 210. That old-fashioned contract 
specifies that token holders are “eligible for obtaining Payouts according to their stakes” 
and that the token code is “the mechanism of the distribution of Payouts.” Id. It even 
provides ways to adjust the Payout calculation in the event that Polybius repurchases and 
burns some circulating tokens, or to account for dilution if Polybius receives new equity 
financing. Id. 
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on vernacular promises.224 Below is an excerpt of what the public-facing 
code (incorporated by reference) looks like. 
 










This shows that it is not merely the case that the investment depends 
on the development team’s decision to actually build the products it 
hypes in its whitepaper.226 Investors must also have faith—either that 
ordinary contract law litigation will back up old-fashioned terms of use, 
or that the bytecode, which essentially no one can or will parse, renders 
those promises operable. 
Putting unauditable smart contracts to one side, here are the results 
of our analysis, which compares the software to promises made in 
whitepapers, blog posts, and websites marketed to investors. 
B. Supply Promises: Scarcity and Burning 
We begin with promises regarding supply. Of the fifty tokens, we 
audited the code of forty-five (four remain in bytecode or in proxy 
contracts, and one, FileCoin, has not released any code or token). We 
dropped projects without auditable code from our analysis. Figure 14 
illustrates how such firms approached supply scarcity commitments. 
                                                                                                                           
 224. Analyzing bytecode involves tracing both the low-level flows of data and 
arithmetic in order to reconstruct a contract’s logic. It requires meticulous attention to 
each individual machine operation, and a memory to retain the state of the virtual 
machine at each step. For an introduction to bytecode, see Bernard Peh, Solidity Bytecode 
and Opcode Basics, Medium (Sept. 17, 2017), https://medium.com/@blockchain101/ 
solidity-bytecode-and-opcode-basics-672e9b1a88c2 [https://perma.cc/Q4PE-DYBM]. 
 225. The main contract incorporates by reference code to perform most tasks. The figure 
shows an excerpt of the bytecode referenced. While a skilled analyst can reconstruct the 
function of the code, such analysis is beyond our scope. See Polybius (PLBT), supra note 205. 
 226. Note that the Polybius team actually decided to release a different project than 
the one described in the whitepaper. Tzao Se, Past ICO Review: Why You Can’t Take 
Polybius to the Bank, U.Today (July 23, 2018), https://cryptocomes.com/past-ico-review-
why-you-cant-take-polybius-to-the-bank [https://perma.cc/BWP8-L8JQ]. The team claimed 
that this was due to an E.U. regulation that was released years before the ICO. Id. This 
underscores the point that after an ICO, a development team is able to do whatever it 
wants with the funds raised. 
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FIGURE 14: SCARCITY AUDIT RESULTS 227 
Almost all issuers promise a supply restriction in their marketing 
documents (40 of 45, or approximately 90%). And most of those that 
promise a restriction deliver it (29 of 40, or approximately 75%). Overall, 
though, only about two in three (29 of 45, or approximately 64%) firms 
that we audited encoded a supply restriction. To be clear, this is not to say 
that the firms that did not deliver coded scarcity limits actually promised 
to do so—their marketing promises either did not mention scarcity or 
may not have discussed how it was to be effected. 
The second sort of supply promise—burning—displays a different 
pattern. Figure 15 details our burning audit. 
 
FIGURE 15: BURNING AUDIT RESULTS 228 
Here, fewer firms promised to burn tokens than promised to cap 
supply in the initial mint (19 as compared to 40). Of those that promised 
to burn supply, approximately 36% (7 of 19) did not fix that claim with 
code. 
                                                                                                                           
 227. See infra Appendix B. “Scarcity Claimed” in the Figure is a designation for those 
issuers that promised a supply restriction in their marketing documents. 
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C. Vesting Promises 
Of the forty-five auditable issuers, thirty-six promised vesting in their 
marketing documents or whitepapers, while nine did not. Figure 16 
illustrates our findings. 
 
FIGURE 16: VESTING AUDIT RESULTS 229 
 
Figure 16 illustrates first that almost 20% of the sample did not 
promise to vest at all, which is a surprising result given the amounts 
raised. Second, of the 80% that promised to vest, the vast majority apparently 
did not use smart contracts to encode those rights.230 
D. Modification Promises 
Finally, we describe the modification rules in the sample. Modification 
is rarely discussed in marketing materials: Only seven of the fifty firms 
discussed the token’s modifiability in their marketing materials or soft 
contracts. But overall, twelve of the fifty firms permit modification 
through their code. While most (4 of 7) of the firms that disclosed 
modification had code that backed up their promises, eight firms that did 





                                                                                                                           
 229. See infra Appendix B. 
 230. Some projects use secondary smart contracts to encode vesting, such as the Basic 
Attention Token. So long as the tokens transferred before the ICO, we would count that as 
a coded vesting. According to Brendan Eich, BAT used this two-stage structure to have 
“simple, do-as-few-things-as-possible smart contracts. We were keenly aware of all the 
problems other projects to that date . . . had trying to get fancy with Solidity.” Email from 
Brendan Eich to David Hoffman (July 30, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 










Code Does Not Permit Modification Code Permits Modification
FIGURE 17: MODIFICATION AUDIT RESULTS 231 
E. Summary 
To sum up: There are significant differences between code and 
contract in our sample.232 Projects are making governance claims that 
look to be modeled off of offline VC or traditional equity-based rules 
intended to reduce agency costs, but they are not encoding those promises 
into the sort of trustless, decentralized systems which undergird their 
networks’ purported sky-high values. 
IV. COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM? 
So far, our inquiry has been motivated by two goals. First, we have 
tried to capture the reality of the ICO form as it existed in 2017–2018—a 
snapshot of a supposedly revolutionary innovation just after its birth. 
Second, we have attempted to understand smart contracts at a deep level 
of contextual detail. They are at the heart of the innovation story told by 
ICO proponents, some of whom claim that code will increasingly be able 
to replace traditional law. 233  We have traced their early history, 234 
explained how they were expected to function in the ICO market of 
2017,235 and taken stock of the reality.236 In this Part, we evaluate the 
distance between expectations and reality. 
As we established in Part III (and in detail in Appendix B), for over 
20% of ICOs in our sample where promoters promised cryptoasset supply 
restrictions, and 35% of promised token burning, we could not observe 
                                                                                                                           
 231. See infra Appendix B. 
 232. For the results in summary form, see generally infra Appendix B. 
 233. See De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24, at 102–03 (“Token sales are the Wild 
West of financing, and by using blockchain technologies and decentralized exchanges, 
companies, projects, or organizations can continue to raise funds by relying on lex 
cryptographica, ignoring geographic rules and regulations governing public markets and 
securities trading.”). 
 234. See supra Part I. 
 235. See supra Part II. 
 236. See supra Part III. 
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restrictions hard-coded into smart contracts. More starkly, we could not 
find hard-coded vesting restrictions in twenty-five of the thirty-six ICOs 
where promoters promised to adhere to such restrictions. Finally, of 
twelve ICOs for which our audit revealed that a central party could 
modify the functionality of the cryptoasset’s smart contract code, only 
four disclosed that ability in their promotional materials. 
Our results raise serious questions about the role of code in ICOs. 
Do investors punish ICOs that fail to build key protections into code or 
fail to disclose the power of modification? If not, is that because code 
does not matter as much as its proponents claim it does? Or is it because 
the ICO market is broken? We examine those questions in the sections 
that follow. 
A. Paper, Code, and Market Response 
For a minute, let’s look at our results from the perspective of an ICO 
advocate who believes that code has the potential to be a cheaper and 
better way of delivering investor protections than traditional venture 
financing routes. Should this person be troubled by our results? At one 
level, the answer has to be yes. The fact that a majority of the leading 
ICOs—each of which raised over $20 million—fail to write their own 
vesting promises into code is inconsistent with a story about code 
replacing law. It also raises serious questions about whether investors are 
adequately protected from founder desertion. 
But our ICO advocate might push back. Perhaps we are wrong about 
the absence of hard-coded rules (and if we are, we hope to be corrected). 
Or, maybe, investors do take the problems we observed in Part III into 
account when investing. That is, maybe problems with coded investor 
protection are reflected in market prices. 
Though the ICO market is young, we are skeptical of this “investor-
protection code is priced” thesis. As a first cut, the sheer number of 
problems in our sample suggests otherwise. Our results show that the 
majority of the top-grossing ICOs of 2017 had major problems with how 
code bore out their antiexploitation disclosures.237 To quantify the idea 
of paper–code distance, we refer to any uncoded investor protection for 
supply, burning, vesting, or incongruence between code and disclosures 
regarding modifiability as “distance.” Using these data, we score each 
ICO from zero to four.238 Of the fifty ICOs, we give forty-nine a score 
because we can evaluate either the token or the associated smart 
contracts. Fourteen have no distance, ninteen have one marker, twelve 
have two, three have three, and one (Monaco) has four. If investors know 
                                                                                                                           
 237. See infra Appendix B. 
 238. That is, the token gets a 1 for scarcity claims not matching code, a 1 for vesting 
claims not matching code, a 1 for burning claims not matching code, and a 1 if it has 
undisclosed modification terms. 



















Bitcoin ICOs (Vesting Claim)
ICOs (No Vesting Claim)
about the problems we’ve identified, then the makeup of the top fifty 
suggests that they don’t much care. 
Nor do the postsale market metrics we are able to observe enable us 
to say a great deal about the “code is priced” thesis. We do not see 
significant changes in code congruence over time, and we lack a natural 
experiment on initial code pricing. What we can observe is whether (over 
time) firms that encode their disclosures have different returns and 
trading volumes. An approach suggested to us by a commentator on an 
earlier draft of this paper239 was to develop a rolling weighted portfolio of 
the prices (and trading volume) of our fifty projects, controlling for their 
disclosed and coded governance rules. Using this approach, we find 
that—consistent with earlier work—disclosed governance rights do seem 
to promote better returns.240 
 
FIGURE 18: VESTING DISCLOSURES AND  
ROLLING AVERAGE CUMULATIVE RETURNS241 
 
                                                                                                                           
 239. We thank Professor Robert Bartlett for his suggestion and the data that gave it life. 
 240. See supra note 31. 
 241. Data from CoinMarketCap, courtesy of Professor Bartlett. Bartlett pulled daily 
volume and price data from coinmarketcap.com and created a weighted average portfolio 
using our coding about project quality. We modified his work when later checking revealed 
minor changes in the coding of particular projects. Both the .do and the underlying data are on 
file with the authors and the Columbia Law Review. 
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The next figure repeats the first, but now breaking out projects that 
coded vesting and those that promised but did not code it. 
 
FIGURE 19: VESTING (CODED VS. DISCLOSED)  
AND CUMULATIVE RETURNS242 
 
Here, we can see that firms that coded vesting had returns that were 
indistinguishable from those that did not code it. Professor Robert Bartlett 
reported similar results on scarcity, as well as trading volume. In a series 
of regressions, he found while disclosure of vesting and scarcity were 
correlated with higher returns, coding of those attributes had no 
consistent and significant effects. 243  Trading volume and price were, 
however, closely tied to Bitcoin’s price and trading volume, a result that 
fits with other recent research.244 
Finally, we are skeptical of the “investor-protection code is priced” 
thesis because buy-side literature in 2016–2018 rarely treated the guts of 
code as something worth considering. Like stocks, ICOs have developed 
a wide range of secondary information sources, including “ratings” 
websites. But most of these raters do not vet smart contract code. Of the 
                                                                                                                           
 242. For information regarding from where this data set was obtained and the 
procedures performed on it, see supra note 241. 
 243. The authors’ regression files are on file with the Columbia Law Review. 
 244. See Griffin & Shams, supra note 8, at 33 (indicating that Tether, a digital 
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top five English-language rating sites by Alexa ranking, which measures 
how popular a website is,245 only one posts information about code quality, 
though not of significant detail.246 Similarly, code takes a backseat to 
other investment drivers in the retail valuation literature. 
In the period before 2017, advisory publications focused on a 
project’s ability to deliver anonymity and decentralized governance, which 
in turn was thought to help hedge against regulation.247 In the period 
after 2017, guides focused on the potential for widespread functional use 
within the startup’s system,248 the reputation and involvement of the 
founders and creative team,249 and the avoidance of obvious scams.250 
                                                                                                                           
 245. Kim Kosaka, What Is Alexa Rank?, Alexa Blog, https://blog.alexa.com/marketing-
research/alexa-rank/ [https://perma.cc/MQP5-68UV] (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 246. We use ICOnow to identify the top five ratings sites. Top ICO Listing Sites, 
ICOnow, http://iconow.net/all-ico-calendarlisting-sites-with-alexa-rank-and-traffic/ [https:// 
perma.cc/WQ8K-8LVP] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Four of these sites do not analyze smart 
contract code: (1) icodrops.com (Alexa rank: 14,206); (2) icobench.com (Alexa rank: 15,078); 
(3) coinschedule.com  (Alexa rank: 18,861); and (4) cryptopotato.com (Alexa rank: 136,699). 
Id. Only one of the four sites does analyze smart contract code: icorating.com (Alexa rank: 
79,549). Id. However, the site’s attention to code is thin. While it mentions smart contracts 
on its “methodology” page, it does not regularly (if ever) analyze any code itself. See 
Project Evaluation, ICORating, https://icorating.com/methodology/ [https://perma.cc/ 
WXS6-UGH6] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
 247. See, e.g., Roger Aitken, German Blockchain Startup BlockPay “Bootstrapped” 
with Crypto ICO Investment, Forbes (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
rogeraitken/2016/08/20/german-blockchain-startup-blockpay-bootstrapped-with-crypto-
ico-investment/ [https://perma.cc/3A65-GE8G] (“For criminals and legitimate businesses 
alike, the blockchain’s transparency could pose a real problem. . . . If you can figure out 
where the money is going, you can gain a major competitive edge over a company.”); 
Marco Santori, Appcoin Law: ICOs The Right Way, CoinDesk (Oct. 15, 2016), https:// 
www.coindesk.com/appcoin-law-part-1-icos-the-right-way/ [https://perma.cc/2BDP-FEHR] 
(“Appcoin developers should consider building products . . . which run . . . in a decentralized 
fashion. The more unaffiliated developers contributing to the development and operation of 
the product, the less likely any profit . . . is to be considered ‘from the efforts of others’—and 
the less likely vertical commonality will be present.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Chinedu Adeyemi, Cryptocurrency: How to Start? Guide to 
Cryptocurrency Trading for Beginners, The Oofy (June 2, 2018), https://theoofy.com/ 
13199/cryptocurrency-how-to-start-guide-to-cryptocurrency-trading-for-beginners/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Y7XW-FNT9] (“Some coins seem to keep increasing in value simply due to 
supply-demand factors. This trend might not be sustainable. For a coin to have [long-
term] supported value, it must have a real-world use case eventually.”). 
 249. How to Choose an ICO to Invest In, Cointelegraph, https://cointelegraph.com/ 
ico-101/how-to-choose-an-ico-to-invest-in#read-the-white-paper [https://perma.cc/UPZ3-
Q3LK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (advocating for potential investors to “[f]ind out 
everything [they] can about the development team” and to “make sure that the developers 
are not anonymous”). 
 250. See, e.g., John Wasik, Why Millennials Are at High Risk for Bitcoin & ICO Fraud, 
Forbes (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2018/03/05/why-
millennials-are-at-high-risk-for-bitcoin-ico-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/MYB2-NU5L] (“One 
simple way to avoid fraud is to reject solicitations. Whenever you see a mobile ad or email 
telling you about overnight riches in cryptocurrencies, avoid clicking on their links.”). 
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Eventually, some investors gave up on ICOs completely.251 But there’s 
never been an emphasis on checking that coded governance actually 
happens. 
For instance, while the bestselling Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor’s 
Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond does exhort investors to scrutinize developer 
activity,252 it does not view the actual product of developer activity—the 
code—on the same plane. Indeed, the book does not include a project’s 
codebase in the materials that it suggests a fundamental-analysis investor 
would want to consider. 253  To the authors of most buy-side advice, 
cryptocurrency investment is an exercise in reading whitepapers, blog 
posts, and commentary—and watching the social-media trade winds—but 
rarely involves inquiry into code.254 Taken together with analysis of our 
sample, these impressionistic sources of evidence lead us to believe that 
investor-protection code is not a significant driver of market pricing.255 
ICO advocates might reasonably respond to this absence of evidence 
for the importance of code in a number of ways. First, it might be the 
case that investor-protection code will manifest itself as a driver of market 
returns in the future. Perhaps future researchers will develop measures 
that capture price tremors in response to phenomena like the one we 
identified in Part III. It is also possible that the ICO market’s “crypto 
winter” was driven by investors who scrutinized the code of circulating 
tokens and found it lacking. 
Some commentators do advise investors to pay attention to the 
underlying code of cryptocurrency projects, and their approach may be 
gaining adherents. 256  Further, some ICO promoters take to Reddit 
                                                                                                                           
 251. See supra note 19. 
 252. See generally Burniske & Tatar, supra note 31. 
 253. See id. at 172–73 (discussing the materials necessary to conduct fundamental 
analysis of cryptoasset investments). 
 254. See, e.g., Reza Jafery, Cryptocurrency Fundamental Analysis: 4 Ways to Gauge the 
Strength of a Community, Hacker Noon (Jan. 8, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/4-ways-
to-gauge-the-strength-of-a-cryptocurrencys-community-4b42c0e5d735 [https://perma.cc/U6QJ-
HBQV]; Simon Kertonegoro, Fundamental Analysis: How to Judge a Cryptocurrency’s 
Intrinsic Value, Medium (Mar. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/@esscay/fundamental-
analysis-how-to-judge-a-cryptocurrencys-intrinsic-value-a3d789da94e1 [https://perma.cc/ 
HNA3-L3LE]; Dean Patrick, On Tokenomics and ICO Valuations, Medium (Jan. 13, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@deanpatrick_63570/on-tokenomics-and-ico-valuations-5312e5bdc2bd 
[https://perma.cc/V8UH-DNXW]. 
 255. Aside from Rhue, supra note 31, at 20, who finds that identification of “bugs” on 
Etherscan is associated with lower market capitalization, we are aware of no other analysis 
of the relationship between code and market value. 
 256. See Rohr & Wright, supra note 18, at 27 n.73 (suggesting that failure to list code 
in an open source site “may signal ulterior motives on the part of the party selling the 
token”). Others agree. See How to Choose an ICO to Invest In, supra note 249 (“Evaluate 
the quality of the code. If a project has no working code whatsoever prior to an ICO, or 
even if they do, but it isn’t open source—that’s a major red flag.”); Michiel Mulders, 10 
Keys for Evaluating Initial Coin Offering (ICO) Investments, CryptoPotato (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://cryptopotato.com/10-keys-evaluating-initial-coin-offering-ico-investments/ [https:// 
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message boards to offer bounties to independent parties interested in 
auditing smart contract code—an indication that attention to code (or at 
least the perception of attention to code) is valuable from the promoter 
perspective.257 These audits focus on the antihacking aspects of cybersecurity, 
not specific instantiation of economically relevant promises.258 But perhaps 
the recent “modifiability crisis” after the Bancor hack will bring our 
investor-protection concepts to the fore. In other words, the market will 
reflect investor protections found in code sooner or later.259 
A second potential response from our ICO advocate might take a 
different tack. Instead of defending the importance of code in delivering 
investor protections, the advocate might retreat and take up a holistic 
defense. Specifically, even if code is failing to protect investors, there still 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/9NZ3-HF55] (“The quality of a developer can be understood by analyzing some 
of their code . . . . Avoid messy developers.”). 
 257. A search of “ICO audit” of the Etherium Community’s Developer Reddit 
evidences as much. See, e.g., bfjs123, Best Way to Get My ICO Contract Audited?, 
r/ethdev, Reddit (Feb. 6, 2018), https://old.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/ 
7vq3s0/best_way_to_get_my_ico_contract_audited/ [https://perma.cc/8DVU-AR7R]; 
Bspendcom, Looking for ICO Security Audit, r/ethdev, Reddit (Oct. 12, 2017), https:// 
old.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/75wz6m/looking_for_ico_security_audit/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TA54-Y9SC]; Cointed, [BUG BOUNTY][ICO] Cointed Token Audit (100k EUR Reward!), 
r/ethdev, Reddit (Oct. 12, 2017), https://old.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/75x5kb/ 
bug_bountyico_cointed_token_audit_100k_reward/ [https://perma.cc/4AMQ-TJZP]. 
 258. See, e.g., Cimpanu, supra note 114 (citing industry study). This auditing is quite 
important, of course. See Anna Irrera, More Than 10 Percent of $3.7 Billion Raised in 
ICOs Has Been Stolen: Ernst & Young, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-ico-ernst-young/more-than-10-percent-of-3-7-billion-raised-in-icos-has-been-stolen-
ernst-young-idUSKBN1FB1MZ [https://perma.cc/PS5P-63XZ] [hereinafter Irrera, More Than 
10 Percent]. ICOcheck.io does feature crowdsourced evaluations of the presence or 
absence of smart contract provisions, including hard-coded vesting constraints. See ICO 
Checker, icochecker.com, [https://perma.cc/H3QX-EYJP] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). But 
its Alexa rank is in the millions, in contrast with the top five sites, which range in ranking 
from 136,699 to 14,206. See supra note 246. 
 259. Much of the excitement over ICOs has shifted to a new form of token-based 
fundraising: the “security token” offering, or STO. STOs are ICOs in which issuers 
embrace the security-like nature of their tokens, adhering to SEC rules governing offers 
and sales, while adding features of traditional instruments like cash flow or governance 
rights. The imminent rise of STOs could give the SEC a greater opportunity to address 
consumer protection risks posed by token sales. Or, enthusiasm for STOs could be pure 
hype. See, e.g. Aashish Sharma, Will STOs (Security Token Offerings) Rule Over ICOs in 
2019?, Hacker Noon (Jan. 12, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/will-stos-security-token-
offerings-rule-over-icos-in-2019-8feda7bcf562 [https://perma.cc/89EP-RBSA] (“We have it 
on a good source that the estimated growth of STO is . . . $10 trillion over the next few 
years.”); Syed Shoeb, Will 2019 Be the Year of the STO?, Hacker Noon (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://hackernoon.com/will-2019-be-the-year-of-the-sto-understanding-stos-security-tokens- 
market-potential-over-icos-4d2502227220 [https://perma.cc/3L5E-FT38] (explaining that 
STOs are ICOs with “certain regulations that hold the token issuers accountable”). For an 
overview on the technical tradeoffs involved in STO issuance, see Matthew Finestone, The 
2019 Truth on Security Tokens, Loopring Protocol (Dec. 21, 2018), https://medium.com/ 
loopring-protocol/the-2019-truth-on-security-tokens-7800c14129e4 [https://perma.cc/28WM-
AP5U]. 
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remain legal and reputational checks on exploitation and desertion by 
ICO teams. That is, there will be substitutes for coded governance rules. 
Instead of the law of the blockchain, the law of the Swiss stiftung, the 
California Business Practices Code, and the Securities Act of 1933 will 
ensure that bad actors are punished, and the market will do the rest.260 
As we argued above, the legal safeguards against ICO investor 
exploitation are, at present, significantly weaker than in other investment 
markets.261 It is easy for an issuer to set up shop in a low-regulation 
jurisdiction,262 and the architecture of the cryptoeconomy enables far 
more user and promoter anonymity than typical markets.263 And even for 
transparent issuances conducted in the shadow of U.S. law, our 
background legal regime presents untested forms of investor protection. 
While a number of class-action suits, largely premised on state law violations, 
have been filed against some prominent ICO teams, the viability of any of 
their claims remains unclear.264 The deterrent threat of legal ramifications 
is not nearly as strong as in typical markets—and, of course, is far weaker 
than the automated enforcement of code. 
At a deeper level, arguments about the power of traditional legal 
deterrence are dangerous for ICO advocates. They show that advocates 
have already abandoned the high ground of “lex cryptographica.”265 
Smart contract code was, after all, supposed to render traditional interme-
diaries useless, obviate the need for regulation, and reduce transaction 
costs for participants.266 Without those justifications, it becomes harder to 
see what benefits ICOs provide, other than regulatory arbitrage. 
To be explicit, if the value of blockchain-based financial products 
turns on the reputations of their creators or the vitality of legally enforceable 
wrap contracts, we see no good reason why traditional regulatory tools—
                                                                                                                           
 260. These are some of the bodies of paper law that plaintiffs have invoked in their 
lawsuits against Tezos and Paragon, for instance. See Complaint at 2, Davy v. Paragon 
Coin, Inc., No. 18-cv-00671 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018), 2018 WL 653425; Complaint at 19, 
Gaviria v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 6:17-cv-01959 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2017), 2017 
WL 5713392; Complaint at 5, Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. CGC-17-562144 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 5022656. 
 261. See supra Part II. 
 262. See Rohr & Wright, supra note 18, at 30–31, 96. 
 263. See, e.g., Shifflett & Jones, supra note 8; John O. McGinnis & Kyle Roche, 
Bitcoin: Order Without Law in the Digital Age 30–33 (Nw. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 
17-06, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929133 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); 
Massimo Bartoletti, Salvatore Carta, Tiziana Cimoli & Roberto Saia, Dissecting Ponzi Schemes 
on Ethereum: Identification, Analysis, and Impact 1 (Mar. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 264. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 265. Cf. De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24, at 193–204 (arguing that ICOs can rely on 
“lex cryptographica” to enforce investor protections). 
 266. See, e.g., ChainTrade, 10 Advantages of Using Smart Contracts, Medium (Dec. 
26, 2017), https://medium.com/@ChainTrade/10-advantages-of-using-smart-contracts-
bc29c508691a [https://perma.cc/65H6-87GT] (describing in greater detail these classic 
arguments raised in support of smart contracts). 
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securities law, know-your-customer regulations, and fiduciary suits—
should not heavily police a space that currently is rife with the opportunity 
to bilk investors. The analogy to the failures of the pre-1933 securities 
regime would be unavoidable.267 
However, we are not ready to make that sort of strong claim about 
the missing role of intermediaries. Some projects encode all of their 
governance protections, and others appear to fall short largely only on 
vesting.268 We simply do not know enough at the moment about what 
incentives encouraged particular turns to coded governance. Nor have 
we investigated the more mature 2018 market. Today, several sites are 
working to develop informally rich certification systems.269 Perhaps such 
systems will evolve and further depress the need for old-fashioned 
intermediation in the absence of regulation. 
But perhaps not. If problems with investor protection code are not 
priced into the market, and traditional law presently has trouble deterring 
abuses, where does that leave us? 
B. Whose Market Is This? 
The absence of evidence suggesting that investors are well-protected 
in the ICO market raises a natural question for legally-minded readers: 
Should we regulate this thing? Some see evidence of fraud and call for 
the whole market to be shut down.270 Others would like the state to keep 
out.271 Each approach has costs and benefits, of course—a conundrum 
where good things like innovation, investor protection, and regulatory 
clarity sit uneasily alongside each other.272 There are tradeoffs galore. 
For the pragmatists out there, a lot depends on who is being protected, 
and who benefits from innovative change. Are the investors actually 
                                                                                                                           
 267. See Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information 
and the Performance of New Issues, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 295, 296–97 (1989) (describing 
briefly the failures in the market that led to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933). 
 268. See supra Part III. 
 269. See, e.g., Messari Disclosures Registry, Messari, http://messari.io/registry (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
 270. This has been the approach taken, for example, by regulators in China and South 
Korea. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 16, at 30–32. 
 271. See, e.g., Richard Waters, To Coin a Craze: Silicon Valley’s Cryptocurrency Boom, 
Fin. Times (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2b0d8926-96d9-11e7-b83c-
9588e51488a0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting Tim Draper as stating that 
“ICOs are filling in where governments have failed”); cf. Max Raskin, The Law and 
Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 Geo. L. & Tech. Rev. 305, 333–40 (2017) (arguing for a light 
hand on smart contract regulation). 
 272. See generally Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 
107 Geo. L.J. 235 (2019) (describing a theoretical framework for understanding the 
competing goals of clarity, innovation, and market integrity that regulators seek to balance 
when confronting new financial technology). 
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grandparents risking their retirement savings?273 Or are they day-traders 
enjoying a virtual casino?274 We might want—really, we do want—to protect 
mistaken elders more than thrill-seekers.275 We also must be aware that 
regulations often will protect first-movers against competition by setting 
up new barriers to entry. And any serious regulatory strategy needs to 
help combat cryptoassets’ role in supporting illicit markets.276 To inform 
the best approach to regulation, we need to know a lot more about the 
ICO buy side. 
We see four archetypal participants on the buy side in the ICO 
market. Each has different implications for how to interpret the sell-side 
picture we have painted in this Article. Gaining a better read on the 
precise ratios and combinations of each will be a key next step for 
scholars and policymakers who deal with ICOs. 
1. Irrational Exuberance. — The conventional wisdom about ICOs—
the meme that drives most headlines—is that explosive valuations were 
the result of a massive financial bubble. As one leading analyst put it in 
the New York Times, “It’s not going to last forever, but it’s fun in the 
interim. The space is giddy right now.”277 A massive financial bubble 
would certainly help explain why the market didn’t seem to care about 
the investor protections in smart contract code. 
The possibility of a bubble accords well with the existing literature 
on what drives cryptoasset performance. While we are the first to study 
investor-protection measures found in code, numerous researchers have 
investigated the relationship between market performance and a host of 
potential predictors, including founder profiles, business plan charac-
teristics, social media factors, known cybersecurity incidents, and more.278 
                                                                                                                           
 273. See Michael Hiltzik, When Grandma and Grandpa Join the Frenzy, You Know 
Bitcoin is Turning into a Bubble, L.A. Times (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-bitcoin-bubble-20171201-story.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 274. See, e.g., John Omar, Making a Living Day Trading Cryptocurrency, Chain 
Operator, https://chainoperator.com/making-a-living-day-trading-cryptocurrency/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3EB2-6YEJ] (last updated Sept. 1, 2018). 
 275. See, e.g., Jacob Hale Russell, Misbehavioral Law and Economics, 51 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 549, 549–54 (2018) (arguing for a normative distinction between taste-driven and 
mistake-driven irrationality). Things do get complicated for our prejudiced normative 
priors when it’s “grandma and grandpa” who are seeking the thrills. See Peter Rudegeair 
& Akane Otani, Bitcoin Mania: Even Grandma Wants In on the Action, Wall St. J. (Nov. 29, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-mania-even-grandma-wants-in-on-the-action-
1511996653 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 276. See, e.g., Foley et al., supra note 64, at 1. 
 277. Popper, Easiest Path, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chris 
Burniske, an industry analyst). For industry postmortems on the alleged financial bubble, see 
supra notes 14 and 19. 
 278. See supra note 31 (describing the existing literature that explores the influence 
of various factors on market performance). 
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A consistent theme in this emerging literature is that reputation is 
the key to understanding the ICO market. Unfortunately, reputation is 
hackable. For instance, one paper finds that management team quality, as 
rated on a website called ICObench.com, predicts market performance.279 
ICObench, however, has been accused of operating as a “pay-to-play” 
operation.280 Indeed, many rating platforms at the heart of the ICO 
informational ecosystem281 operate on a “pay-to-be-rated” model.282 Project 
owners place a high value on their project’s rating and are willing to pay 
as much as $20,000 for a rating on the most influential sites.283 Such paid 
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cryptocurrency/@whaproject/we-are-rated-by-ico-bench-experts-now [https://perma.cc/URD8-
FB95]. Like Yelp, where business owners manage their own Yelp page, the project owners 
manage everything except the rating on the project’s ICO page within the rating site. Any 
project can submit a request for an ICO page, but the sites reserve the right to deny 
requests at their discretion. See, e.g., FAQ , ICObench, https://icobench.com/faq 
[https://perma.cc/9QZZ-JJXE] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (describing ICObench’s rating 
system, which combines a rating by the website with ratings by “independent experts”); 
Publish Your ICO, ICObench, https://icobench.com/publish (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (requesting information from ICOs and preICOs 
wishing to publish pages on ICObench and offering expedited review for a fee). Each 
rating site also has a unique feature they promote to set them apart from the others. For 
example, ICObench distinguishes itself with ratings crowdsourced by “independent 
experts,” rather than via the paid promotion model. See Stats and Facts, ICObench, 
https://icobench.com/stats [https://perma.cc/DQ5R-GB2S] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019). 
Cryptorated allows users to “upvote” tokens in the queue to be rated and provides both 
“actual ratings” and “curved ratings” for users to see where a token stands in relation to 
other ICOs. See ICO Rating System, Cryptorated, https://cryptorated.com/ico-ratings- 
calculator/ [https://perma.cc/LR9J-8PZG] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Others have other 
features. ICO Drops has an “interest level” weighing short-term conditions, and a “bounty 
program” that allows users to get tokens by helping the ICO by, for example, promoting it 
on social media. About Us, ICO Drops, https://icodrops.com/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/69LZ-WYAD] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). ICORating organizes its IPOs by 
ten investment ratings from positive to negative, based on the “independent opinion[s] of 
ICORating experts.” ICORating, http://www.icorating.com [https://perma.cc/BKH2-
SJ4Z] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Project Evaluation, ICORating, https://icorating.com/ 
methodology/ [https://perma.cc/SF7G-3CPY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
 282. See Sedgwick, ICO Trackers, supra note 281. 
 283. Kirill Shilov, What Should Your ICO Marketing Plan Look Like in 2018?, Hacker 
Noon (Jan. 16, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/what-should-your-ico-marketing-plan-look-
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systems have well-known pathologies, as reflected in the credit-ratings 
experience during the financial crisis.284 As a result, when academic 
papers find that some proxy for social “hype” or “buzz” correlate with 
higher returns,285 we are not heartened. Instead, they only make us worry 
about targeted ads286  and “pump-and-dump” cartels that coordinate 
massive social media pushes to temporarily inflate prices before selling 
their tokens to their marks.287 These sources of noise and misdirection  
                                                                                                                           
like-in-2018-315135fe9851 [https://perma.cc/6LXP-9TTQ] (reporting that ICORating charges 
$20,000 for a report). Altogether, the average cost of advertising packages from top ICO 
marketing agencies starts at around $280,000. Id. 
We had little success independently investigating how much a number of popular 
rating sites charge. Some rating sites, such as ICO Champs, ICO Drops, and Smith + 
Crown, disclaim any fee-for-rating service. See Frequently Asked Questions About ICO 
Champs, ICO Champs, https://www.icochamps.com/#faq-section [https://perma.cc/ 
M83W-KKZ2] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Privacy Policy, Smith + Crown, 
https://www.smithandcrown.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/EU8F-4FQU] (last visited Jan. 
27, 2019); Submit ICO, ICO Drops, https://icodrops.com/submit-ico/ [https:// 
perma.cc/29VF-6EGP] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Others have premium models which 
permit faster listings or access to special platforms in return for payment, such as 
CoinGecko and ICObench. See How Can I Make My ICO Sponsored?, CoinGecko, 
https://support.coingecko.com/knowledge_base/topics/how-can-i-make-my-ico-sponsored 
[https://perma.cc/CG9S-5DLS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Premium, ICObench, 
https://icobench.com/premium [https://perma.cc/DPG3-R4RM] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
Finally, a few popular sites are explicit that they take payment, but sometimes will not 
disclose how much. For example, ICO Holder requires $500 to be listed. See Publish ICO, 
ICO Holder, https://icoholder.com/en/v2/ico/create [https://perma.cc/XSK2-AEJZ] 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019). On the other hand, CoinSchedule, ICO Alert, ICO Rating, and 
ICO Watchlist will not disclose their price until after an ICO has been submitted for 
listing. See Add a New ICO, ICO Watch List, https://icowatchlist.com/add-ico 
[https://perma.cc/4U6G-XRYX] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Consulting, ICO Alert, 
https://info.icoalert.com/consulting [https://perma.cc/L8FL-RWTG] (last visited Jan. 
27, 2019); ICORating Terms and Conditions, ICO Rating, https://icorating.com/terms-
and-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/PDT9-38RM] (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); The Ultimate 
ICO Guide, CoinSchedule, https://www.coinschedule.com/brochure.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) . 
 284. See Gretchen Morgenson, Ratings Agencies Still Coming Up Short, Years After 
Crisis, N.Y Times (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/business/ratings-
agencies-still-coming-up-short-years-after-crisis.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 285. See Bourveau et al., supra note 26, at 5; Rhue, supra note 31, at 21–23. 
 286. See Louise Matsakis, The Cryptocurrency Industry Might Actually Benefit from 
an Ad Ban, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/cryptocurrency-industry-
might-benefit-from-ad-ban/ [https://perma.cc/W74X-HYAD]; Kate Rooney, Twitter Bans 
Cryptocurrency Advertising, Joining Other Tech Giants in Crackdown, CNBC (Mar. 26, 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/26/twitter-bans-cryptocurrency-advertising-joining-other- 
tech-giants-in-crackdown.html [https://perma.cc/39SZ-MU8T]. 
 287. See Griffin & Shams, supra note 8; Julian Hosp Tenx, The ICO World Is Full of 
Pump-and-Dump Schemes—Don’t Be a Victim, Venture Beat (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://venturebeat.com/2017/08/26/the-ico-world-is-full-of-pump-and-dump-schemes-
dont-be-a-victim/ [https://perma.cc/82W4-KUF7]; Oscar Williams-Grut, ‘Market 
Manipulation 101’: ‘Wolf of Wall Street’-style ‘Pump and Dump’ Scams Plague Cryptocurrency 
Markets, Bus. Insider (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/ico-cryptocurrency- 
pump-and-dump-telegram-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/CZ8Q-JCRL]; see also Erin Griffith, 
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have contributed to many bubbles in the past.288 
Of course, reputation-driven markets are not necessarily all bad; it is 
the particular characteristics of this one that cause concern. We are not 
alone in this worried hand-wringing. Even researchers who hold out 
hope that “the wisdom of crowds” might one day triumph still characterize 
the ICO market as a series of “information cascades” susceptible to 
insanity.289 Cooler heads suggest that taking market returns seriously 
during the 2017–2018 highs would have been seriously misleading, given 
the market’s immaturity and “speculative frenzy.”290 As of early 2019, 
there is compelling evidence that valuation highs were more bubble than 
accurate assessments of promising projects. The market capitalization of 
all cryptocurrencies fell over eighty percent in 2018,291 and trading of 
certain coins has essentially stopped completely.292 Research that identifies 
the particular sources of air for the bubble will be valuable going forward.293 
                                                                                                                           
The Hustlers Fueling Cryptocurrency’s Marketing Machine, WIRED (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/the-hustlers-fueling-cryptocurrencys-marketing-machine/ 
[https://perma.cc/7YGD-8FKJ] (“Much of the [crypto] industry’s action happens on a 
messaging app called Telegram.”); Deep Patel, 6 Red Flags of an ICO Scam, TechCrunch 
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/07/6-red-flags-of-an-ico-scam/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8PUY-WSPB] (describing Reddit sub-threads’ discussions of specific ICOs as a 
good source for technical evaluations of crypto projects). 
 288. See Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 63–99 (2014). 
 289. Lee et al., supra note 31, at 23, 30–31 (acknowledging that the “insanity of 
crowds” might be at work). 
 290. See Howell et al., supra note 26, at 4 n.3 (“[I]n light of the sector’s immaturity 
and speculative frenzy, returns appear more divorced from the goal of serious utility token 
issuers to use the ICO to (a) raise financing; and (b) promote customer adoption of their 
networks.”). 
 291. See Ryan Browne, Cryptocurrencies Have Shed Almost $700 Billion Since January 
Peak, CNBC (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/23/cryptocurrencies-have-
shed-almost-700-billion-since-january-peak.html [https://perma.cc/E29M-97AF] (tracking 
a decline in total cryptocurrency market capitalization to $138.6 billion, from a peak of 
over $830 billion in the beginning of 2018). 
 292. See Deceased Coins, Dead Coins, https://deadcoins.com/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z4KF-99BE] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (listing 680 cryptocurrencies as 
“deceased,” along with another 182 as “scams”); see also Jay Adkission, The 
Cryptocurrency Paradox and Why Crypto Is Failing, Forbes (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/11/28/the-cryptocurrency-paradox-and-
why-crypto-is-failing/ [https://perma.cc/2SFY-AWNS] (describing the “vast majority” of 
cryptocurrencies as having failed). 
 293. We have observed a number of instances in which reports of market capitalization 
greatly exceed what we have been able to identify on blockchain explorers like 
etherscan.io. Theoretically, investors could determine how many tokens were provided to 
how many investors during an ICO and in exchange for what kind of consideration. The 
number of transactions should correspond to the number of buyers. Verifying the size of a 
team’s ICO looks like a mathematical exercise: The product of the number of tokens sold 
and the price paid. In practice, however, this kind of analysis is impractical. First, teams 
routinely engage in private, individualized sales of their tokens to specific investors outside 
of the blockchain. See Applicature, Private Sale or Public Sale?, Medium (Nov. 8, 2018), 
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In a sense, a bubble would be the least surprising and most manageable 
explanation of the ICO market’s rapid price swings. Regulators would 
need to focus on the time-honored, if difficult task of popping future 
bubbles with better informational requirements. But the “animal spirits” 
of irrational exuberance are not the only plausible drivers of ICO 
demand.294 
2. Illicit Demand. — As a complement to the bubble theory of 
cryptoasset success, many signs suggest that a material portion of 
cryptoasset demand is driven by money launderers, tax evaders, and 
other holders of illicit cash.295 Some of these illicit holders might be 
                                                                                                                           
https://medium.com/applicature/private-sale-or-public-sale-b515476718a3 [https://perma.cc/ 
S7N7-KTUP] (“Presaling coins of a cryptocurrency or token of a blockchain project has 
become an effective method of raising funds for the development of a new application.”). 
Though it is possible to verify that a project’s tokens were transferred to certain wallets at 
some point before its public sale, there is no way to know how much the owners of those 
wallets actually paid for the tokens. Maybe unsurprisingly, the self-reported size of a team’s 
private presale often dwarfs the amount sold in its ICO. Thus, for instance, though 
Paragon announced its launch with a $50 million capital raise including presale 
placements, the SEC recently entered into a consent judgment finding only around $12 
million in total was raised. See supra note 174. 
Second, there is generally no way to link a given Ethereum wallet address to a specific 
person or institution. See Dominiek Ter Heide, A Closer Look at Ethereum Signatures, 
Hacker Noon (Feb. 16, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/a-closer-look-at-ethereum-
signatures-5784c14abecc [https://perma.cc/4EEB-TUAT] (“The notion of an account is a 
bit of a misnomer, because in strict technical terms there are only keys and a ledger of 
funds that correspond with those keys.”); cf. Sudhir Khatwani, 6 Ways to Guarantee 
Anonymity When Making Bitcoin Transactions, Coin Sutra (Nov. 10, 2018), 
https://coinsutra.com/anonymous-bitcoin-transactions/ [https://perma.cc/BX83-QGBH] 
(“Bitcoin transactions, by design, are not linked to a person or identity . . . . A person’s 
name, physical address, or email is found nowhere in the transaction.”). Ethereum 
addresses can be created rapidly and for free. See, e.g., Create New Wallet, MyEtherWallet, 
https://www.myetherwallet.com/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (allowing users to 
instantly generate an Ethereum wallet address at no cost). As a result, though it’s possible 
to verify that a certain number of Ethereum addresses received a project’s tokens, it’s 
impossible to confirm that a certain number of investors participated in the sale. A 
development team seeking to drive up enthusiasm for its token might spawn a high 
number of wallet addresses and then transfer tokens to them. These transactions would be 
indistinguishable from legitimate arm’s-length purchases by actual investors. As a result, 
even the portion of an ICO that takes place on a blockchain is subject to manipulation. 
 294. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock 
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135 (2002) 
(offering a behavioral approach to irrational markets). 
 295. See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 Mich. L. Rev. First 
Impressions 38, 43–44 (2013), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1001&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/L3RZ-G5L2] (“Tax-evaders and money launderers 
regularly use . . . tactics to attempt to hide the sources, as well as the destination, of 
funds.”); Ryan Clements, Decoding the Demand for Cryptocurrency: What Is Driving the 
Historic Price Surge?, FinReg Blog (Sept. 26, 2017), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/ 
2017/09/26/decoding-the-demand-for-cryptocurrency-what-is-driving-the-historic-price-surge/ 
[https://perma.cc/7VGU-PSQN] (“Another reason for the run up in price of cryptocurrencies . . . is 
its ability to facilitate criminal activity and to make transactions anonymously—away from the 
informational reach of government and regulators.”). 
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inspired by the original, anarcho-capitalist vision for Bitcoin: to “win a 
major battle in the arms race and gain a new territory of freedom” from 
centralized governments.296  Others might not have politics on their 
mind. 
This second piece of “conventional wisdom” about the cryptoasset 
market was initially suggested by accounts of how Bitcoin’s growth was 
fueled by the drug trade.297 Recent allegations that Russian hacking of 
the Democratic National Committee in 2016 was bought and paid for 
using Bitcoin have made this concern more salient.298 Indeed, one recent 
paper found that approximately half of all bitcoin transactions were 
associated with some form of illegal activity.299 Another found that the 
imposition of “Know Your Customer” policies designed to enforce tax 
and anti-money laundering laws shrank ICO returns.300 
This source of demand would have entirely different implications 
for ICO regulation than the “bubble” story. Obviously, it would seriously 
weaken the case for ensuring an “innovation-friendly” environment 
through well-tailored regulation. It would also counsel in favor of greatly 
increasing scrutiny on the major players in an ICO ecosystem who are 
benefiting from their dalliance with criminal underworlds. 
Along with the “bubble demand” hypothesis, the “illicit demand” 
hypothesis also comports with some of our results. For instance, if 
criminal payments facilitation is indeed a major driver of demand for 
ICOs, then it is unsurprising that investors do not seem to care about 
whether founder vesting promises are delivered via smart contract code. 
Instead, they might simply be treating all ICOs like new printings of 
black-market money. If this is the case, then the high-flying business plans 
found in ICO whitepapers are merely window dressing, or an initial spark 
to help create a network effect for a new cryptocurrency. This form of 
demand could dovetail with the speculators driving the bubble described 
above. And it seems fair to say that gamblers, bubble speculators, and 
                                                                                                                           
 296. Email from Satoshi Nakamoto to the Cryptography Mailing List, Re: Bitcoin P2P E-Cash 
Paper (Nov. 7, 2008), https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/ 
msg09971.html [https://perma.cc/R8TL-PXRU]. 
 297. See Reza Raeesi, The Silk Road, Bitcoins and the Global Prohibition Regime on 
the International Trade in Illicit Drugs: Can This Storm Be Weathered?, 8 Glendon J. Int’l 
Stud., 2015, at 1, 2, 9 (noting that for a time, between 4.5% and 9% of all Bitcoin 
transactions were connected to the Silk Road, an online black market associated with trade 
in illegal drugs). 
 298. See Jordan Pearson, The Russians Who Allegedly Hacked the DNC Mined Bitcoin 
to Fund Their Operation, Motherboard (July 13, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/bjbz7v/russian-hackers-mined-bitcoin-mueller-indictment [https://perma.cc/ 
8JHL-8L4R]. 
 299. See Foley et al., supra note 64, at 2 (“For example, approximately one-quarter of 
all users (26%) and close to one-half of bitcoin transactions (46%) are associated with 
illegal activity.”). 
 300. See Lee et al., supra note 31, at 3 (“[A]nti-money laundering measures, such as a 
Know Your Customer policy, negatively predict fundraising success.”) . 
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criminal cartels alike will not be inordinately attentive to smart contract 
code. 
3. Crypto Winnings. — A third possible source of ICO demand might 
be coming from investors who raked in gains on investments in Bitcoin 
and Ethereum. These two cryptocurrencies have appreciated enormously 
since the beginning of 2015. This has led to massive wealth-creation for a 
cohort of so-called “Bitcoin millionaires,”301 and their decisions about 
what to do with their winnings might be driving a fair bit of ICO success. 
This hypothesis might play out in two ways. First, ICOs might serve 
as a decent place to park winnings that are trapped in crypto purgatory. 
To the extent that the “crypto winners” have been the illicit actors 
described above, they will have trouble converting their cryptocurrency 
holdings to fiat money through traditional channels. To be explicit, even 
if they could easily turn ether or Bitcoin directly into cash, they might 
not want to—they might be worried that governments would investigate 
the owners of fiat cash hoards. 
Instead, they might attempt to wait until cryptocurrency affords them 
more access to consumption in the real world. In doing so, ICOs would 
provide a reasonably good vehicle through which to diversify their holdings 
and to attempt to invest their winnings in potentially lucrative ventures. 
Second, to the extent that some investors treat cryptoasset markets 
like casinos, they might be simply gambling with the house’s money.302 
That is, it is easier to imagine investing in speculative assets, without caring 
too much about the details, when the stake one uses to invest with is itself 
the product of recent, sharp, gains. This is why people sometimes 
(foolishly) play the roulette wheel after winning at blackjack at the casino. 
The “crypto winnings” hypothesis is the least-explored in literature 
about ICO demand and market performance. Nevertheless, there is 
preliminary evidence supporting it. Specifically, one time-series analysis 
suggests that blockbuster ICOs have negative effects on Bitcoin and ether 
prices.303 This suggests that investors are trading between ether and 
Bitcoin on the one hand, and ICOs, on the other. Other analysts observe 
that ICO teams who amassed huge Ethereum war chests from the 
proceeds of their token sales were eventually forced to liquidate them as 
the price of ether dropped. This intensified price declines in not only 
ether but tokens as well.304 If research continues to bear out this effect, it 
                                                                                                                           
 301. See Don Reisinger, Newly-Minted Bitcoin Millionaires Are Lining Up to Buy 
Lamborghinis, Fortune (Apr. 3, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/04/03/bitcoin-millionaire- 
lamborghini-when-lambo/ [https://perma.cc/7AXD-EMUL]. 
 302. See, e.g., Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a 
Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. Ill. J.L. 
Tech. & Pol’y 165, 187 (noting the extent of gambling linked to Bitcoin). 
 303. See Masiak et al., supra note 31. 
 304. See, e.g., Angel Reyes, Ethereum ICO Funds Liquidation Reaches All-Time High 
as December Ends, Crypto.IQ (Dec. 31, 2018), https://cryptoiq.co/ethereum-ico-funds-
liquidation-reaches-all-time-high-as-december-ends/ [https://perma.cc/GQT4-B2XV]; Joseph 
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would only further support the kinds of regulatory responses that are 
appropriate in light of the “bubble” and “illicit demand” scenarios 
described above. 
4. Smart Money. — Finally, it is possible that some ICO demand is 
driven by legitimately smart money. Anecdotal reports indicate that a 
wide range of old-growth VC firms, hedge funds, and family offices are, 
in fact, investing in ICOs.305 Sometimes, they invest directly, as with the 
participation of Sequoia Capital, Andreessen Horowitz, and Union 
Square Ventures in the Filecoin ICO.306  In other cases, they invest 
through intermediaries, whether due to regulatory restrictions on their 
holdings, or simply to work with other investors who are experts in the 
cryptoasset class.307 In either case, these investors are the most likely to be 
engaging in fundamental analysis of ICOs, and thus the most likely to be 
scrutinizing smart contract code. 
The presence of these investors in the market raises numerous 
questions for researchers and regulators alike. First, recall the colloquy 
with the ICO advocate in Part IV.A above. In a world where the code of 
“lex cryptographica” is not performing crucial investor-protection roles, 
we must look to traditional sources of protection. One of those is public 
regulation, but another is private gatekeeping. In the IPO world, for 
instance, the involvement of initial underwriters and primary market-
makers channels pricing toward a fundamental valuation.308 So, too, does 
the participation of institutional investors on the long and short sides of 
the market.309 These investors do the heavy analytical lifting that helps 
                                                                                                                           
Young, Did ICOs Cause Ethereum to Drop by 44% in 2 Weeks by Dumping on the Market?, 
CCN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/did-icos-cause-ethereum-to-drop-by-44-in-2-
weeks-by-dumping-on-the-market/ [https://perma.cc/D3Q7-7UVW]; c.f. Larry Cermak, 
ICOs Are Not Liquidating Their ETH Treasuries, Despite Price Declines. Yet., The Block 
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2018/11/20/icos-are-not-liquidating-
their-eth-treasuries-despite-price-declines-yet/ [https://perma.cc/K9SX-HDKM]. 
 305. See, e.g., Maiya Keidan & Jemima Kelly, Number of Crypto Hedge Funds Surges 
Amid Bitcoin Volatility, Reuters (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-
hedgefunds-bitcoin/number-of-crypto-hedge-funds-surges-amid-bitcoin-volatility-idUSKCN1FZ189 
[https://perma.cc/UZN3-E729]; Olga Kharif & Camila Russo, Venture Capital Surges into 
Crypto Startups, Bloomberg (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-03-26/icos-can-wait-venture-capital-surges-into-crypto-startups [https://perma.cc/3UQ5-
66AM]. 
 306. See Fitz Tepper, Filecoin’s ICO Opens Today for Accredited Investors After 
Raising $52M from Advisers, TechCrunch (Aug. 10, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2017/08/10/filecoins-ico-opens-today-for-accredited-investors-after-raising-52m-from-advisers/ 
[https://perma.cc/YWN9-NY3H]. 
 307. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Cryptocurrency Hedge Fund BlockTower Raises 
$140 Million, Bloomberg (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-01-04/cryptocurrency-fund-blocktower-is-said-to-raise-140-million [https://perma.cc/YP55-
E2Y3]. 
 308. Steven E. Bochner, Jon C. Avina & Calise Y. Cheng, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & 
Rosati, Guide to the Initial Public Offering 18–20 (8th ed. 2016), https://www.wsgr.com/ 
publications/PDFSearch/IPOGuide2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFK6-8RF4]. 
 309. See id. at 29. 
656 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:591 
 
protect retail investors from succumbing to irrationality. And (most of 
the time) these investors read the investment contracts.310 
Are “smart money” investors playing similar channeling roles in the 
ICO market? It is hard to say. Maybe investors like Sequoia Capital are 
entering into side letters with ICO teams to contractually ensure that 
supply and vesting promises are upheld. 311  Maybe the Andreessen 
Horwitzes of the world are scrutinizing modifiability and holding private 
corporate-governance fiduciary powers to rein in its use. They might also 
be embedding important information into market prices—for instance, 
information about ICO project activity, founding team reputation, and 
the quality of an ICO’s informational disclosures.312 On the other hand, 
maybe they’re not. There is nothing stopping the “smart money” from 
riding cryptoasset volatility for all it’s worth. Bubbles are profitable for 
smart money, too, so long as they can cash out before the music stops. It 
would be valuable for future research to suss out the strategies and tactics 
that old-growth investors have been employing in this market. 
From a regulatory perspective, the presence of smart money presents 
both a reason to care about preserving ICOs as a potentially valuable 
innovation and a potential lever to use. Indeed, one happy story that 
might be told a decade hence is that the ICO market of 2017 merely 
represented a period of growing pains, where reliable information 
sources and reputable gatekeepers were taking formation. 
C. Whose Market Might It Become? 
Based on the strong evidence that smart money is not leading this 
market, it can be tempting to cast doubt on all aspects of ICOs, including 
smart contracts. Though it will take future research to prove it, the ICO 
buy side today looks to us like a mixture of a bubble and an illicit market, 
with some smart money in the mix. And yet, this doesn’t mean that smart 
contracts are meaningless. 
As John Maynard Keynes (didn’t) say, “The market can stay irrational 
longer than you can stay solvent.”313 But over a long enough time horizon, 
                                                                                                                           
 310. Cf., e.g., Matt Levine, You Can’t Always Read the Documents, Bloomberg (June 5, 
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-05/you-can-t-always-read-
the-documents (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining that arbitrageurs are the 
people who “read[] the bond documents so that everyone else doesn’t have to. It’s just 
that everyone else pays [them] to do it.”). 
 311. The Storj secondary vesting contract, discussed infra at note 627, would provide a 
different (and more transparent) way to accomplish the same end. 
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 313. See Jason Zweig, Keynes: He Didn’t Say Half of What He Said. Or Did He?, Wall 
St. J.: Marketbeat (Feb. 11, 2011), https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/02/11/keynes-
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every bubble must pop. This leaves open the possibility that fundamental 
aspects of smart contract quality will, eventually, sway the outcomes of the 
market, with smart money at the helm. 
In many ways, the ICO market of the past couple of years resembles 
the dot-com boom that took place at the end of the last century. That 
boom featured massive reallocations of investment capital toward nearly 
any company that proposed a business strategy that incorporated what 
was then called the “world wide web.”314 The same has been observed in 
relation to “blockchain” and “token”-based business plans in today’s 
climate.315 In the dot-com boom, investors also broke from fidelity to 
traditional investment metrics like price-to-earnings ratios, instead 
relying on new valuation drivers like the sheer number of “eyeballs” 
viewing a website or the “stickiness” of the website experience.316 Short-
term performance on these metrics turned out to have little relation to a 
company’s long-term success.317 
It is hard not to see the rise of crypto-investment metrics like GitHub 
reputational stars, Twitter followers, and Instagram likes as representing 
a similarly problematic set of proxies for the possibility of network 
success. Financially, between the years of 1997 and 2000, internet stocks 
zoomed up and up, suggesting a new paradigm for corporate finance. 
The cryptoasset investor subcultures devoted to rejecting “fear, uncertainty, 
and doubt” may be in for a similarly painful fall to earth. Almost without 
question, both the dot-com market and the ICO market would have 
benefited from clearer and more reliable information environments to 
curb their excesses. 
And yet, from a distance of twenty years, the economic follies of the 
late 1990s look less like utter madness, and more like a kind of overeager 
prescience. The clothing retailer boo.com may have gone belly-up, but e-
commerce represents 40% of sales for even classic footprint companies 
like J.Crew,318 and leading apparel startups like Everlane and Rent the 
Runway are decidedly “online-native.” 319  And though the grocery 
deliverer Webvan.com was widely derided as one of the biggest flops of 
                                                                                                                           
 314. See Elizabeth Demers & Baruch Lev, A Rude Awakening: The Internet Shakeout 
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content/40ec964a-e429-11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 316. See id. 
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the dot-com bust,320 Amazon is pushing in that direction.321 The rush for 
eyeballs has become a rush for data, and online shopping continues its 
remarkably paced growth.322 
Will we look back on the cryptoasset craze initiated in 2017 with 
similar curiosity twenty years from now? What will fall away as the 
ephemera of the moment, and what will work itself deeply into our 
economic institutions? Given the froth of the market, it can be tempting 
to focus on the gut-level question of whether the ICO market is a 
financial bubble, and if so, how regulators should address it. 
But our view is that legal policymakers might do well to look beyond 
the bubble (and its certain fate). Bubbles misallocate capital to 
unproductive uses and divert the energy of those who respond to the 
capital’s call. They also harm unsavvy investors who fall prey to the 
salesmen who are selling a bull market.323 These animal spirits cause 
huge amounts of mischief. It ought to be—and indeed is—the province 
of lawmakers and regulators to temper them. 324  And yet, we are 
convinced there is something useful to be learned from this first 
experiment in blockchain governance. Some firms are encoding their 
promises, though it’s not obviously rewarding to do so. Others are 
working to create intermediaries and certification regimes despite the 
contrary incentives present in a sharply rising market. Rewarding such 
good actors should be as important to regulators as punishing fraudsters. 
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CONCLUSION 
The computer code at the heart of ICOs enables a new way of 
founding and governing enterprises. It allows entrepreneurs to adopt the 
ICO method, whether for good or ill. But while smart contract 
technology may be a driver—indeed, a definitional component—of the 
ICO phenomenon, we believe our study demonstrates in detail that 
smart contracts are also embedded in the social world. Just like Coca-
Cola’s vending machines, ICOs are products of their time and place. 
They are built atop innovative “technical systems” that only recently 
came into being, and they are conducted within particular “communities 
of discourse” that happen to exist here and now.325 To make sense of the 
technology’s role, scholars and regulators alike should study the unique 
forms that this embeddedness takes. 
Our study demonstrates that the current structures—markets, formal 
organizations, and professional communities—where ICOs take place are 
producing a disconnect. Far from replacing (or seamlessly extending) 
law and norms, code is often falling short of expectations. It sometimes 
fails to deliver key investor protections, and can provide founders with 
significant, undisclosed authority to alter the terms of investor 
engagement. While ICOs are promoted by an industrial community that 
espouses technolibertarian beliefs in the power of “trustless trust” and 
carefully designed code, actual ICO practices do not uphold that ideology. 
The disconnect we observe reflects the informality of the ICO world. 
Paper contracts and IPOs are joint products of law firms, investment 
banks, regulators, and a panoply of buy-side institutional intermediaries. 
Smart contracts and ICOs, at least at the moment, largely result from 
coders and entrepreneurs working at greater distance from risk-averse 
gatekeepers. Befitting their relatively informal production setting, smart 
contracts have been plagued with quality control problems. They suffer 
vast amounts of hacking,326 and, as we show, standards as to how code is 
produced and made legible are wanting.327 Unlike the traditional legal 
world, there are currently no guilds or expert institutions governing 
smart contract coders’ practices to encourage quality. To withstand 
market ups and downs, the ICO community should invest in developing 
reliable institutions and promulgating best practices for the long term. 
The informality of smart contract production leads to risks, to be 
sure, but it also breeds creativity. Lawyers tend to recycle language from 
agreement to agreement without much thought, but the smart contract 
community is full of “makers,” excitement, and avocational energy. This 
distinction suggests that the rate of innovation within smart contracting 
                                                                                                                           
 325. See Suchman, supra note 24, at 92. 
 326. See Irrera, More Than 10 Percent, supra note 258 (“More than 10 percent of 
funds raised through ‘initial coin offerings’ are lost or stolen in hacker attacks.”). 
 327. See supra Part III. 
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is driven by social factors, as well as technological ones.328 It also suggests 
that whether or not the ICO market is a bubble, professionals and 
hobbyists working on ICOs will be able to port smart contract governance 
into new settings over the years to come. As their ranks increase, the “no-
reading” problem for smart contracts might also be tempered. Right 
now, one aspect of the disconnect we’ve identified is that so few people 
can read smart contracts. The community of people who are able to vet 
and audit smart contracts has much room to grow. As it does grow, and as 
existing institutions develop vetting capacity, we would expect to see 
quality improve. 
We think that optimal regulation depends heavily on a better 
understanding of the buy side of the market. But whatever the fraction of 
investors who deserve protecting, our results show that computer code is 
not presently a reliable part of the ICO form. Our results strongly suggest 
that an increased presence of gatekeepers and regulators might help that 
process along. The SEC, with its newly developed “Cyber Unit,”329 is 
increasingly active in patrolling the scene. Other regulators, along with 
courts, will also contribute to increasing formalization of ICO code 
standards. So, too, will private standard-setting organizations within the 
industry itself. The rise of trusted intermediaries will be the next 
necessary step in any maturation of this novel financial form. 
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U8LQ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. 
 464. Polybius, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polybius/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/VA5C-XVV6] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2019) (reported as of July 15, 2017). 
 465. Id. 
 466. Unikoin Gold, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/unikrn [https://perma.cc/ 
869H-YA4Z] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Unikoin Gold, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/unikoin-
gold/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/J8M7-4NJX] (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 21, 2017). 
 470. Id. 
 471. DomRaider, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/domraider [https://perma.cc/ 
5MH8-QHZK] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. 
 474. DomRaider, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/domraider/historical- 
data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/R2LV-CACL] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 6, 2017). 
 475. Id. 
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Blackmoon  CYP
476 $30.0477 10/12/17478 $25.3479 $3.8480 
Bankera  LTU
481 $150.9482 2/27/18483 N/A484 N/A485 
Agrello EST
486 $35.0487 8/17/17488 $34.5489 $3.3490 
Storj USA
491 $30.0492 5/25/17493 $23.5494 $19.3495 
Eidoo CHE
496 $28.0497 10/16/17498 $25.5499 $22.3500 
                                                                                                                           
 476. Blackmoon, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/blackmoon [https://perma.cc/Y6EX-
L7DM] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Blackmoon, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/blackmoon/ 
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/5L3R-QQPN] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 20, 2017). 
 480. Id. 
 481. Bankera, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/bankera [https://perma.cc/4CQU-
L6VF] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 482. Id. 
 483. Id. 
 484. No market capitalization data for Bankera were available from publicly available 
coin-focused websites. 
 485. See supra note 484.  
 486. Agrello, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/agrello [https://perma.cc/M8QM-
FEPB] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Agrello, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/agrello-delta/ 
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/DA72-2RW9] (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 9, 2017). 
 490. Id. 
 491. Storj, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/storj [https://perma.cc/WK6J-W4ZR] (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Storj, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/storj/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/UX89-8YXN] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2019) (reported as of July 2, 2017). 
 495. Id. 
 496. Eidoo, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/eidoo [https://perma.cc/5JMZ-JBCQ] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Eidoo, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/eidoo/historical-data/ 
?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/D68K-KBQU] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) 
(reported as of Oct. 17, 2017). 
 500. Id. 
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Monaco CHE
501 $26.7502 6/18/17503 $23.9504 $35.3505 
Power Ledger AUS
506 $13.2507 10/6/17508 $76.6509 $32.0510 
Everex SGP
511 $26.7512 8/31/17513 $31.5514 $4.4515 
Decentraland ARG
516 $24.0517 8/8/17518 $18.7519 $47.7520 
FunFair GBR
521 $20.0522 6/23/17523 $348.3524 $22.9525 
                                                                                                                           
 501. Monaco, ICODrops, https://icodrops.com/monaco/ [https://perma.cc/JGG8-PRE9] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 502. Id. 
 503. Id. 
 504. Crypto.com, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/crypto-com/ 
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/R2UG-JSG8] (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of July 3, 2017). 
 505. Id. 
 506. Power Ledger, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/power-ledger [https://perma.cc/ 
F4E6-7TA5] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 507. Id. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Power Ledger, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/power-
ledger/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/AXD8-UTEA] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 6, 2017). 
 510. Id. 
 511. Everex, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/everex [https://perma.cc/3BVJ-
FW6P] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 512. Id. 
 513. Id. 
 514. Everex, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/everex/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/8GXU-H92P] (last visited Feb. 
2, 2019) (reported as of Oct. 10, 2017). 
 515. Id. 
 516. Decentraland, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/decentraland [https://perma.cc/ 
8QLC-AVFC] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 517. Id. 
 518. Id. 
 519. Decentraland, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/decentraland/ 
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/G6VA-S7DG] (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 28, 2017). 
 520. Id. 
 521. FunFair, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/funfair [https://perma.cc/9NQ9-
C6QL] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 522. Id. 
 523. Id. 
 524. FunFair, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/funfair/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/5CMJ-6FZA] (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019) (reported as of July 2, 2017). 
 525. Id. 
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BitClave USA
526 $25.5527 11/29/17528 $81.7529 $0.3530 
Tierion USA
531 $25.0532 7/28/17533 $81.6534 $5.0535 
OmiseGo SGP
536 $25.0537 7/23/17538 $42.6539 $189.5540 
Aragon ESP
541 $25.0542 5/17/17543 $36.9544 $11.2545 
0x USA
546 $24.0547 9/15/17548 $134.6549 $163.9550 
                                                                                                                           
 526. BitClave, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/bitclave [https://perma.cc/7JVU-
DC8N] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 527. Id. 
 528. Id. 
 529. BitClave, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitclave/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/KR7E-WABF] (last visited Feb. 
2, 2019) (reported as of Jan. 16, 2018). 
 530. Id. 
 531. Tierion, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/tierion [https://perma.cc/S44L-
P449] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 532. Id. 
 533. Id. 
 534. Tierion, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tierion/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/S34T-QHJZ] (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019) (reported as of Aug. 27, 2017). 
 535. Id. 
 536. OmiseGo, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/omisego [https://perma.cc/N7G3-
YV8M] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 537. Id. 
 538. Id. 
 539. OmiseGo, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/omisego/historical- 
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/QCU9-EH6B] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) 
(reported as of July 15, 2017). 
 540. Id. 
 541. Aragon, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/aragon [https://perma.cc/DB26-
QH48] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 542. Id. 
 543. Id. 
 544. Aragon, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/aragon/historical- 
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/4LRD-3NSK] (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019) (reported as of May 19, 2017). 
 545. Id. 
 546. 0x, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/0x [https://perma.cc/K6MJ-ZDCN] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 547. Id. 
 548. Id. 
 549. 0x, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/0x/historical-data/ 
?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/9CZ8-KVJD] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) 
(reported as of Aug. 16, 2017). 
 550. Id. 
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Enjin Coin SGP
551 $23.0552 10/31/17553 $18.7554 $28.6555 
BLOCKv USA
556 $21.5557 10/25/17558 $31.6559 $7.2560 
FinShi Capital SGP
561 $21.4562 10/6/17563 N/A564 N/A565 
UTRUST CHE
566 $20.0567 11/20/17568 $68.1569 $10.0570 
Target Coin IND
571 $20.7572 8/31/17573 $28.8574 $0.8575 
                                                                                                                           
 551. Enjin Coin, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/enjin-coin [https://perma.cc/ 
UY3T-GJB4] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 552. Id. 
 553. Id. 
 554. Enjin Coin, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/enjin-coin/ 
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/7DY8-XLH9] (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 15, 2017). 
 555. Id. 
 556. BLOCKv, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/blockv [https://perma.cc/68GU-
VQM4] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 557. Id. 
 558. Id. 
 559. BLOCKv, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/blockv/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/BCB8-XVY3] (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019) (reported as of Dec. 7, 2017). 
 560. Id. 
 561. FinShi Capital, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/finshi-capital [https://perma.cc/ 
FT72-X3FL] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 562. Id. 
 563. Id. 
 564. No market capitalization data for FinShi Capital was available from publicly 
available coin-focused websites. 
 565. See supra note 564. 
 566. UTRUST, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/utrust [https://perma.cc/5KVG-
YVUT] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 567. Id. 
 568. Id. 
 569. UTRUST, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/utrust/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/SWZ8-Y629] (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019) (reported as of Dec. 29, 2017). 
 570. Id. 
 571. Target Coin, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/target-coin [https://perma.cc/ 
QGL2-C2R2] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 572. Id. 
 573. Id. 
 574. Target Coin, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/target-coin/ 
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/UZ72-G6DZ] (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2019) (reported as of Oct. 7, 2017). 
 575. Id. 
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ATB Coin USA
576 $20.4577 9/1/17578 $35.2579 $0.4580 
Giga Watt USA
581 $15.0582 7/31/17583 $4.3584 $1.6585 
Total N/A $2,584.0 N/A $6,969.7 $5,335.1 
 
  
                                                                                                                           
 576. ATB Coin, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/atb-coin [https://perma.cc/ 
L7DV-MNDS] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 577. Id. 
 578. Id. 
 579. ATBCoin, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/atbcoin/historical-
data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/GV7E-D6MB] (last visited Feb. 
18, 2019) (reported as of Oct. 7, 2017). 
 580. Id. 
 581. Giga Watt, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/giga-watt [https://perma.cc/ 
H4CW-CWNF] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 582. Id. 
 583. Id. 
 584. Giga Watt Token, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/giga-
watt-token/historical-data/?start=20130801&end=20190125 [https://perma.cc/AXD8-UTEA] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 2, 2017). 
 585. Id. 
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Filecoin594 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tezos595 ScarcityNN BurningYN VestingYN ModificationNN 
EOS Stage 1596 ScarcityNN BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
Paragon597 ScarcityYY BurningYY VestingNN ModificationNN 
Bancor598 ScarcityYN BurningYY VestingYN ModificationNN 
                                                                                                                           
 586. For individualized details related to claims of token scarcity for each ICO, see 
generally Appendix C, supra note 69. 
 587. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract. 
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645. 
 588. For individualized details related to claims of token burning for each ICO, see 
generally Appendix C, supra note 69. 
 589. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract. 
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645. 
 590. For individualized details related to claims of token vesting for each ICO, see 
generally Appendix C, supra note 69. 
 591. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract. 
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645. 
 592. For individualized details related to claims of token modifications for each ICO, 
see generally Appendix C, supra note 69. 
 593. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract. 
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645. 
 594. Filecoin’s ICO buyers received traditional investment agreements that promise 
delivery of cryptoassets in the future. See Bennett Garner, What Is Filecoin? Beginner’s 
Guide to the Largest-Ever ICO, CoinCentral (Feb. 20, 2018), https://coincentral.com/ 
filecoin-beginners-guide-largest-ever-ico/ [https://perma.cc/PJ52-J335]; see also Appendix 
C, supra note 69. To date, Filecoin has not made any smart contract code publicly available 
for audit on Etherscan. See Email from Marvin Ammori, Gen. Counsel of Protocol Labs, 
to David Hoffman, Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. (Aug. 2, 2018) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (confirming that the organization was not affiliated with any tokens 
labeled “Filecoin” available on Etherscan). 
 595. Tezos ran simultaneous capital raising efforts on both the Bitcoin and Ethereum 
networks. Following the development of the independent Tezos blockchain, contributors 
were to be manually allocated “Tezzies” (the associated coin) on the new chain, in 
proportion to their contributions. The “ICO” contract on the Ethereum blockchain 
provided no such guarantee. See Steven O’Neal, The History of Tezos: The Infamous ICO 
Trying to Rebound Amidst Lawsuits and Disputes, CoinTelegraph (July 5, 2018), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/the-history-of-tezos-the-infamous-ico-trying-to-rebound-
amidst-lawsuits-and-disputes [https://perma.cc/F88J-5BDW]. 
 596. EOSIO, Eos-Token-distribution, Github (July 5, 2017), https://github.com/ 
EOSIO/eos-token-distribution/blob/master/src/eos_sale.sol [https://perma.cc/8TXF-XTEH]. 
 597. Paragon (PRG), supra note 178. 
 598. Bancor (BNT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x1f573d6f 
b3f13d689ff844b4ce37794d79a7ff1c#code [https://perma.cc/JD5L-U6CL] (last visited Feb. 16, 
2019). 
2019] COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM 673 
 
Kin599 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYY ModificationNN 
Status600 ScarcityYN BurningYY VestingYY ModificationYY 
Tron601 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
TenX602 ScarcityYN BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
MobileGo603 ScarcityYY BurningYY VestingNN ModificationNN 
KyberNetwork604 ScarcityYY BurningYY VestingYN ModificationNN 
MCAP605 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingNN ModificationNN 
Loopring606 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingNN ModificationNN 
Enigma Catalyst607 ScarcityYY BurningYN VestingYN ModificationNN 
ICON608 ScarcityNY BurningNY VestingYN ModificationNN 
PeerBanks609 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingNN ModificationNN 
Electroneum610 ScarcityYN BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
Aeternity611 ScarcityYY BurningYN VestingYN ModificationNN 
  
                                                                                                                           
 599. Kin (KIN), supra note 154. 
 600. StatusNetwork (SNT), supra note 183. 
 601. Tronix (TRX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xf230b 
790e05390fc8295f4d3f60332c93bed42e2#code [https://perma.cc/ZF45-QSTX] (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). 
 602. TenXPay (PAY), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xB97048 
628DB6B661D4C2aA833e95Dbe1A905B280#code [https://perma.cc/87RH-XDAX] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 603. MobileGo (MGO), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x40395 
044Ac3c0C57051906dA938B54BD6557F212#code [https://perma.cc/2WFL-QZ9W] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 604. KyberNetwork (KNC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xdd974 
d5c2e2928dea5f71b9825b8b646686bd200#code [https://perma.cc/J5T9-83T7] (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). 
 605. MCAP (MCAP), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x93 
e682107d1e9defb0b5ee701c71707a4b2e46bc#code [https://perma.cc/7MJN-GAJR] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 606. Loopring (LRC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xef68 
e7c694f40c8202821edf525de3782458639f#code [https://perma.cc/L8K8-3Z9Z] (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). 
 607. Enigma (ENG), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xf0ee 
6b27b759c9893ce4f094b49ad28fd15a23e4#code [https://perma.cc/P622-PA3Q] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 608. ICON (ICX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xb5 
a5f22694352c15b00323844ad545abb2b11028#code [https://perma.cc/6Z4P-PLEU] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 609. PEERBANKS (IRA), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xcb73 
cef85b5d50a23a580919e72818fd2264c0f5#code [https://perma.cc/RXU7-37BD] (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). 
 610. This ICO was performed entirely off chain, prior to the launch of the Electroneum 
network. As a result, automated enforcement of the promises made in the whitepaper was 
not available. 
 611. Aeternity (AE), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x5ca 
9a71b1d01849c0a95490cc00559717fcf0d1d#code [https://perma.cc/K46G-E6H5] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
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Monetha612 ScarcityYY BurningYY VestingYY ModificationNN 
Basic Attention 
Token613 
ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYY614 ModificationNN 
Stox615 ScarcityYY BurningNY VestingYY ModificationNY 
Civic616 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNY 
Request Network617 ScarcityYY BurningYY VestingNY ModificationNN 
Grid+ 618 ScarcityYY BurningYN VestingYY ModificationNN 
ChainLink619 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingNN ModificationNN 
Polybius620 Unauditable Unauditable Unauditable ModificationYY 
Unikoin Gold621 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingNN ModificationNN 
DomRaider622 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYY ModificationNN 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 612. Monetha (MTH), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xaf4 
dce16da2877f8c9e00544c93b62ac40631f16#code [https://perma.cc/35DX-3GUY] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 613. Basic Attention Token (BAT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/ 
0x0d8775f648430679a709e98d2b0cb6250d2887ef#code [https://perma.cc/26YV-YR3F] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 614. BAT implements vesting via a secondary smart contract, to which tokens were 
transferred before the ICO. See BATSafe, Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/ 
address/0x67fa2c06c9c6d4332f330e14a66bdf1873ef3d2b#code [https://perma.cc/A2GE-
LWWN] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
 615. Stox (STX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x006 
bea43baa3f7a6f765f14f10a1a1b08334ef45#code [https://perma.cc/6Z6V-U94T] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 616. Civic (CVC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x41e 
5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45#code [https://perma.cc/G6PU-2TFA] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 617. Request (REQ), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x8f8221 
afbb33998d8584a2b05749ba73c37a938a#code [https://perma.cc/G22E-FJ9N] (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). 
 618. Sale, Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x94dc1cf66c8fd62 
ef3bd7da53f47423862839823#code [https://perma.cc/8BJT-93F8] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 619. ChainLink Token (LINK), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/ 
0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca#code [https://perma.cc/J367-VV4R] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 620. This ICO constitutes a “proxy contract”: a primary smart contract with which 
users interact and a secondary smart contract whose code is incorporated by reference. 
The primary contract for this ICO is written in Solidity and stores the modifiable reference 
along with code controlling how the reference may be changed, thus modifying the 
overall functionality. The secondary smart contract is available on Etherscan but only in 
bytecode format. As all functionality other than modification is delegated to the secondary 
bytecode contract, we were unable to audit the scarcity, burning, and vesting whitepaper 
claims. See Polybius (PLBT), supra note 205.  
 621. Unikoin Gold (UKG), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/ 
0x24692791bc444c5cd0b81e3cbcaba4b04acd1f3b#code [https://perma.cc/KWA3-4DT7] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 622. DomRaiderToken (DRT), Contract, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x9af4f 
26941677c706cfecf6d3379ff01bb85d5ab#code [https://perma.cc/B9DL-897Y] (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). 




Unauditable Unauditable Unauditable ModificationNY 
Bankera624 ScarcityYN BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
Agrello625 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
Storj626 ScarcityYY BurningYY VestingYN
627 ModificationNY 
Eidoo628 ScarcityYN BurningYY VestingYY ModificationNN 
Monaco629 ScarcityYN BurningYN VestingYN ModificationNY 
Power Ledger630 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
Everex631 ScarcityYY BurningNN VestingYN ModificationNN 
Decentraland632 ScarcityNN BurningYY VestingYN ModificationNN 
FunFair633 ScarcityYN BurningYY VestingYN ModificationYY 
Bitclave634 ScarcityYY BurningYN VestingYN ModificationNY 
  
                                                                                                                           
 623. This ICO constitutes a “proxy contract.” For a detailed description of what 
constitutes a proxy contract, see supra note 620. As a result, for this ICO our audit was 
limited solely to claims related to Modification. See Blackmoon Crypto Token (BMC), 
supra note 200. 
 624. Banker Token (BNK), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/ 
0xc80c5e40220172b36adee2c951f26f2a577810c5#code [https://perma.cc/3YCM-JMXE] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 625. Delta (DLT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x07e3c70653548 
b04f0a75970c1f81b4cbbfb606f#code [https://perma.cc/S5DZ-J2XR] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 626. Storj (STORJ), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/ 
0xb64ef51c888972c908cfacf59b47c1afbc0ab8ac#code [https://perma.cc/ZF7X-Y69P] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 627. Storj is a hard case. It built a token-based vesting regime outside of its ICO smart 
contract. For the vesting contract and associated transaction log, see TokenVault, Contract Overview, 
Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x34f34f58c50ef059b766065dbb24f7cf885e6463 
[https://perma.cc/FE7X-DH8P] (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). While we believe that the 
project team manually transferred tokens for lockup into that second contract, this was 
not an automatic process. Nor (as with BAT, supra note 614) was it completed manually in 
advance of the ICO. 
 628. Eidoo (EDO), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xced4e 
93198734ddaff8492d525bd258d49eb388e#code [https://perma.cc/6MFT-LRZC] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
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22, 2019). 
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(last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
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ICO Name Supply Claims Burning Claims Vesting Claims Modification Claims 
Filecoin Sale Cap: 200,000,0001  “Q: What happens if less than 200mm 
tokens are sold? Do they get burnt? If not, 
who owns them?  
A: . . . We will split all remaining tokens as 
follows:  
• We will first apply the remainder to 
pay for the costs of the token sale itself 
(many token sales usually pre-allocate 
this cost) 
• We will sell half of the remainder to 
the public on network launch.  
• We will keep the other half for market 
stability (buying and selling filecoin 
on exchanges to provide market 
liquidity, price stabilization, correcting 
unbalanced incentives for storage and 
retrieval miners, etc.).”2 
“The vesting schedule for each participating group is as follows:  
• Investors: 1 year minimum (advisor pre-sale), 6 month minimum 
(public sale)  
• Protocol Labs: 6 years, linear vesting  
• Foundation: 6 years, linear vesting.  
• Miners: Release half-life of 6 years 
For investors, the following vesting periods and discounts are 
available:  
• 6 month vesting, 0% discount  
• 1 year vesting, 7.5% discount 
• 2 year vesting, 15% discount 
• 3 year vesting, 20% discount”3 
N/A 
Tezos “Following the example set by the Ethereum 
Foundation, there is no cap on the amount of 
contributions that will be accepted by the 
Foundation. This is done in order to ensure that 
participation is not limited only to insiders or the 
‘fast-fingered.’ The Tezos development team believes 
that an uncapped fundraiser will promote a 
widespread distribution of the tokens, a necessary 
prerequisite to launching a robust network.”4 
“If two endorsements are made for the 
same slot or two blocks at the same height 
by a delegate, the evidence can be 
collected by an accuser [sic] and included 
in a block . . . . This accusation forfeits the 
entirety of the safety deposit and future 
reward up to that point in the cycle. Half is 
burned, half goes to the accuser in the 
form 
of a block reward. 
In the current protocol, accusations for the 
same incident can be made several times 
after the fact. This means that the deposits 
and rewards for the entire 
cycle are forfeited, including any deposit 
made, or reward earned, after the 
incident.”5 
“10% to the Foundation, vesting over four years. 
An amount equivalent to one eighth of the tokens allocated in pools 
A, B, and C will be allocated to the Foundation. This pool will 
represent 10% of the total number of tokens issued during the 
fundraiser. . . . These tokens will vest over a period of 4 years.”6 
N/A 
                                                                 
1 Filecoin, Filecoin Token Sale Economics, CoinList, coinlist/assets/index/filecoin_index/Filecoin-Sale-Economics-e3f703f8cd5f644aecd7ae3860ce932064ce014dd60de115d67ff1e9047ffa8e.pdf [https://perma.cc/U75F-XNUS] [hereinafter Filecoin Token Sale] (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
2 Filecoin, Filecoin Investor FAQ, IPFS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmWdXyhqHJWJut5wt4gSCueTjSnFyDHBy3SRfmcqArtz1a/2017-08-08-Filecoin-Investor-FAQ.html [http://perma.cc/M5FD-Q8Q6]. 
3 Filecoin Token Sale, supra note 1. 
4 Tezos, Tezos Overview 11 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
5 Arthur Breitman, Proof of Stake in Tezos, Gitlab (Nov. 23, 2018), https://gitlab.com/tezos/tezos/blob/master/docs/whitedoc/proof_of_stake.rst (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
6 Tezos, supra note 4, at 12. 
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ICO Name Supply Claims Burning Claims Vesting Claims Modification Claims 
EOS Stage 1 “The EOS.IO software may be configured to enforce 
a cap on producer awards such that the total annual 
increase in token supply does not exceed 5%.”7 
“These founders' tokens (‘Founders' Tokens’) 
represent 10% of the aggregate EOS Token 
Distribution (or 100,000,000 EOS Tokens).”8 
N/A “The default EOSIO Software configuration developed by Block.one 
locks new founders’ tokens distributed pursuant to the launch of an 
EOSIO Platform in a smart contract and releases 100,000,000 of such 
tokens (10% of the aggregate EOS Token Distribution) linearly to 
Block.one every second over a period of 10 years.”9 
N/A 
Paragon “Paragon will issue a total of 200,000,000 tokens. No 
additional tokens will ever be generated. Distribution 
of the initial 100 million tokens will be through a 
series of token offerings.”10 
“All fees on the Paragon ecosystem will be 
paid in PRG. The fee structure will keep 
the price of each transaction low. Each 
transaction will cost $.000000005 or 
5/1000000000 of a cent (5E-10%). One-
half of the fee will be burned each time a 
transaction occurs, and the other one-half 
will be deposited to the Paragon Reserve 
Fund. With the cannabis market surpassing 
$100B market size in the US alone and 
current banking issues, we’re hoping to 
bring a big share of it onto our platform.”11 
• “50,000,000 tokens for sale at stage 2—no sooner than 2021, at 
market price (not the initial $1 of the first crowdsale)  
• 40,000,000 tokens allotted for Paragon controlled reserve to 
maintain price support of the PRG tokens. Tokens can be 
bought or sold to keep the tokens circulation stable  
• 10,000,000 tokens community-controlled reserve to be used for 
the best startup ideas as voted on by the community”12 
N/A 
Bancor • “Fixed Price: 0.01 ETH per 1 BNT (i.e. 100 BNT 
per 1 ETH)  
• Hidden ETH Cap: revealed if 80% of the cap is 
reached.”13 
“4.3.1 Implicit burn by transferring tokens 
to the SmartToken address 
• Likelihood: low 
• Impact: high 
SmartToken implements functionality that 
burns tokens if transferred to the address 
of the token itself. While this seems a 
sensible default, absent a compelling need 
for users to be able to burn tokens, we 
recommend that this functionality be 
removed, and the token instead throw an 
exception in this case. User error, and 
mistakenly entering the token address in 
the to [sic] field, could otherwise easily 
lead to them inadvertently destroying 
tokens.”14 
“Vesting is a governance practice designed to ensure long-term 
alignment of interests and is standard for any serious project. All 
founders and team members will have a 3 year vesting schedule with 
a 6 month cliff. This means we will mature one-sixth of our tokens 
every 6 months.”15 
N/A 
Kin “In order to finance the Kin roadmap, Kik will 
conduct a token distribution event that will offer for 
sale one trillion units out of a 10 trillion unit total 
supply of kin.”16 
N/A “Each day, once the Rewards Engine is up and running, d=0.061% of 
the remaining reserves will be put into circulation (for a total of 20 
percent of remaining reserves every year).”17 
N/A 
                                                                 
7 EOS, EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2, GitHub (Apr. 28, 2018), https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md [https://perma.cc/7D6W-AQ73]. 
8 Frequently Asked Questions, EOS, https://eos.io/faq (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
9 Id. 
10 Paragon, Whitepaper Version 1.0, at 29 (2017), https://paragoncoin.com/whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/K4YZ-LTYD]. 
11 Id. at 32. 
12 Id. at 13. 
13 Bancor, Bancor Network Token (BNT) Contribution & Token Allocation Terms, Medium (June 5, 2017), https://medium.com/@bancor/bancor-network-token-bnt-contribution-token-creation-terms-48cc85a63812 [http://perma.cc/H7DV-NZPN]. 
14 Nick Johnson, Bancor Audit, GitHubGist (May 31, 2017), https://gist.github.com/Arachnid/c65fd1bd61a8e0294aef95a4808edc78#file-bancor-audit-md [http://perma.cc/3DSR-KCU5]. 
15 Bancor, supra note 13. 
16 Kik Interactive, Inc., Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem of Digital Services for Daily Life 21 (2017), https://kinecosystem.org/static/files/Kin_Whitepaper_V1_English.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XH2-H4LL]. 





ICO Name Supply Claims Burning Claims Vesting Claims Modification Claims 
Status “The easiest way to understand the Dynamic Ceiling 
is as a series of ‘hidden hard caps’. A fixed upper 
limit that restricts further contributions until the next 
upper limit is revealed. 
The first ceiling is public and begins the moment 
12M CHF (Swiss Francs) equivalent has been 
reached. It signifies that the Contribution Period will 
end within 24 hours, or sooner if the hidden hard 
ceiling has been met.  
The moment the first ceiling has been triggered 
there will be a series of additional hidden ceilings 
that begin after a given number of blocks has been 
reached. Each hidden ceiling decreases in size and 
has to be revealed publicly before accepting further 
contributions. 
This allows contributors to continue to participate 
after the first ceiling has been reached, but reduces 
the maximum contribution size per ceiling, and 
solves the problem of run-away ‘soft caps’.”18 
“The distribution of SNT created during 
the contribution period has been outlined 
by Status’ team in the following way: . . . 
- 29% SNT Reserve for future stakeholders, 
locked for a minimum of a year, to be 
burned if not deemed necessary for the 
growth of the network.”19 
“20% of SNT created during the Contribution Period will be 
allocated to Status Core Dev; the founders and team, over a 24 
month vesting period, with a 6 month cliff. This means Founder 
tokens will not be immediately tradable . . . .”20 
“Based on the work of smart contract 
developer Jordi Baylina, the Status 
Network token possesses an interesting 
attribute—the ability to easily spawn new 
tokens that have the same balance 
distribution as the parent token at any 
given block number. We're strong 
believers in a culture of 
experimentation, and this model 
preserves fair contribution for early 
backers, without imposing rigid 
restrictions on the ability to test new 
SNT utility as the project evolves over 
time. 
The core team and the Status 
community are committed to ensuring 
that the SNT token adds value to the 
platform and drives network effects. 
Given the Ethereum ecosystem is still in 
its infancy and token models are still 
being researched and developed, we 
also plan to introduce the ability to 
propose new functionality to the Status 
community. Thus, SNT may be assigned 
a number of additional functions in the 
network beyond those defined in the 
scope above. Due to its complexity, 
future rights of the SNT are not 
guaranteed and remain a research 
topic.”21 
Tron “A total of 100 billion.”22 N/A “The 34.2518% TRX held by Tron Foundation, namely the 
34251807523.9 TRX had already being locked up until January 1st, 
2020. Tron Foundation TRX will not be withdrawn or traded.”23 
N/A 
  
                                                                 
18 The Status Network, Status (June 15, 2017), https://status.im/whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/HD28-8RE8]. 
19 Blockchain Paper, Status ICO Analysis, Medium (June 15, 2017), https://medium.com/@researchpaper/status-ico-analysis-7ca4c491295e [http://perma.cc/A98X-E5XP]. 
20 Status, supra note 18. 
21 Id. 
22 Tron, Tron Whitepaper 30 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
23 Tron Found., Announcement to Our Investors, Medium (Dec. 19, 2017), https://medium.com/@Tronfoundation/announcement-on-the-lock-of-trx-held-by-tron-foundation-e64bf861c7e0 [http://perma.cc/GX8Q-WCM8]. 
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TenX PAY token price24 1 PAY token equals 1/350 
ETH (1 ETH will buy 350 
PAY tokens) 
N/A “10% will be used by TenX to incentivise founders, employees and 
the development team. Each TenX founder and employee will 
receive part of their compensation package in PAY tokens, which will 
vest over 4 years.”25 
N/A 
Total Percentage of all 
PAY tokens for public, 
comprising (a) and (b) 
below 
80% 
(a) Percentage of all 
PAY tokens for TenX 
Initial Token Sale 
51% 
(b) Percentage of all 




Percentage of all PAY 
tokens for long-term 
alignment of interests 
20% 
Target Amount Sold 
(Fixed limit) 
200,000 ETH worth of PAY 
Tokens 
MobileGo “The token has a fixed supply of 100 million tokens, 
with the full supply created on both blockchains.”26 
“We will use a percentage of the profits 
from the Gamecredits mobile store to buy 
back and burn MobileGo tokens. Once the 
crowdsale is completed, a marketing fund 
will be created with a minimum of 50% of 
funds raised. The allocation of these 
resources and the profits that these 
resources generate will be audited and 
made available to MobileGo Token 
holders.”27 
N/A N/A 
                                                                 
24 TenX, Payment Platform Whitepaper 34 (2017), https://downloads.ctfassets.net/xecblntwky6m/5sWzq3FOoMiWuiQ0i8gKCG/84d359acabe7bb1ef3d1c1252c82828a/tenx_whitepaper_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ZYL-TT5F].  
25 Id. at 37. 
26 MobileGo, Whitepaper MobileGo Token, BRAVENEWCOIN, https://orig.bravenewcoin.com/assets/Whitepapers/MobileGo-Whitepaper.pdf?_ga=2.246319106.704478340.1548440339-1315354191.1548440339 [http://perma.cc/M6RB-CVXF] (last visited Jan. 25, 
2019). 





KyberNetwork “A maximum amount of 226,000,000 KyberNetwork 
Crystal tokens (KNC) will be minted.”28 
“Before operating, KyberNetwork reserves 
need to pre-purchase and store KNC 
tokens. In every trade, a small fraction 
(exact numbers are TBD) of the trade 
volume will be paid by the reserve to 
KyberNetwork platform in KNC. This small 
fee represents the reserve's payment in 
return for the right to be able to operate 
and earn profits from trading activities in 
KyberNetwork. The collected KNC tokens 
from the fees, after paying for the 
operation expenses and to the supporting 
partners, will be burned, i.e. taken out of 
circulation. The burning of tokens could 
potentially increase the appreciation of the 
remaining KNC tokens as the total supply 
in circulation reduces.”29 
“The tokens for founders and advisors (around 15% of the total 
tokens) will be fully vested in 2 years, with a one year lock-up 
period.”30 
N/A 
MCAP “There are a total of 100 million MCAP tokens.”31 N/A N/A N/A 
Loopring “Part of providing an open protocol is remaining 
blockchain agnostic. Hence, Loopring has launched 
an initial currency on Ethereum (LRC), but it also 
plans to launch Loopring NEO (LRN) and Loopring 
QTUM (LRQ). . . . The total supply of LRN will be 
139,507,605.45. This is exactly 1/10 of the total 
supply of LRC.”32 
N/A N/A N/A 
Enigma Catalyst “There will now be 150M total tokens in the 
supply.”33 
“The crowdsale will continue for 5 days. If 
we do not sell all 75M tokens in our 
crowdsale, the unsold tokens will be 
burned. We will also burn proportional 
tokens from the remaining supply. This 
ensures the crowd owns 50% of all created 
tokens.”34 
“The team’s ENG tokens vest over multiple years, with all of the team 
committed to holding their tokens through the first year.”35 
N/A 
                                                                 
28 Loi Luu, KyberNetwork’s Token Sale Terms Overview, KyberNetwork (Aug. 24, 2017), https://blog.kyber.network/kybernetworks-token-sale-terms-overview-de031ce9738e [http://perma.cc/R4CT-WFFK].  
29 Loi Luu & Yaron Velner, KyberNetwork Whitepaper, CryptoGround 16, https://www.cryptoground.com/storage/files/1527489066_KyberNetworkWhitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/MQM6-UZEF] (last updated Aug. 27, 2017).  
30 Luu, supra note 28.  
31 MCAP, MCAP Whitepaper, Crypto Rating, http://cryptorating.eu/whitepapers/MCAP/mcap-whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3HM-9P7F] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
32 Bennett Garner, Loopring NEO: All About the LRN Token & Airdrop, CoinCentral (May 2, 2018), https://coincentral.com/loopring-neo-lrn-airdrop/ [http://perma.cc/5NEC-HM89]. 
33 Enigma Project, Enigma’s Token Sale — Full Details, Enigma Blog (Sept. 5, 2017), https://blog.enigma.co/enigmas-token-sale-full-details-4d70c56510ba [http://perma.cc/GX6S-AYR4]. 
34 Id. 
35 Token Data, The MITation Game — Q&A with Enigma, Medium (Aug. 29, 2017), https://medium.com/blockchannel/the-mitation-game-q-a-with-enigma-bf2c0c85adc [http://perma.cc/TN76-3F77]. 
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ICON “ICX can be issued up to 20% of total volume 
annually with the consensus of ICON Republic, 
taking into consideration the ICX trading volume, 
DEX trading volume, freezing volume, and 
transaction fee. However, ICX is not directly issued 
but by providing nodes with the right to issuance. 
These rights are granted to the nodes on ICON 
Republic, and each node is entitled to receive ICX 
from the ICON Foundation by exercising its rights. 
Each Node may exercise its rights at any time and 
does not have to exercise immediately.”36 
N/A “Lock up period for team will be 2 years, with vesting 6 months for 4 




PeerBanks “Currently, the total number of IRA tokens are fixed 
to 1,000,000.”38 
N/A N/A N/A 
Electroneum “With Electroneum’s supply of 21 billion coins we’ve 
made it easier to mine whole coins and pay with 
whole coins.”39 
N/A “How many coins is allocated for the devs?  
- $2000 dollars worth of Electroneum, which is around 20 million 
coins.  
Can the devs dump them when the coin gets listed?  
- No. They cannot sell them within the first 12 months of the launch 
of the coin.”40 
N/A 
Aeternity “Aeternity conducted 2 rounds of public token sale. 
The Aeternity token is named AE. . . . The Aeternity 
team kept 17% of total supply (46,526,591 AE). This 
resulted in a total supply of 273,685,830.”41 
Aeternity has discussed “burning” its 
tokens on the Ethereum blockchain in the 
process of converting the tokens to 
currency on the Aeternity blockchain, 
which does not yet exist.42 
“Two years, but certain amount of the sums will become spendable in 
periods.”43 
N/A 
Monetha “The creation will be capped (‘Soft Cap’) upon 
receipt of ETH equivalent to EUR 7m (fixed on 
28000 ETH). This amount is subject to change before 
the Token Creation event. The Token Creation 
period will last 31 (thirty one) days, if Soft Cap is not 
reached sooner. If the Soft Cap is reached before the 
end of 31 (thirty one) days, additional contributions 
will be accepted for 120 hours in case some 
contributors missed the very short window for MTH 
creation.”44 
“Tokens that are not sold during the 
Crowdsale will be burned automatically by 
the smart contract.”45 
% of tokens generated to 
Monetha team 
15%. Automatically locked for 12 
months by smart contract. 
 
N/A 
% of tokens generated for 
loyalty program 
13%. Automatically locked for 12 
months by smart contract. 
% of tokens generated to 
bounty campaign, advisors, 
partners, ICO campaign costs 
12%
% of tokens generated for 
future company financing 
10%. Automatically locked for 12 
months by smart contract.46 
Basic Attention “Token Distribution N/A BAT Contract BAT Total Distribution N/A 
                                                                 
36 ICON Found., ICON Whitepaper 30 (2017), https://docs.icon.foundation/ICON-Whitepaper-EN-Draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/334K-FM98]. 
37 helloicon, ICON Technical Q&A Summary, r/hellocin, Reddit (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/helloicon/comments/70t56h/icon_technical_qa_summary/ [http://perma.cc/GXW4-F2K4]. 
38 Peerbanks, Peerbanks Whitepaper 7 (2017), https://peerbanks.org/doc/whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/YA5B-9L6N]. 
39 Electroneum, Electroneum Overview & Whitepaper 9 (2017), https://electroneum.com/overview-white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/9YFG-TJVJ]. 
40 Imikocha, Electroneum FAQ, Electroneum Talk (Sept. 16, 2017), http://electroneumtalk.proboards.com/thread/8/electroneum-faq [http://perma.cc/A7MX-MSVW].  
41 Edward Ward, Token Analysis: Aeternity (AE), Medium (May 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@Edward.Ward_53210/token-analysis-aeternity-ae-782a87a5aabe [http://perma.cc/DB4U-8Z7Q]. 
42 See Aetrnty, Comment in Burning Token, r/Aeternity, Reddit (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.reddit.com/r/Aeternity/comments/6za07b/burning_token/ [https://perma.cc/483H-EQV3]. 
43 vdramaliev, Comment in How Long Is the Founders/Team Coins Locked? 12 Months?, r/Aeternity, Reddit (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/Aeternity/comments/632f8l/how_long_is_the_foundersteam_coins_locked_12/ [http://perma.cc/Y45K-H5CC]. 
44 Monetha, White Paper 35–36 (2017), https://ico.monetha.io/Monetha_WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HUA-ZYHY]. 
45 Id. at 35. 





Token • Brave: 13.3% of max; 200 million BAT.  
• User growth pool: 300 million BAT.  
• Token available to public at launch: 1 billion 





Stox “In order to finance Stox’s road map, Stox will 
conduct a token sale of an initial supply of STX 
tokens. 
STX will be sold at a constant price (in ETH) and the 
initial supply will depend on amount of STX sold. As 
of the conclusion of the sale, the distributed STX will 
constitute the entirety of the available liquid supply. 
A portion of the supply would be preallocated to 
invest.com as the founding member of the ecosystem, 
in a long term vesting schedule. Major portion of the 
allocation to Stox Ltd. will be used for bringing 
further strategic partners to the Stox platform.”49 
N/A % of Total 
Supply  
Beneficiary Special terms N/A 
50% Token sale participants Coins cannot be 
transferred until end 
of token sale period 
12.5% invest.com Ltd. Uniform 12-month 
vesting schedule 
10% Stox team Uniform 24-month 
vesting schedule 
27.5% Stox Ltd. Will be used to bring 
strategic partners to 
the Stox ecosystem, 
and as operational 
reserve50 
Civic “[The] Company will create 1 billion Tokens . . . .”51 N/A “33% (or 330 million) [of the created Tokens] will be allocated to 
the Company (the “Company Inventory”), for its use as follows: 
(i) One third of the Company Inventory will remain in a locked state 
for 1 year from the Crowdsale End Date; another third of the 
Company Inventory will remain in a locked state for 2 years from the 
Crowdsale End Date; and the remaining third of the Company 
Inventory will remain in a locked state for 3 years from the Crowdsale 
End Date.  
(ii) Once unlocked, Company reserves the right to use the Company 
Inventory for any purposes at its sole discretion.  
(iii) In no event will the Company sell any Tokens from the 
Company Inventory before the date that is one year after the 
Crowdsale End Date.  
(iv) In no event will any Tokens from the Company Inventory be sold 
by the Company at any point for a Price Per Token of less than USD 
$0.10.”52 
N/A 
                                                                 
47 Stox Platform for Prediction Markets, Stox 43, https://resources.stox.com/stox-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2Q3-RKGY] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
48 FAQ, Basic Attention Token, https://basicattentiontoken.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/6RJE-PAQE ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
49 Stox, Stox Platform for Prediction Markets 43, https://resources.stox.com/stox-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2Q3-RKGY] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
50 Id. 
51 Civic Techs., Inc., Crowdsale Terms 12 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
52 Id. 
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Request Network “The Request Network token launch ended 
successfully with 100% of the tokens distributed. We 
are glad to have received positive feedbacks [sic] 
from the community and that the event happened in 
a smooth way. 
The fundraising was capped at 100,000 ETH for 
500,000,000 REQ and we limited the number of 
approved registrants at 14,895.”53 
“This layer is chargeable, in that each 
extension will take a fee that will be 
partially burned and partially transferred 
to the extension developers, with the 
extensions accrued on the same invoice. 
Costs decrease over time to remain 
competitive and discourage alternative 
systems. The costs of these extensions [are] 
estimated to be between 0.1% and 0.5% 
initially, though as the system grows, the 
costs will be reduced. More than 5,000 
billion dollars in payments are made each 
day, and in the end it will be enough to 
finance the network by less than 0.1%.”54 
N/A N/A 
Grid+  “A fixed number of GRID tokens (300,000,000) will 
be minted before the upcoming token sale—this will 
be the only time GRID are created.”55 
“Each GRID token will be a credit on the 
Grid+ platform, redeemable by customers 
of the Grid+ platform for the right to 
purchase 500 kWh of electricity at the 
wholesale price available to Grid+ in the 
relevant jurisdiction at the time such 
electricity is received by the redeeming 
customer. At the time of redemption, 
GRID tokens will be assigned a timestamp 
by the redemption contract and taken out 
of supply forever via a mechanism modeled 
after EIP 661.”56 
“20% (60,000,000) will be held by the founders of Grid+; of these, 
25% will remain time-locked for each of 6, 12, and 18 months, with 
the final 25% also being unlocked after 18 months. Another 20% 
(60,000,000) will be held by external owners of Grid+; these will be 
time-locked on the same schedule and in the same percentages as 
the founders’ tokens.”57 
N/A 
ChainLink “The total supply of the token is 1,000,000,000, and 
each token is divisible up to 18 decimal places.”58 
“To prevent accidental burns, the token 
does not allow transfers to the contract 
itself and to 0x0.”59 
N/A N/A 
Polybius “The total supply is not locked, as we will need to be 
able to add tokens before the end of sale and revoke 
the unsold amount. . . . At the end of the crowdsale all 
sold tokens are considered to be 93% of the total 
supply. The remaining 7% are then distributed 
among founders and bounties receivers according to 
the information above.”60 
“There will be 20, 000, 000 Tokens 
generated for the purpose of the 
Crowdfunding. Unreleased Tokens will be 
destroyed after the Crowdfunding.”61 
N/A “Polybius can propose modifications by 
deploying an entirely new secondary 
smart contract and linking it to the 
primary smart contract via the 
commitUpgrade function.  The primary 
smart contract does not allow the owner 
to make modifications directly—the 
owner must first propose the upgrade, 
which only takes effect after three days 
unless the user opts out.”62 
                                                                 
53 Laura Girod, Request Network Token Launch — Statistics, Request Network (Oct. 17, 2017), https://blog.request.network/request-network-token-sale-statistics-db65476ae8ca [https://perma.cc/Q7HQ-9AHP]. 
54 Request Network, The Future of Commerce: A Decentralized Network for Payment Requests 8 (2018), https://request.network/assets/pdf/request_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JN6-FRK5]. 
55 Welcome to the Future of Energy, Grid+ at 40, https://gridplus.io/assets/Gridwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL23-D6SX] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 LINK Token Contracts, GitHub, https://github.com/SmartContractKit/LinkToken [https://perma.cc/TF2N-DQDK] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
59 Id. 
60 Polybius Prospectus, Polybius 3, 5, https://polybius.io/media/prospectus.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGH9-XREW] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
61 Polybius Crowdfunding Terms & Conditions, Polybius, https://polybius.io/media/terms_and_conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7XZ-Y5HM] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 





Unikoin Gold “Company will create a total of 1,000,000,000 
UnikoinGold by the time of the Delivery Date . . . . 
No additional UnikoinGold will be created.”63 
N/A N/A N/A 
DomRaider “The Trading Operation foresees the creation and 
distribution of 1 billion DomRaider Tokens (DRT) . . 
. .”64 
N/A “Sold tokens may be used and transferred from the time they are 
assigned. 20% of tokens distributed free of charge to stakeholders 
that have contributed to the operation’s success will be immediately 
useable and transferable. The remaining 80% will be released 
gradually at 10% of the total each month from the date the first 
tokens are issued. In this way, every holder of tokens obtained 
through this category will have received full free usage and 
transferability of these tokens 8 months following their issue. The 
tokens held in reserve by DomRaider will be locked at a level of 90% 





“All available BMC will be issued during the 
Distribution period. This will be a one-time operation 
and no additional issuance is available for BMC 
tokens. The total number of BMC to be issued will be 
calculated at the end of the Distribution Period 
according to the formula: amount of BMC sold 
during the Distribution multiplied by 2.”66 
“50% of the proceeds are distributed 
among the fund’s token holders via a buy-
back process. In this way, distribution of 
income provides liquidity of the fund’s 
tokens. Bought-out tokens are burned so 
that income will continue to increase for 
the remaining fund tokens.”67 
“30% of the BMCs will be allocated to the Company reserve and 
locked for a minimum of 36 months. This reserve is a source of the 
Company’s income after the Distribution Period and can be 
allocated only partially and only among direct contributors and the 
core team if necessary, and not earlier than 36 months. This reserve 
is a necessary foundation for sustainable future development of the 
Blackmoon Crypto Platform. 
20% of the BMCs will be allocated to the founding Blackmoon 
Crypto team and advisors, locked in a smart contract with a 24-month 
vesting period, and six-month cliff. These BMCs won’t be 
immediately tradable and will secure the core team members by 
ensuring their motivation after the Distribution Period. Some BMCs 
from this pool (but not more than 5% of all BMCs) will be allocated 
to non-operational advisors and will be locked with a six-month cliff 
without vesting.  
Up to 3% will go to subcontractors and bounty campaign members 
without vesting.”68 
N/A 
Bankera  “[T]he total HARDCAP for pre-ICO and ICO is 
10,000,000,000 BNK (2,500,000,000 + 7,500,000,000) 
worth 177M EUR (25M EUR + 152M EUR) and at 
least 750M EUR for the SCO.”69 
N/A “The 25% of tokens will be attributed to the team as a motivation as 
well as for bounty program for outsiders. The team part of tokens will 
be allocated over time.”70 
N/A 
                                                                 
63 Terms of Token Sale, Unikrn 13, https://static.unikrn.com/42/unikrn_bm/doc/terms_of-token_sale.pdf [https://perma.cc/G75U-SDH4] (last updated Sept. 22, 2017). 
64 Domraider, ICO: Whitepaper 47 (2017), https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/domraider/domraider/DomRaider+ICO+Whitepaper+EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSA6-EZMK]. 
65 Id. 




69 Bankera, Bankera Whitepaper, Icorating 19, https://icorating.com/upload/whitepaper/YLuetfjRzqDjwWwCnfi8BN3IcZ3l2ytV6AtTBz1M.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6AK-H8JS] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
70 Id. 
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Agrello “With a total of 150 million DLT token (and no plan 
to create new), Agrello’s team has decided to 
distribute 90 million DLT via its ICO which will take 
place on July 10th, 2017 till August 9th, 2017 (token 
distribution date as well), with a minimum 
investment goal of 4,000 BTC.”71 
N/A “The token sale funds are held in thousands of cold stored addresses. 
This is a way that the sale was conducted and anyone associated with 
the sale would know this. Agrello is a private company and we plan 
on having open dialogue with our supporters and we have been very 
appropriately been using funds. There are not 1 or a few addresses 
that show the funds collected. No one on the team, any contractors, 
advisors, or partners have received DLT. All parties have vesting 
periods for their tokens.”72 
N/A 
Storj “At present, the total supply of Pre-existing Tokens is 
500 million, 51,173,144 of which are [sic] Pre-existing 
Tokens in circulation (‘Circulating Pre-existing 
Tokens’). As of April 1, 2017, Storj U.S. held 
448,967,875 Pre-existing Tokens (‘Storj U.S. Pre-
existing Tokens’).”73 
“4. Tokens to Be Sold
The Company anticipates selling 
approximately 75 million Tokens during 
the Sale Period. The Tokens to be sold 
during the Sale Period will be from a pool 
of Company-owned Tokens transferred 
from the Company Custodial Wallet to the 
Smart Contract System. All Tokens will be 
of equal value and functionality. During 
the Sale Period, Company will burn at least 
one Token in the Company Custodial 
Wallet for each Token it sells. 
5. Tokens Retained by Company 
. . . Although it has no plans to do so at this 
time, the Company reserves the right to 
burn Retained Tokens at any point during 
or after the Sale Period.”74 
“Tokens not sold or burned during the Sale Period will be retained 
by the Company (the “Retained Tokens”). At least 80% of Retained 
Tokens retained will be placed into time-locked smart contracts and 
remain in a locked state for at least six (6) months. Although it has 
no plans to do so at this time, the Company reserves the right to 
burn Retained Tokens at any point during or after the Sale Period. 
Over time, the Company currently anticipates using the Retained 
Tokens to compensate employees (including salaries and non-salary 
compensation), to fund future development of Storj and the 
Network, provide grants to (or purchase equity stakes in) third-
parties working on projects in the Storj ecosystem, donate Tokens to 
non-profit entities, and support general development of the Storj 
ecosystem. These anticipated purposes are listed for illustration only, 
and Company reserves the right to use Reserved Tokens for these 
purposes (or others) at its sole discretion.”75 
N/A 
  
                                                                 
71 MCAP Labs, Agrello ICO Evaluation, Medium (Aug. 2, 2017), https://medium.com/mcap-labs/agrello-ico-evaluation-ccae2f4b1281 [https://perma.cc/5CRU-GT6B]. 
72 Agrello, Alex Left Agrello Team, r/Agrello, Reddit (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/Agrello/comments/72qv3o/alex_left_agrello_team/dnl6se7/ [https://perma.cc/GYG3-F6Y6]. 
73 Storj Labs (BVI) Ltd., Terms of Token Sale 11 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 



















Lock Time N/A 
Eidoo 47 0 47 20M EDO  
2 years  
15M EDO for 1 
year  
6M EDO  
6 month*  
6M EDO 
3 month* 
Founders 13 3 10 10M EDO for 2 
years** 
Advisors 3 3 0
Early 
Investors 









Monaco “Monaco Card aims to accept up to 150,000ETH 
from our initial token partners and create 
approximately 17.6m MCO for sale in exchange for 
the ETH committed. 
The MCO smart contract will stop accepting 
commitments at 888,888ETH hard cap. The Token 
Sale will last for 30 days. If soft-cap is reached, the 
event will be extended for 7 days and then closed. If 
hard-cap is reached, the event will close 
automatically.” 79 
“We are setting aside 30% of all MCO created as 
Reserve Tokens. 
These MCO will not be issued or sold during the 
initial sale and are locked in a smart contract.”80 
“At any time, a holder of MCO can 
‘Redeem and Burn’ the MCO for their pro-
rata share of each token held by the MCO 
Asset Contract. The holder will irrevocably 
destroy the MCO, and in exchange, the 
MCO Asset Contract will transfer the 
underlying tokens to the holder. 
MCO token will have a market value at or 
above the assets contained in the MCO 
Asset Contract. If the value goes below, 
market participants will be incentivized to 
purchase MCO and burn it; this will then 
push the value of MCO back up.”81 
• “25% of MCO created during the creation event will be 
allocated to Monaco Card founders, locked in a smart contract 
for 3 months 
• 10% of MCO created during the creation event will be allocated 
to the Company and utilized as a future employee token pool, to 
strengthen our ability to attract & retail top talent; these tokens 
will be locked in a smart contract for 12 months 
• 5% of MCO created during the creation event will be created for 
and granted to advisors; these tokens will be locked in a smart 
contract for 3 months.”82 
N/A 
                                                                 
76 Eidoo, Ethereum Funding Informative Prospect 13 (2017), https://eidoo.io/docs/EIDOO_Ethereum_Funding_Informative_Prospect_v_1_0_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPP7-EXXA]. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. One asterisk indicates that “[t]hese tokens will be subjected to Airdrop.” Id. Two asterisks indicates that “[t]hese tokens will be locked after the token sale.” Id. 
79 Monaco, Monaco Whitepaper, White Paper Database 8, https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Monaco-MCO-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXS9-5GQY] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
80 Id. at 11. 
81 Id. at 6. 
82 Id. at 29. 
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Power Ledger “1,000,000,000 POWR tokens have been created and 
the total amount of tokens will be allocated as follows:
• 600,000,000 tokens distributed to rapidly develop 
the Ecosystem (i.e Distribution Pool’s allocation 
of 350,000,000 to the Token Sale, 248,500,000 
used by the Power Ledger Growth Pool, and 
1,500,000 towards the Bounty Campaign); 
• 250,000,000 tokens will be reserved for future 
use if needed (Power Ledger Escrow); and 
• 150,000,000 tokens allocated under escrow to 
Developers and Founders.”83 
“Q: Are there any plans to burn the 
remaining tokens held by PL if they are not 
needed for future funding? 
A: We will need them if we grow to the size 
aimed for that was the logic in 1 b 
selection. But like the thinking[!]”84 
“The POWR tokens which are gifted to or discounted to Application 
Hosts, from the Growth Pool, will be held in escrow for a minimum 
period of 1–3 years after they are distributed to ensure that they are 
used on the Platform . . . . 
A further 250,000,000 tokens will be retained for any future funding 
needs of Power Ledger and the Platform, including development or 
on-boarding future Participants if required. Due to the dependency 
on the outcome of the Token Sale, this allocation will be held in the 
Power Ledger Escrow. The escrow period will be 2 years. The escrow 
period in respect of these tokens will commence at the date of 
distribution . . . . 
The Developer's and Founder's tokens will be distributed to Power 
Ledger’s directors, employees and contractors engaged in the 
building of the Platform. All of the Developer's and Founder’s tokens 
will be subject to escrow for a period of between six and 18 months, 
with their release linked to performance variables. The escrow period 
in respect of these tokens will commence at the completion of the 
Token Sale.”85 
N/A 
Everex “Total EVX Tokens supply: approx. 25,000,000*
Tokens offered for a public sale: 17,500,000 
*final number of tokens is defined after the end of 
the token sale based on amounts contributed. 
No tokens are pre-issued before the crowdsale 
event.”86 
“If less than 70,000 ETH in proceeds has 
been received by the termination of the 
Sale Period (the ‘Minimum Threshold’), 
the unsold balance of Tokens that is 
authorized but unissued to purchasers will 
be retained in Company inventory to be 
utilized by Company as part of its incentive 
Development Fund to be distributed in 
accordance with the decision of the board 
on a quarterly basis as elsewhere set forth 
herein.”87 
EVX Vesting Schedule88 N/A 
Team holdings: 15%
-not vested 5%
-vested in 6 month 5%
-vested in 12 month 5%
Advisors and partners: 4% not vested
EVX Development fund 4% vested in 12 month
  
                                                                 
83 Power Ledger, Token Generation Paper, Hubspot 2,  https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4519667/Documents%20/Power%20Ledger%20Token%20Paper%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW32-LPW4] [hereinafter Power Ledger Token Generation] (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
84 Power Ledger, Power Ledger Founders AMA Transcript, Medium (Nov. 14, 2017), https://medium.com/power-ledger/power-ledger-founders-ama-transcript-9b147521de4d [https://perma.cc/F8N7-THFZ]. 
85 Power Ledger Token Generation, supra note 83, at 3–4. 
86 Everex One, Pte, Ltd., Token Sale Event: Terms and Conditions 2 (2017), https://azdoc.pl/evx-token-sale-event-terms-and-conditions.html  (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
87 Everex, Everex Terms and Policies 27 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 





Decentraland “Increasing Sale: MANA tokens will sell at a price that 
goes from $24 USD per LAND equivalent to $40 
USD. A hard cap is set at $25 million USD. The 
distribution of additional tokens is fixed. . . . 
Inflation rate: Included is an 8 percent increase of 
the token supply for the first year, and a lower rate in 
subsequent years. This is implemented through a 
Continuous Token Model. This structure will allow 
Decentraland to regularly expand while 
accommodating new users.”89 
“Decentraland will use an Ethereum smart 
contract to maintain a ledger of ownership 
for land parcels in the virtual world. We 
call these non-fungible digital assets LAND 
. . . . 
LAND is bought by burning MANA, a 
fungible ERC20 token of fixed supply. This 
token serves as a proxy for the cost of 
claiming a new parcel. The LAND contract 
uses a burn function to destroy MANA and 
create a new entry in the LAND registry. 
New parcels need to be adjacent to a non-
empty parcel.”90 
“20 percent will go to the development team, early contributors and 
advisors, and the remaining 20 percent will be held by Decentraland. 
Project Leads will have three-year vesting.”91 
N/A 
FunFair “The Phase 1 creation crediting period will end no 
later than July 7, 2017 at 14:00 UTC. If 500 million 
(500,000,000) FUN have been created at any time 
before Jul[y] 7, 2017 14:00 UTC, token creation will 
continue for 4 additional hours at that time. After 4 
hours or 1 billion FUN are issued, the crediting 
period will cease, the receiving contract will be 
marked “finished” and it will reject ether from that 
time on by calling throw. 
As soon as Phase 1 closes, additional tokens will be 
created in an amount equal to three times the 
amount sold during the Phase 1 creation crediting 
period and held in trust until the Phase 2 token 
issuance event. 
At some point following the Phase 1 close, the Phase 
2 token issuance event will begin. In Phase 2, all 
tokens held in trust will be offered in a Dutch 
auction. Whatever tokens remain unsold in this event 
will be distributed pro rata to holders of tokens sold 
in Phase 1 issuance.”92 
“The Token Contract implements the 
ERC20 standard with a few additional 
features. The contract is split into three 
separate parts: . . . 
• A ‘Ledger’ contract referred to by the 
‘Controller’—this contract holds all 
balances and manages all minting and 
burning and will not change except in 
extreme circumstances.”93 
“Founder Stake: FunFair developers, founders and angel investors 
will receive 37.5% of total tokens, released slowly over an 18-month 
period. 
Advisor Stake: FunFair advisors will receive 2.5% of total tokens, 
released immediately.”94 
“The Token Contract implements the 
ERC20 standard with a few additional 
features. 
The contract is split into three separate 
parts: 
• A ‘Front End’ contract—this is the 
permanent address of the token. 
• A ‘Controller’ contract referred to 
by the Front End—this encapsulates 
the logic used to implement FUN 
token mechanics and may be 
upgraded in the future.” 95 
Bitclave “General Terms 
• Consumer Activity Token (CAT) 
• 2 billion total token supply 
550,842,000 tokens distributed in token sale or 
25,547,000 USD hard cap.”96 
“Due to the recent increase in crypto to 
USD rate, we might reach our USD cap 
before reaching the tokens cap. In this 
case, the unsold tokens will be burned.”97 
“Team has vesting for 2 years. They cannot sell the tokens.”98 N/A 
                                                                 
89 Ari Meilich, The Decentraland Token Sale Terms, Decentraland (July 3, 2017), https://blog.decentraland.org/the-decentraland-token-sale-terms-81861704c086 [https://perma.cc/9JLH-EWG6]. 
90 Decentraland White Paper, Decentraland 9, https://decentraland.org/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CGJ-CQJZ] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
91 Meilich, supra note 89. 
92 FunFair Technologies Token Creation Event Terms & Conditions, Funfair Techs. 2 (June 22, 2017), https://funfair.io/wp-content/uploads/FUN-Token-Creation-Event-Terms-V0.2.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM8J-FGDQ]. 
93 Funfair, Disruptive Online Gaming on the Blockchain That’s Fun, Fast and Fair 18 (2017), https://funfair.io/wp-content/uploads/FunFair-Commercial-White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/C2J6-9LY3]. 
94 Id. at 13. 
95 Id. at 18. 
96 BitClave, [Draft] BitClave Token Sale Terms, Medium (Nov. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/bitclave/draft-bitclave-token-sale-terms-27cd2f9a6be2 [http://perma.cc/2AE3-RLP5]. 
97 BitClave, BitClave Token Sale Terms, Medium (Nov. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/bitclave/bitclave-token-sale-terms-f8413bf59d67 [http://perma.cc/3MDB-QDAM]. 
98 Tyska, Re: [ANN] [ICO] Bitclave - Decentralized Search ★ September, 15 ICO ★, Bitcoin Forum (Sept. 1, 2017), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2005370.msg21405447#msg21405447 [https://perma.cc/G9WV-2KHK]. 
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Tierion “Tierion is creating a total supply of 1 billion 
(1,000,000,000) TNT tokens, of which: 35% will be 
available for purchase as described above, 29% will 
remain in the Company’s inventory under a lock up, 
35% will be allocated to incentivize the Tierion 
ecosystem, and 1% will be used to cover token sale 
costs.”99 
N/A “Will there be a lock-up on tokens retained by Tierion?
Yes, these tokens will be locked up for six months. After the initial 
lockup, they will be distributed 10% per quarter for ten consecutive 
quarters.”100 
N/A 
OmiseGo “During the crowdsale period (‘OMG token creation 
period’), up to a total of USD $25 million (Maximal 
Launch Quantity) equivalent of OMG are to be 
created by the smart contract, all equal value and 
functionality, but divided by the smart contract into 
different pools, for both public and private 
distribution: 
Public 
(i) Sale [65.1% of OMG issued] 
The bulk of the OMG will be released in a sale, where 
they will be sold in exchange for up to a maximum of 
USD $25 million equivalent.”101 
“The token itself acts as a bond for its 
activity on this blockchain, improper 
activity results in the token/bond being 
burned on the OMG chain. By creating a 
custom chain with deep enforcement, we 
are able to construct a system where 
consensus rules optimize for high-
performant activity.”102 
“(iii) OmiseGO reserve [20% of OMG issued]
Directly released by the smart contract to OmiseGO for future costs 
and uses including use for network validation as part of the 
development and execution of the project. These OMG are locked 
through a smart contract function and may not be transacted by 
OmiseGO for a period of 1 year, starting at the end of the creation 
period. 
(iv) Team [9.9% of OMG issued] 
Reserved for team members and key contributors who worked to 
develop the ideas, supporting structures, and actual implementations 
of the OmiseGO Project. These OMG are locked for 1 year.”103 
“OMG will be a standard Ethereum 
ERC20 token, until the OmiseGO chain 
(‘OMGchain’) is launche[d]. When 
OMGchain is launched, ERC20-OMG is 
used as a Proof-of-Stake token on this 
network. This is achieved by allocating 
control of one’s the ERC20 to an ETH 
contract reflecting the OMG chain. 
Further improvements are possible from 
reallocation of ERC20 tokens and may 
be taken if it proves to be a better 
design, but the current approach is to 
have the ERC20 token locked into 
activity on a contract on the ETH chain. 
It is the responsibility of the community 
to elect to allocate the ERC20 token 
towards the OMG chain, as the 
community has control over the 
network.”104 
                                                                 
99 Tierion Token Sale - Frequently Asked Questions, Tierion, https://tokensale.tierion.com/faq.html [http://perma.cc/AJ85-VDZR] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
100 Id.  
101 OmiseGo, OmiseGo Crowdfunding Whitepaper 21 (2017), https://cdn.omise.co/omg/crowdsaledoc.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QJB-2NAL]. 
102 Joseph Poon & OmiseGo Team, Decentralized Exchange and Payments Platform 5 (2017), https://cdn.omise.co/omg/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T4P-EGN8]. 
103 OmiseGo, supra note 101, at 21–22. 





Aragon “70/15/15 distribution: 70% will go to purchasers, 
15% to the Foundation, and 15% to the founders and 
early contributors who have worked on the 
project. . . . 
We want our token sale to last so we can onboard to 
our community as much people as we can. So 
uncapped was the obvious choice. 
But since we don’t want another The DAO scenario 
to happen, a security cap is a must. 
So we will place a hidden cap. The cap will be 
cryptographically sealed, and revealed after the sale. 
If it’s reached, we will issue an emergency stop that 
will stop the acceptance of new purchases. 
Since we take security seriously, we will also set a 
hardcoded cap into the sale contract, just in case.”105 
“ANT will continue to be minted by the network 
following the initial sale and network deployment. 
Minting new tokens will have a cost, and a percentage 
of the fees (decided by governance) paid by 
organizations to join the network will fund the 
minting of new tokens. This creates an incentive for 
Aragon organizations to pay fees, as organizations 
that contribute more will receive more ANT. . . . 
The cost to mint new tokens will be determined by 
ANT token holders. This will likely be a contentious 
decision, and one where the basic economic 
principles of supply and demand need to be 
considered. For example, consider the scenario 
where the cost of minting tokens is too low. More and 
more tokens will be added to the supply, until supply 
greatly outweighs demand. This is a recipe for 
inflation and the value of individual ANT tokens will 
fall. Ultimately, we believe that token holders will 
eventually decide on a healthy equilibrium for 
inflation. By weighing the opinion of every 
stakeholder, the market will accurately reflect the 
optimal minting cost.”106 
N/A “70/15/15 distribution: 70% will go to purchasers, 15% to the 
Foundation, and 15% to the founders and early contributors who 
have worked on the project. The founder and early contributors will 
all have vesting.”107 
“The Aragon Network Token (ANT) will 
initially begin as an upgradable token, 
but will evolve to serve as the 
governance token for the Aragon 
Network when deployed. . . . In terms of 
architecture, the Aragon Token has a 
controller which can manage its critical 
functionality (for example, minting new 
tokens). During the sale period, the 
smart contract running the sale serves as 
the token controller. 
Once the sale is complete, a placeholder 
contract will take over as controller 
(does not perform any critical 
functions). The placeholder controller 
will transfer controller power to the full 
Aragon Network after deployment. The 
Aragon developers core group will 
deploy the Aragon Network’s code when 
appropriate and the token will serve as a 
governance mechanism.”108 
0x “Company will create 1,000,000,000 ZRX shortly 
before the Token Sale. No additional ZRX will be 
created.”109 
“In the event that not all Sale ZRX have 
been sold by the Token Sale End Date, the 
remaining ZRX will be transferred to 
Company.”110 
“120,250,000 ZRX will be allocated to Company’s founding team 
(with a 4 year vesting schedule and one year cliff) as compensation 
for their efforts on the 0x Protocol.”111 
N/A 
                                                                 
105 Luis Cuende, Aragon Network Token Sale Terms, Aragon Project Blog (Apr. 21, 2017), https://blog.aragon.one/aragon-network-token-sale-terms-8998f63a3429 [https://perma.cc/EDB4-84EJ] [hereinafter Cuende, Sale Terms]. 
106 Luis Cuende & Jorge Izquierdo, Aragon Network: A Decentralized Infrastructure for Value Exchange, ChainWhy (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.chainwhy.com/upload/default/20180705/49f3850f2702ec6be0f57780b22feab2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA58-F3YY] 
107 Cuende, Sales Terms, supra note 105.  
108 Luis Cuende, Introducing the Aragon Community Multisig, Aragon Project Blog (May 15, 2017), https://blog.aragon.one/introducing-the-aragon-community-multisig-348a69d16374 [https://perma.cc/GP52-4YAN]. 
109 ZeroEx Int’l, ZeroEx Terms of Token Sale 14 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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Enjin “Only one billion ENJ tokens will ever be created.”112 N/A “Enjin Coin Platform tokens that are owned by the Company will not 
be sold for less than the public crowdsale price. 
Enjin Coin Platform and Company Staff Tokens will be locked for 6 
months after the end of the Token Sale. Advisor tokens will be 
locked for 2 months after the end of the Token Sale.”113 
 
“Team tokens are locked for the first 6 months, and will be vested 
over a period of 24 months total. Team members will be transferred 
25% of their tokens after 6 months, and then 12.5% every 3 months 
afterward. The team list may be updated during the 24 month vesting 
period. 
Advisor tokens are locked for 2 months and distributed fully.”114 
N/A 
BlockV “The total number of tokens released during both 
the main sale and pre-sale events will add up to 35% 
of the total supply of V. 
During the main sale event, 1 billion V will be 
released for sale to the public. The sale will continue 
for 5 days, with a hard cap of $20 million. The final 
price per token will depend on the total sum raised in 
the main sale, with a maximum price of $0.02 per 
token.”115 
N/A “15% of the tokens will be locked up long term. To ensure long-term 
success of our project, this portion of the tokens will be locked up for 
6 years with some vesting starting at year 3. We have absolute 
confidence in our project and are fully dedicated to the spread 
vAtoms throughout the world and having this reserve will be the best 
way to add further fuel to this vision in the future. 
25% of the tokens will be reserved for incentives to promote the use 
of BLOCKv and vAtoms. These tokens will be used to reward 
developers for devising innovative uses for vAtoms, and to reward 
vAtom end-users for performing specific actions. The diving goal is to 
proliferate the use of vAtoms all over the world and across many 
industries. These tokens will be locked up for 2 years, with 1/5th 
being available after the token sale and 1/5th being unlocked every 6 
months thereafter to ensure regular and timely incentives. 
25% of the tokens will be held by the company with a portion going 
to the development team, early contributors and advisors over time. 
We believe that rewarding our supporters appropriately will 
ultimately contribute to our project’s success in the long-term. These 
tokens will be locked up for 2 years, with 1/5th being available after 
the token sale and 1/5th being unlocked to the company every 6 
months thereafter.”116 
N/A 
                                                                 
112 Enjin Pte. Ltd., Enjin Crowdsale Terms and Conditions, Enjin Coin 13 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://enjincoin.io/enjincoin_crowdsale_terms.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NYA-JNLG]. 
113 Id.  
114 Enjin Pte. Ltd., Enjin Coin White Paper 30 (2017), https://enjincoin.io/enjincoin_whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/WG69-2U6K]. 
115 Reeve Collins, Lukas Fluri & Gunther Thiel, BLOCKv: Smart Virtual Goods on the Blockchain, White Paper Database 23,  https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BLOCKv-VEE-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNN3-7GYC] (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2019). 





FinShi Capital “The amount of issued tokens will depend on the 
sum raised in dollars according to the rate 1 USD = 1 
token. 
Minimum capital – $30,000,000. Minimum sum of the 
issued tokens = 30,000,000. 
Maximum Capital – $50,000,000. Maximum sum of 
the issued tokens = 50,000,000.”117 
“FinShi Capital takes on the obligation of 
buying back the tokens through the fund’s 
profits, thus implementing dividend policy. 
Once the fund announces an exit from a 
portfolio company, there will be created a 
queue of investors who applied for selling 
their tokens back to the fund. The amount 
of tokens for buy-back will be announced 
together with the exit date. . . . 
The fund will buy out the tokens within 
one month after the exit from a startup. 
After that the tokens will be destroyed.”118 
N/A N/A 
UTRUST Token Pool Supply 500,000,000 (five 
hundred million)119 
“Each time a buyer pays with any 
cryptocurrency via the UTRUST payment 
platform a percentage of the transactional 
fee will be used to buyback UTK and to 
remove them from the market. The 
removed tokens will be burned. This will 
reduce the amount of UTK supply further 
driving demand, the adoption of the 
platform and the value for contributors. 
The amount of UTK was projected to be 
reduced from the initial 1 billion to a 
minimum cap of 100 million, at a rate no 
faster than 50 million a year.”120 
“50M
UTRUST 
Diluted 2% per year during the next 5 years 
100M  
PRE-SALE 
Private Investors (1 year vesting)”121 
“At the beginning the tokens will not 
have any features. The use as a means of 
payment will only be possible after the 
regulatory status of the UTRUST 
platform has been clarified with 
FINMA.”122 
Target Coin “TGTCoin plans to issue 2 Bn coins. 1.34 Bn coins 
are available to the public and 260 Mn coins are held 
by the management team and 400 Mn coins are held 
by the pre-ICO investors.”123 
N/A N/A N/A 
ATB Coin “As a POS cryptocurrency, ATB Coin will start with an 
open ICO. During the ICO anyone will be able to 
purchase ATB Coin tokens and also can receive a 
certain number of ATB Coins as a bonus. The total 
number of coins that are offered to the public during 
the ICO equals a number of coins in the genesis 
block, which is 50,000,000 ATB.”124 
N/A N/A N/A 
                                                                 
117 FinShi Capital Crowdsale Whitepaper, FinShi Capital 18, http://finshi.capital/whitepaper_finshi_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MCN-74SJ] (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). 
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120 Id. at 18. 
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Giga Watt “If a cap of 30,000,000 WTT tokens sold is reached 
before the scheduled end of the Token Launch, 
Cryptonomos at its own discretion may issue WTT 
tokens ahead of the specified date to provide access 
to the facilities built by that time.”125 
N/A “WTT tokens retained for distribution to the team will be distributed 
only when no proceeds from over-subscribed tokens remain in 
escrow awaiting the completion of additional processing center 
capacity construction. WTT tokens retained for distribution to 
partners and advisors will be distributed on a case by case basis.”126 
“4.1 Replacement. The contract owner 
can relinquish the ownership in favor of 
any other Ethereum user or contract.  
4.2 Blockade. The contract owner can 
stop or resume token transfers between 
token holders at any time. . . . 
5.2 Limits. Maximum allowed tokens in 
circulation and may be set and are 
limited to.”127 
 
                                                                 
125 Giga Watt, Giga Watt Token Launch White Paper 16 (2017), https://wtt.cryptonomos.com/white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/77PZ-BP9X]. 
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